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OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE STRATEGY IN NATO

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OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE STRATEGY IN NATO

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1982

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building; Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs) presiding.

Chairman Zablocki. The subcommittees will please come to order.

The purpose of these hearings is to determine what progress has been made over the past year in formulating and carrying out a nuclear arms control policy that enhances U.S. and Western security interests.

In pursuit of that objective, the administration has proposed an unprecedented multibillion dollar increase in defense spending totaling nearly one-quarter of a trillion dollars in fiscal year 1983 alone. In this time of fiscal austerity and projected deficits of $100 billion, approximately, the magnitude of such defense spending underscores the contribution which negotiated arms reduction can make toward the restoration of our country's economic well-being.

In the eyes of many leaders among our NATO allies the administration's emphasis on strategic force buildup alone, independent of arms control negotiations, does not strengthen world stability but only constitutes another step in a continuing arms race with the Soviet Union, an arms race that imposes increased risks to European security.

Divisions with our NATO allies have grown still further as a result of assertions by administration officials that a nuclear conflict may be plausibly limited to European soil. Understandably, that makes them very nervous. Such developments undermine European confidence in the longstanding U.S. policy that our nuclear forces exist to deter Soviet nuclear attacks on the United States and/or its Western allies.

Today's hearing, and two more to follow, jointly sponsored by the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, will focus on the requirements for European security and the role of arms control in meeting those requirements.

The subcommittees will review the Reagan administration's arms control initiatives and identify those needed to fulfill NATO's basic policy of deterrence through the maintenance of an adequate defense posture and the simultaneous pursuit of arms control efforts.

Following these joint hearings, the hearings will continue under the sponsorship of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs in an examination of the implications of the administration's strategic modernization program for arms control policy and the conduct of arms control negotiations in both intermediate-range and strategic weapons.

During both sets of hearings, we will seek to identify the arms control policy that is being pursued by the Reagan administration to link our approach to talks at both levels for reasons for practical political considerations, on the European side especially, and for reasons of U.S. security interests.

I am convinced that we must proceed with both and that prospects for ultimate success in each will improve significantly if they are taken together.

Unfortunately, my colleague and chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Mr. Hamilton, cannot be with us this morning due to a back problem. His doctor has asked him to rest for a couple of days before returning to his duties on the Hill. I am sure we all wish Lee a complete recovery and a speedy return to this office.

In addition, at this point I would like to have placed in the record a statement by our colleague, Hon. Larry Winn, Jr., of Kansas, a member of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.

[Mr. Winn's statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY WINN, JR.

I welcome this first of several hearings by the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, in regard to NATO nuclear strategy and European theater arms control.

As my colleagues well know, since its establishment in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been of great value to both the United States and the European community. That Western Europe has remained free and protected from external threat is in no small part attributable to the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO has denied Moscow the opportunity to dominate Western Europe and has provided the West with a sense of security and confidence. Moreover, the Alliance has provided its member nations with opportunities to seek a gradual resolution of East-West differences.

However, while efforts are being made to better resolve these differences, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact friends continue to seek conventional and theater nuclear superiority over NATO, while doing nothing to alter their unacceptable behavior in regard to events in Poland. In recent years, quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet theater nuclear forces have especially called into question NATO's political and military capabilities to continue deterring the growing adversary threat.

It is for these reasons that NATO's historic December 1979 decision, whereby the United States and its Alliance partners agreed to not only modernize its theater nuclear forces but also agreed to seek arms reductions at Geneva, looms important. This NATO decision, supported by a Democratic Administration and now a Republican one, will hopefully contribute to the Alliance's ability to execute its basic strategy against the adversary—that of flexible response and political cohesion. Despite the 1979 decision being complicated by recent European fears as well as Soviet disinformation in West European countries, I firmly believe it is incumbent upon the United States and its European allies to sustain political support for the "dual track" NATO decision.

To better assure the security of its people, the North Atlantic Alliance must not only continue to maintain a strong military base but also exercise effective arms control within the difficult and complex INF framework. In negotiating at Geneva, it is my hope that this Administration will utilize arms control as an important tool of American foreign policy, in order to better provide the Western Alliance with a stronger sense of national security.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair now recognizes my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Paul Findley, for a brief statement.

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Dr. Rostow, I join in welcoming you. I see you as a fellow advocate over many years of a noble concept to which we have both given a lot of energy; namely, Atlantic union. And when I learned that you were to have this new assignment, I rejoiced. Your assignment certainly puts arms control above politics, above partisan politics. And that is what we all want.

And I welcome this chance also to state my understanding and support for what the administration has been doing, and I am sure that the chairman meant no criticism or unfair criticism in what he said in the opening statement.

But I just do not think it is fair to say the administration is pursuing military buildup and ignoring arms control to the chagrin of our allies. I think there is considerable evidence to the contrary. And, of course, the dramatic Soviet strategic and theater nuclear buildup has occurred while the SALT I agreement was in place and the provisions of the SALT II agreements were being observed.

And it is also very obvious that what the Soviets do with their arms, either through direct invasion in Afghanistan or indirect interference and coercion in Poland, is of great importance and cannot be put out of mind. And I am under the distinct impression that our allies were simply thrilled with President Reagan's November 18 arms control speech. His proposal for a zero option was conceived in concert with our allies.

So at least as far as I understand the history of it, the United States is now negotiating seriously with the Soviet Union on the intermediate-range nuclear weapons under extremely difficult circumstances and by the most objective accounts, including that of the International Center for Strategic Studies, the Soviet Union has a clear advantage over NATO in the discussions.

So we all want the United States to negotiate seriously. And I note that the administration did not cancel the INF talks even as it took other steps after the Soviets enforced martial law on Poland.

Personally, I would like very much to see President Reagan appoint a blue-ribbon panel of distinguished experts to review NATO capabilities and strategy. I think there is a need to reexamine and clarify NATO strategy and to make the world understand it better and to fit it into current military realities.

So far, sincere efforts to discuss this publicly, such as President Reagan himself has attempted, have led only to further confusion and apprehension.

And as a strong supporter of NATO, I want to see the steps necessary, including long-range theater nuclear weapons, arms deployment and arms control, which will keep the alliance vital. And I am sure the committee, on a bipartisan basis, will support these objectives. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Findley.

I want to clarify that my opening statement was not as a criticism per se. It was intended to assure all that the members of the subcommittees will carefully scrutinize all of the facts that are involved in this area and once these have been received then we will comment and offer objective criticism when we have a better understanding of what the policy really is.

We are very pleased to have as witnesses this morning Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Hon. Richard R. Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; and Hon. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

We are very happy to welcome all you gentlemen, and particularly Mr. Rostow, if you will proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Rostow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Findley. I am very glad to see you again. And I appreciate your kind words about me and my appointment to this post.

And, please, Mr. Chairman, convey my warm good wishes to Congressman Hamilton. I am perhaps the best qualified man in Washington to sympathize with him in his difficulties, since I have had back trouble since I was 25. And assure him for me that while it is worse than a bad cold, it is not much worse. [Laughter.]

I had assumed, Mr. Chairman, that this hearing today was focused on progress in the INF negotiations, so that the paper that I have prepared may not fully answer the themes that you mentioned in your opening statement. If that is so, I apologize, but I will certainly try to address them as I go along or in the question period.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INF TALKS

It is pleasant to have this opportunity once again to meet with your two subcommittees and to report to you on developments in the talks with the Soviet Union on the control of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Those talks, as you know, are being carried on in the setting of direct appreciation for the problem of controlling and reducing Soviet and American intercontinental nuclear weapons as well.

These two subjects, intermediate-range weapons and intercontinental-range weapons, can never be considered separately, since the longer range weapons can also be aimed at targets in Europe or Japan or other areas of supreme importance to our security. They should be viewed, therefore, as aspects of the same problems—those of nuclear deterrence on the one hand and of alliance solidarity—or what is called decoupling in the jargon of arms control—on the other.

The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces which began last November 30 in Geneva are an important element in our strategy for establishing and preserving peace. I want today to sketch the background, the development, and the current status of these negotiations in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN NUCLEAR BALANCE

Like most arms control issues these days, INF has to be viewed against the background of the significant change which has taken place in the nuclear balance over the last 20 years. That change has occurred because of the Soviet Union's relentless pursuit of nuclear superiority over the United States both in intermediate-range and in strategic weapons. When the Soviet Union deployed a large number of missiles of intermediate range aimed at Western Europe in the early sixties, we were concerned. That was the source of the celebrated controversy about the "missile gap." At that time, however, the risk to Europe was minimized by the overall American advantage in intercontinental weapons. Our nuclear deterrent was fully and visibly credible, although our advantage in intercontinental-range weapons had already started to diminish by the time we concluded the SALT I agreements in 1972. The United States and its NATO allies nonetheless refrained from raising the issue of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Perspectives changed in the middle seventies, however, and concern became more acute both in Europe and in the United States. Japan and many other countries followed these developments closely. The cause of the change in perspective was obvious, the development of Soviet intermediate-range weapon capacity through the multiple-warhead SS-20 missile program, coupled with the massive Soviet buildup in strategic and conventional forces. The members of NATO concluded they had to react after the Soviet Union ignored repeated Western warnings about the gross imbalance that was being created. Other countries, also ultimately dependent on the American nuclear guarantee, watched the course of events with growing concern.

WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET GRAY AREA WEAPONS

The logic behind the Western reaction to the Soviet gray area weapons, as they were called, is brutally simple: the huge and growing Soviet advantage in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are of great accuracy and power, is designed to intimidate and paralyze our allies in Europe and elsewhere while the changing balance in intercontinental nuclear weapons makes the American strategic nuclear guarantee less and less credible. At a given point, the Soviet strategists hoped such doubts would become an overwhelming political force dividing our allies from the United States and leaving the United States isolated and impotent in a hostile world. Henry Kissinger and others articulated these anxieties during the late seventies, but the concern would have been just as acute if Mr. Kissinger had never spoken on the subject. It was—and it still is—the most dramatic example we have witnessed since October 1962, the time of the Cuban missile crisis, of the stunning political impact of the existence—not the use, but the existence—of nuclear weapons.

SS-20'S

The Soviets have claimed from time to time that the SS-20 did not disturb the balance on the ground, that it is not more than a modernization and partial replacement of the older SS-4's and SS-5's, which, they say, are to be withdrawn from service anyway and scrapped. The fact is, however, that the SS-20 represents a leap ahead in the INF field, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is a modern, highly accurate missile with three warheads—the SS-4's and 5's had only one—and a range of about 5,000 kilometers. Thus, each SS-20 could hit three targets in NATO Europe, even from bases in Siberia. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, it is mobile. The Soviets have been deploying it along with its associated launch equipment at an average rate of one a week since the beginning of the program. They now have 280 launchers in place with 840 warheads. Add to this the fact that the 300 SS-4's and SS-5's are still in place, and you have a total of nearly 600 long-range INF missiles with over 1,100 warheads, most of which are now aimed at Europe or can readily be aimed at targets in Europe or Japan or at targets which may become critical in the Middle East or elsewhere, depending upon the evolution of the Soviet drive for power. Moreover, the SS-20 has a built-in and survivable refire capability which will be taken into account from the beginning in assessing its destructive capacity.

The implacable growth of the Soviet SS-20 program gave rise to the NATO two-track decision of December 1979. That decision committed the United States to deploy 224 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile launchers with 572 missiles in several Western European countries and, at the same time, to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviets which might reduce the numbers of these weapons on both sides. From the beginning of our alliance deliberations on this matter, we have agreed with our allies that both parts of the 1979 decision are of equal importance. We have begun the negotiations and are pursuing them vigorously and in good faith. Our allies, for their part, are in agreement with us that preparations for deployment must go forward and that, in the interest of allied security and stability, we must demonstrate that we are prepared to carry out our program, including the beginning of deployments in 1983, unless there is a negotiating result that makes deployment unnecessary. Without that clear determination, the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate seriously.

I should like to expand on this last point, because it is intimately related to the political problems both we and some of our allies—particularly certain of the basing countries—have had to face in respect to the NATO modernization decision. The argument that you have to arm—or be fully prepared to do so—in order to achieve equitable arms control agreements is not an easy one for Westerners to accept, but it is nevertheless, a fundamental axiom of successful arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and it is of critical importance in the present case. As I remarked earlier, the Soviet Union refused to negotiate at all about intermediate-range missiles until the United States with allied approval had firmly decided to make ground-based cruise missiles and Pershing II's and deploy them in Europe. We are negotiating now from a position in which the U.S.S.R. has the advantage of large numbers of weapons in place, while our counter to this threat consists of a program to put offsetting systems into Western Europe starting next year. To be sure, our program is established and well underway, and we have the strong support of our NATO allies for it, despite the political problems it creates for some of them at home. But the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated that it is convinced of the need to negotiate seriously. Until it comes to accept that necessity, for any one of a number of reasons, or for several in combination, we must assume that it will continue to conduct—the INF negotiations, not as part of a quest for stability and peace, a question in which the United States and the Soviet Union necessarily share equal responsibility, but as a tactical effort to divide the United States from Europe, from Japan, and from its other allies and vital interests; to prevent American and Allied military modernization; and to destroy the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. In short, the Soviet Union is not negotiating. It is playing to the galleries of public opinion in the NATO countries, in Japan, the ANZUS allies, and other Western nations.

I am sorry I must report this to you. Ambassador Nitze and his excellent negotiating team are doing their best to overcome these attitudes, and their best is very good indeed—and we in Washington are supporting their efforts in every possible way. But I have no progress to report.

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION IN INF TALKS

The U.S. negotiating position in the INF talks was stated by the President in his speech of November 18. It is based on a set of ideas fully considered by our NATO allies and fully supported by them. We are approaching the problems of the intermediate-range missiles in the setting of the START problem—that is, the problem of intercontinental nuclear weapons. And we wish to begin with the most destabilizing weapons in this category, the land-based missiles of great accuracy and power, like the SS–20's. We are prepared, as I have said, to cancel our program for the deployment of Pershing II missiles and GLCM's if the Soviets will destroy all of their SS–20 missiles and retire and scrap the older SS–4's and 5's. This proposal is simple and straightforward. And it addresses itself to the systems which are of most concern to both sides. The President has made it clear that we will negotiate in good faith and consider any proposals made by the Soviet Government.

THE SOVIET POSITION

Not surprisingly, the Soviets have taken a different approach. Mr. Brezhnev laid out a good part of their position in public last November, just before the negotiations began; and Moscow elaborated on it in a public statement early this month. Basically, the Soviet proposals to this point consist of two related ideas: A moratorium for the duration of the negotiations; and a program of equal reductions based on the assumption that the sides are now equal in intermediate-range missiles. The proposed reduction agreement, which would expire in 1990, would reduce each side to 300 "systems" by that year.

The Soviet proposal is confined to the development and deployment of new medium-range systems—that is, those with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers and less than 5,500 kilometers—which are in Europe or "intended for use in Europe," the phrase the Soviets use. And it would be confined also to the improvement of existing systems. The restriction of the Soviet proposal to systems deployed in Europe "or intended for use in Europe," whatever that phrase may mean, is a sufficient ground in itself for rejecting the proposal. There would be no benefit to the stability of the world political system if missiles now targeted on Europe were moved eastward, where they could threaten Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. interests in the Far East. And we must never forget that the SS-20 is mobile. Systems which are moved to the east can also be moved back to the west.

The moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union would last as long, but only as long, as the negotiations for a more permanent agreement continue. Obviously, this proposal would relieve the Soviet Union of any pressure to negotiate seriously.

The Soviet reduction proposals are based on its moratorium scheme. They provide for a program of reductions to be carried out throughout the 1980's: reductions in NATO "medium-range" nuclear systems in the territory of Europe, in waters adjacent to Europe and intended for use against targets in Europe down to 600 NATO systems by 1985 and to 300 by 1990, as the Soviets calculate these figures, with corresponding reductions for the Soviet Union to the same levels. This agreement would expire in 1990 unless renewed.

The Soviet moratorium proposal would effectively kill NATO's Pershing II and GLCM modernization program, while permitting the Soviets to produce an unlimited number of SS-20's and deploy them in the eastern Soviet Union. Put more simply, it would deprive us of an important means to restore the nuclear balance in Europe—the means we and our allies chose after careful deliberation in 1979 as the most appropriate and effective means to that end. The more nearly permanent agreement the Soviet Union has proposed, coupled with its moratorium proposal, if carried out as the Soviets envision it, would not permit the United States at any time to have Pershing II missiles, GLCM's, or comparable missiles in or near Europe, while it would leave the SS-20 essentially untouched. Under the Soviet proposal the Soviet Union could have 300 SS-20 launchers in European Russia—an increase even beyond their present capabilities in European Russia—and any number of such launchers in Siberia. If British and French systems are counted, as the Soviets insist they must be, the United States by 1990 would be left with virtually no INF systems in Europe, while the SS-20 program could proceed at full throttle. In essence, we are being asked to accept and perpetuate an overwhelming Soviet nuclear advantage based on the rationale that the Soviet Union has more enemies than the United States and thus has a "right" to more offensive systems.

PARITY AN IMPORTANT GOAL

The Soviet spokesmen are still refusing even to consider INF as a global negotiation. Until now they have insisted on talking not about INF but about Euro-missiles. Their goal is transparent.

We remain convinced that true parity between the two leading nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States—true parity, that is, in allowing each side the equal capacity to deter aggression against its vital interests—is of itself an important goal for each nation, indeed, the supremely important goal of its foreign and security policy, if each side is interested in restoring and preserving the system of peace. An INF agreement can make a contribution to parity in this sense. Such an event would in itself be a giant step, as President Reagan said on November 18, toward the possibility of peace.

The Soviet perception of the problem in the INF talks is altogether different from our own. The question of which systems ought to be counted in order to establish a basis for reductions lies at the heart of our difference with them. By counting British and French systems, as well as NATO nuclear-capable aircraft—and by leaving out thousands of the corresponding systems on their side—the Soviets have stated that a rough balance now exists, a balance which would be upset by the projected NATO deployments. Indeed, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet position is that they have been making this argument about a rough balance throughout the period of the SS-20 deployment. They said the same things about balance several years ago when they had only a few of these weapons in the field. Yet, curiously enough, year after year, the Soviet calculation of the supposed balance always comes out at about 1,000 on each side.

QUESTION OF INF BALANCE

The assertion of an existing balance is fundamental to the proposals that the Soviets have made so far, as it is to all aspects of the Soviet position. But we have not yet reached an agreed data base for these negotiations. In alleging that a balance in INF exists, the Soviets chose to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has an enormous numerical advantage over NATO in the field of nuclear-capable aircraft as well as in the missile field. Their so-called balance seems to omit literally thousands of Soviet aircraft with nuclear capabilities comparable to those of the American aircraft they do include. Instead the Soviets choose to focus attention on America's so-called forward-based systems. When they talk about forward-based systems, as they have since the negotiation of SALT I, the Soviets mean American nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe or on aircraft carriers, whose range permits them to reach the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviets contend that a qualitative difference exists between our airplanes in this category and their own, because theirs cannot reach the continental United States, while ours can reach the Soviet Union.

This is a most significant argument, which throws a clear light on the Soviet Union's major interest in these negotiations thus far—to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. Soviet spokesmen simply are trying to create a doubt in the minds of our allies—and in our own minds—about the credibility of our basic commitment—that we will regard an attack on an ally or any other vital American security interest as an attack on the United States. One obvious implication of this attitude is the relegation of the countries of Western Europe and other allies to second-class status, their security being less important than that of the superpowers. At the same time, it is a shorthand way of saying that the United States has no business being in Europe. To accept such an argument would be to agree that the NATO alliance rests on a false foundation. But no one knows better than the intelligent strategists and planners of the Soviet political-military establishment that the independence of Western Europe is a vital American security interest. In their doctrine, as I remarked earlier, Soviet control of Western Europe is the first of their military objectives and the key to Soviet dominance in Asia and the Third World generally.

It is hardly necessary to comment on the Soviet proposal, which is a bare-faced claim not to equality but to hegemony. The fact that it has been made at all dramatizes the tragic gravity of the situation. As I carry on this work, Mr. Chairman, I often wonder, to recall Churchill's famous quip, what kind of people do they think we are.

Without going into detail, or trespassing in any way on our agreement with the Soviet Union about respecting the confidentiality of the negotiations, I should now like to set forth briefly for you the most important principles underlying the U.S. position in these talks.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POSITION

First, I should mention that we are focusing on land-based missiles in the upper part of the INF spectrum as the first step in the negotiations. The missiles, as I have already said, are the weapons perceived as most threatening by both sides. Just as we in the West have been deeply concerned by the SS-20 program, the Soviets have reacted most sharply to the projected deployment of Pershing II rockets and GLCM's, although as a negotiating tactic they also profess concern over nuclear-capable aircraft. These weapons, the SS-20's and the Pershing II rockets and the ground-launched cruise missiles, are the weapons to which our negotiators are addressing themselves in the first instance. Their elimination would enhance the security of the alliance and should be the priority objective of the negotiations.

Second, the need to limit systems without regard to location. Although the SS-20 is a large MIRVed system with a range of almost 5,000 kilometers, it is nonetheless sufficiently mobile and transportable so that efforts to ban it with respect to specific regions would not be meaningful. SS-20's deployed east of the Urals can still target NATO Europe, and even those deployed in the far eastern part of the Soviet Union present a threat to the basic security interests of the United States in the Far East, in the Middle East, and because of their mobility, to the NATO allies as well. We must, therefore, seek to ban these missiles everywhere and not only in Europe.

Third, negotiations only on American and Soviet systems. In bilateral negotiations it would be inappropriate for the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate over the systems of any third country. The Soviet Union knows that British and French forces are independent national systems. The United States will not accept anything less than equality in United States and Soviet intermediate-range force missiles and will not agree to include or to compensate for British or French forces. These forces exist and are maintained for absolutely basic reasons of British and French national interest. We respect those interests, and we accept them. We shall do nothing to undermine them in any way. We obviously cannot trim our sails to fit a Soviet view which maintains that Soviet forces must be equivalent to the aggregate of all its potential adversaries throughout the world. This is a claim of a right to hegemony which is not worthy of discussion. The Soviet Union could easily eliminate the basis for such concerns by giving up its aggressive, expansionist course, and undertaking to live by the rules of the United Nations Charter governing the international use of force.

Fourth, equality in outcome: That is the goal for these negotiations, equality in results, equal limitations and equal rights, reductions in order to achieve truly equal deterrent capacity. The principle of de jure equality is fundamental to balanced arms control and to an East-West relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity. This requires the negotiation of equal ceilings and equal rights for both sides. One sided arms control proposals which fail to provide equality as an outcome will not and cannot enhance security.

Our purpose in having nuclear weapons is defensive and deterrent—to prevent aggression against our vital national interests. The Soviet purpose, as we can see vividly in the case of the intermediate-range missiles now targeted on Europe, is to serve as the ultimate engine of the process of nuclear blackmail—a process of expansion involving the use of the credible threat to use propaganda, terrorism, proxy war, subversion, or Soviet troops themselves,' under the sanction and protection of what they hope will be Soviet nuclear superiority. It follows that in the INF negotiations, we must pay much more attention to the distinction between retaliatory weapons and weapons which can also be used for purposes of coercion or first strike. Weapons like the SS-20 and the Soviet big intercontinental-range ICBM's are conspicuous examples of such weapons.

EQUALITY IN DETERRENT CAPACITY

This is the fundamental reason why we have proposed dismantling the entire class of Soviet intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in exchange for a promise not to make or deploy Pershing II and intermediate-range ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles. The equality we seek between the United States and the Soviet Union is equality in deterrent capacity. To achieve that result in the area of intermediate-range nuclear weapons fully justifies the President's proposal of November 18.

The Soviet Union criticizes our proposal as unfair and inequitable, indeed, they claim that we have proposed unilateral Soviet disarmament. Soviet representatives stand, so far, on proposals designed to look like programs for equal reductions from an equal base. As I have pointed out, the base is not equal. But even if it were, it would not follow that equal reductions are the only possible road to an equal result. The United States and the Soviet

Union are not peasants in a country market haggling over the price of pigs. We are the two leading nuclear powers in the world, possessing arsenals of frightening power and menace. It is our responsibility—our equal responsibility—to do whatever is necessary to draw mankind back from the edge of the abyss. That is the perspective in which we approach the problem of negotiating with the Soviet Union about reducing the menace of intermediate-range and intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Fifth, arms control verification. The history of arms control negotiations, including both their successes and their failures, demonstrates convincingly the need for effective provisions to verify compliance. Such provisions can help to establish confidence within the parties and permit them to enter into agreements affecting their vital security interests. Without such assurance, any agreement would be a source of uncertainty and instability. Soviet secrecy is in itself destabilizing and will have to be overcome if arms control is to succeed. It seems quite clear to me that the arms control agreements we are now seeking—and this, of course, applies to START as well as to INF—cannot rely exclusively on national technical means for verifying compliance. If we are to achieve success, in other words, the Soviets will have to modify their historical resistance to cooperative methods of verification. The Soviet Union has agreed to the principle, although it will continue to place primary reliance on national technical means of verification, as we will also. We have welcomed this Soviet assurance, and look forward to discussing the degree to which cooperation in verification will be necessary. But the fact that cooperation will be necessary seems to me indisputable. Indeed, basing our proposal on a ban rather than on numerical limitations should ease the verification problem in any INF agreement.

Any agreement must, of course, provide against the future deployment of systems comparable to the ones it bans. At the same time, some collateral constraints will be needed to keep the agreement from being undermined by unbound systems of shorter range.

Unless the Soviet leaders see a blinding light on the road to Damascus—and we can hope for such a miracle, but hardly count on it—we must assume that the road ahead will be long, slow, and hard. If the Soviet Union negotiates as it has in the past, we should not look for a break in the negotiating pattern until just before the first Pershing II's are due to be deployed. Until then, we must be steady and patient, keeping American and allied public opinion thoroughly informed, and proceeding methodically with our plans for modernizing our Armed Forces. At this point, neither optimism nor pessimism is justified. Our attitude is one of determination to initiate, to persevere, and to imagine, seeking to understand the Soviet outlook fully and sympathetically, and to take advantage of every opportunity to persuade. It is most unlikely that we shall be able to convince the Soviet Union within the framework of the nuclear equations alone. We are therefore approaching the task of arms control negotiation, as I have emphasized from the beginning of my term of office last June, by viewing arms control as an integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

In that perspective, we know that the Soviet Union has profound reasons to want a period of stability in its relations with the West. Its situation in Poland has grave and far-reaching potentialities. Its economic and social problems are real. Above all, after nearly 65 years of devoting an extraordinarily large fraction of its resources to pursuing the chimera of empire, the Soviet Union ought to be ready to embrace the tasks of peace on the basis of the humanity we all share and our common obligation to avoid the unthinkable horror of nuclear war. I must tell you, however, that unless extraordinary change should occur in the Soviet Union, the present Soviet leadership, or any likely combination of its successors, would accept such an outcome of our negotiating effort only if it is apparent that continuing on its present course will surely confront the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks.

[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE ROSTOW, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

I am pleased to have this opportunity to report to your two Subcommittees on developments in the talks with the Soviet Union on the control of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in the setting of the cognate problem of controlling and reducing Soviet and American intercontinental nuclear weapons. These subjects can never be considered separately, since the longer range weapons can also be aimed at targets in Europe, Japan, or other areas of supreme importance to our security. They should be viewed, necessarily, as two aspects of the same problems -- those of nuclear deterrence on the one hand, and alliance solidarity -- or what is called "decoupling" in the jargon of arms control -- on the other.

The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces which began last November 30 in Geneva are an important element in our strategy for establishing and preserving peace. I want to sketch the background, development, and current status of these negotiations in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

Like most arms control issues these days, INF has to be viewed against the background of the significant change that has taken place in the nuclear balance over the last 20 years, because of the Soviet Union's relentless pursuit of nuclear superiority over the United States both in intermediate range and strategic weapons. When the Soviet Union deployed a large number of missiles of intermediate-range aimed at Western Europe in the early 1960s, we were concerned. That was the source of the controversy about "the missile gap." However at that time, the risk to Europe was minimized by the overall American advantage in intercontinental weapons. Our nuclear deterrent was fully and visibly credible. Although our advantage in intercontinental range weapons had begun to erode, as was the case by the time we concluded the SALT I agreements in 1972, the United States and its NATO allies nonetheless refrained from raising the issue of Soviet INF.

Perspectives changed in the middle Seventies, however, and concern became more acute both in Europe and in the United States. Japan and many other countries followed these developments closely. The cause of the change in perspective was obvious: The development of Soviet INF capacity through the multiple warhead SS-20 missile program, coupled with the massive Soviet buildup in strategic and conventional forces. The members of NATO and many other countries ultimately dependent on the American nuclear guaranty concluded they had to react, after the Soviet Union had ignored repeated Western warnings about the gross imbalance that was being created.

The logic behind the Western reaction to the Soviet grey-area weapons is brutally simple. The huge and growing Soviet advantage in intermediate-range nuclear weapons of great accuracy and power is designed to intimidate and paralyze our Allies in Europe and elsewhere while the changing balance in intecontinental nuclear weapons makes the American strategic nuclear guaranty less and less credible. At a given point, the Soviet strategists hope such doubts would become an overwhelming political force, dividing our Allies from the United States, and leaving the United States isolated and impotent in a hostile world. Henry Kissinger and others articulated these anxieties during the late Seventies, but the concern would have been just as acute if Mr. Kissinger had never spoken. It was -- and still is -- the most dramatic example we have yet witnessed of the stunning political impact of the existence -- not the use -- of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets have claimed from time to time that the SS-20 did not disturb the balance on the ground that it is merely a modernization and partial replacement of the older SS-4s and 5s, which, they say, are to be withdrawn from service and scrapped. The fact is, however, that the SS-20 represents a leap ahead in the INF field, both

both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is a modern highly accurate missile with three warheads (the SS-4s and 5s had only one) and a range of about 5,000 kilometers. Thus, each SS-20 could hit three targets in NATO Europe even from bases in Siberia. Moreover, it is mobile. The Soviets have been deploying it, along with its associated launch equipment, at an average rate of one a week since the beginning of the program and now have 280 launchers in place, with 840 warheads. Add to this the fact that 300 SS-4s and 5s are still in place and you have a total of nearly 600 long-range INF missiles with over 1100 warheads most of which are now aimed at Europe, or can readily be aimed at targets in Europe or Japan or at targets which may become critical in the Middle East or elsewhere, depending upon the evolution of the Soviet desire for power. Moreover, the SS-20 has an inherent and survivable refire capability which will be taken into account from the beginning in assessing its destructive capacity.

The implacable growth of the Soviet SS-20 program gave rise to the NATO two track decision of December 1979 to deploy 224 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile launchers with 572 missiles in several Western European countries and, at the same time, to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviets which would reduce the numbers of these weapons on both sides. From the beginning of our Alliance deliberations on this matter, we have agreed with our Allies that both parts of the 1979 decision were of equal importance. We have begun the negotiations and are pursuing them vigorously and in good faith. Our allies, for their part, are in agreement with us that preparations for deployment must go forward and that, in the interest of allied security and stability, we must demonstrate that we are prepared to carry out our program, including the beginning of deployments in 1983, unless there is a negotiating result that makes it unnecessary. Without that clear determination, the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate seriously.

I should like to expand on this last point because it is intimately related to the political problems both we and some of our allies -- particularly certain of the basing countries -- have had to face in respect to the NATO modernization decision. The argument that you have to arm (or be fully prepared to do so) in order to achieve equitable arms control agreements is not an easy one for Westerners to accept, but it is nevertheless a fundamental axiom of successful arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and of critical importance in the present case. As I remarked earlier, the Soviet Union refused to negotiate at all about intermediate range missiles until the United States with Allied approval had firmly decided to make ground-based cruise missiles and Pershing IIs and deploy them in Europe. We are negotiating from a situation in which the USSR now has the advantage of large numbers of weapons in place while our counter to this threat consists of a program to put offsetting INF systems into Western Europe starting in late 1983. To be sure, our program is established and well under way and we have the strong support of our NATO allies for it, despite the political problems it creates for some of them at home. But the Soviet Union is not yet convinced of the need to negotiate seriously. Until it comes to accept that necessity, for any one of a number of reasons, or for several in combination, it will continue to conduct the INF negotiations not as part of a quest for stability and peace, in which the United States and the Soviet Union necessarily share equal responsibility, but as a tactical effort to divide the United States from Europe, from Japan, and from its other allies and vital interests; to prevent American and Allied military modernization; and to destroy the credibility of the American nuclear guaranty. In short, the Soviet Union is not yet negotiating. It is playing to the galleries of public opinion in the NATO countries, Japan, the ANZUS allies, and other Western nations.

I am sorry I must report this to you. Ambassador Nitze and his excellent negotiating team are doing their best to overcome these attitudes -- and their best is very good indeed -- and we in Washington are supporting their efforts in every possible way.

The basic US negotiating position in the INF talks was stated by the President in a speech on November 18, 1981. It is based on a set of ideas fully considered by our NATO allies and fully supported by them. We are approaching the problem of the intermediate range missiles in the setting of the START problem -- that is, the problem of intercontinental nuclear weapons. And we wish to begin with the most destabilizing weapons in this category, the land-based missiles of great accuracy and power, like the SS-20s. We are prepared to cancel our program for the deployment of Pershing II missiles and GLCMs if the Soviets will destroy all of their SS-20 missiles and retire and scrap the older SS-4s and 5s. This proposal is simple and straightforward. And it addresses itself to the systems which are of most concern to both sides. The President made it clear that we will negotiate in good faith and consider any proposals made by the Soviet Government.

Not surprisingly, the Soviets have taken a different approach. Mr. Brezhnev laid out a good part of their position when he visited Bonn last November, just before the negotiations began; and Moscow elaborated on it in a public statement early this month. Basically, the Soviet proposals to this point consist of two related ideas: a moratorium for the duration of the negotiations; and a program of equal reductions based on the assumption that both sides are now equal in intermediate range missiles. The proposed agreement, which would expire in 1990, would reduce each side to 300 "systems" by that year.

The Soviet proposal is confined to the development and deployment of new "medium range" systems (i.e., those with a range of more than 1000 km and less than 5500 km) in Europe or "intended for use in Europe," and on the improvement of existing systems. The restriction of the Soviet proposal to systems deployed in Europe "or intended for use in Europe," whatever that phrase may mean, is a sufficient ground in itself for rejecting the proposal. There would be no benefit to the stability of the world political system if missiles now targeted on Europe were moved Eastward, where they could threaten Japan, South Korea, and other United States interests in the Far East. And we must never forget that the SS-20 is mobile. Systems which are moved to the East can also be moved back to the West.

The moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union would last for as long and only as long as the negotiations for a more permanent agreement continue. Obviously this proposal would relieve the Soviet Union of any pressure to negotiate seriously.

The Soviet reduction proposals are based on its moratorium scheme. They provide for a program of reductions to be carried out throughout the 1980s: reductions in NATO "medium range" nuclear systems in the territory of Europe, in the waters adjacent to Europe and intended for use against targets in Europe down to 600 NATO systems by 1985 and to 300 by 1990, with reductions by the Soviet Union to the same levels. This agreement would expire in 1990 unless renewed.

The Soviet moratorium proposal would effectively kill NATO's Pershing II and GLCM modernization program, while permitting the Soviets to produce an unlimited number of SS-20s and deploy them in the eastern USSR. Put more simply, it would deprive us of an important means to restore the nuclear balance in Europe -- the means we and our Allies chose after careful deliberation in 1979 as the most appropriate and effective means to that end. The more permanent agreement the Soviet Union has proposed, coupled with its moratorium proposal, if carried out as the Soviets envision it, would not permit the US at any time to have Pershing II missiles, GLCMs or comparable missiles in or near Europe and would leave the Soviet SS-20 essentially untouched. Under the Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union could have 300 SS-20 launchers in European Russia -- an increase in their capabilities -- and any number of such launchers in Siberia. If British and French systems were counted, as the Soviets insist they must be, the United States by 1990 would be left with virtually no INF systems in Europe while the SS-20 program could proceed at full throttle. In essence, we are being asked to accept and perpetuate an overwhelming nuclear Soviet advantage based on the rationale that the Soviet Union has more enemies than the United States and thus has a "right" to more offensive systems.

The Soviet spokesmen are still refusing even to consider INF as a global negotiation. Until now they have insisted on talking not about INF but about Euromissiles. Their goal is transparent.

We remain convinced that true parity between the two leading nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States -- true parity, that is, in allowing each side the equal capacity to deter aggression against its vital interests -- is of itself an important goal for each nation, indeed the supremely important goal of its foreign and security policy, if each side is interested in restoring and preserving the system of peace. If parity in this sense can be achieved it would be a giant step, as President Reagan said on November 18, towards the possibility of peace.

The Soviet perception of the problem in the INF talks is altogether different from our own. The question of which systems are to be counted in order to establish a basis for reductions lies at the heart of our difference with them. By counting British and French systems, as well as NATO nuclear capable aircraft (and by leaving out thousands of the corresponding systems on their side), the Soviets have stated that a rough balance" now exists which would be upset by the projected NATO deployments. Indeed, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet position is that they have been making this argument about a "rough balance" throughout the period of SS-20 deployment. They said the same things about the "balance" several years ago when they had only a few of these weapons in the field. Curiously enough, year after year, the Soviet calculation of the supposed balance always comes out at about 1000 on each side.

The assertion of an existing balance is fundamental to the proposals the Soviets have made so far, as it is to all aspects of the Soviet position. We made it clear last August that in both the INF and START negotiations we should insist that each side take responsibility for data about its own forces. But we have not yet reached an agreed data base for the negotiations. In alleging that a balance in INF exists, the Soviets choose to ignore the fact that the USSR has an enormous numerical advantage over NATO in the field of nuclear capable aircraft as well as in the missile field. Their so-called balance seems to omit literally thousands of

Soviet nuclear capable aircraft with capabilities comparable to the US aircraft they include. Rather, they choose to focus attention on US so-called "forward-based systems" (FBS). When they talk about FBS, as they have since the negotiation of SALT I, the Soviets mean US nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe, or on aircraft carriers, whose range permits them to reach the territory of the USSR. The Soviets contend that a qualitative difference exists between our airplanes in this category and their own, because theirs cannot reach the continental United States.

This is a significant argument, which throws a clear light on the Soviet Union's major interest in these negotiations thus far -- to drive a wedge between the United States and its Allies. Soviet spokesmen are trying simply to create doubt in the minds of our Allies -- and in our own -- about the credibility of our basic commitment -- that we should regard an attack on an ally or any other vital American security interest as an attack on the United States. One obvious implication of this attitude is the relegation of the countries of Western Europe and our other Allies to second class status, their security being less important than that of the super powers. At the same time, it is a shorthand way of saying that the US has no business being in Europe. To accept such an argument would be to agree that the NATO Alliance rests on a false foundation. But no one knows better than the intelligent strategists and planners of the Soviet political military establishment that the independence of Western Europe is a vital American security interest. In their doctrine, as I remarked earlier, Soviet control of Western Europe is the first of their military objectives and the key to Soviet dominance in Asia and the Third World generally.

It is hardly necessary to comment on the Soviet proposal, which is a bare-faced claim not to equality but to hegemony. The fact that it has been made at all dramatizes the tragic gravity of the situation. As I carry on this work, I often wonder, to recall Churchill's famous quip, what kind of people do they think we are.

Without going into detail about the conduct of the negotiations, I should like to set forth briefly for you the most important principles underlying our position.

1. Focus first on land-based missiles in the upper part of the INF spectrum. These are, as I have already

said, the weapons seen as most threatening by both sides. Just as we in the West have been deeply concerned by the SS-20 program, the Soviets -- although as a negotiating tactic they profess concern over nuclear-capable aircraft -- have reacted most sharply to the projected deployment of Pershing II rockets and GLCMs. These then are the weapons to which our negotiators are addressing themselves in the first instance. Their elimination would enhance the security of the Alliance and should be the priority objective of the negotiations.

2. The need to limit systems without regard to location. Although the SS-20 is a large MIRVed system with a range of almost 5000 km, it is nonetheless sufficiently mobile and transportable so that efforts to ban it with respect to specific regions would not be meaningful arms control. SS-20s deployed East of the Urals can still target NATO Europe; and even those deployed in the far eastern part of the USSR present a threat to the basic security interests of the United States in the Far East and the Middle East, and, because of their mobility, to the NATO Alliance as well. We must, therefore, seek to ban these missiles everywhere, not just in Europe.

3. Negotiation on US and Soviet systems only. In bilateral negotiations it would be inappropriate for the US and the USSR to negotiate over the systems of any third country. The USSR knows that British and French forces are independent national systems. The US will not accept anything less than equality in US and Soviet INF missiles and will not agree to include or compensate for British and French forces. Those forces exist and are maintained for absolutely basic reasons of British and French national interest. We respect those interests and accept them. We shall do nothing to undermine them in any way. We obviously cannot trim our sails to fit a Soviet view which maintains that Soviet forces must be equivalent to the aggregate of all its potential adversaries throughout the world. This is a claim of a right to hegemony which cannot be discussed or negotiated. The Soviet Union could easily eliminate the basis for such concerns by giving up its aggressive, expansionist course, and undertaking to live by the rules of the United Nations Charter governing the international use of force.

4. Equality in Outcome: Equal limitations and equal rights: reductions in order to achieve truly equal deterrent capacity. The principle of de jure equality is fundamental to balanced arms control and to an East-West

relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity. This requires the negotiation of equal ceilings and rights for both sides. One-sided arms control proposals which fail to provide equality as an outcome will not enhance security.

Our purpose in having nuclear weapons is defensive and deterrent -- to prevent aggression against our vital national interests. The Soviet purpose, as we can see vividly in the case of the intermediate range missiles now targeted on Europe, is to serve as the ultimate engine of a process of nuclear blackmail -- a process of expansion involving the use or the credible threat to use propaganda, terrorism, proxy war, subversion, or Soviet troops under the sanction and protection of Soviet nuclear superiority. It follows that in these negotiations, we must pay much more attention to the distinction between retaliatory weapons and weapons which can also be used for purposes of coercion or first strike. Weapons like the SS-20 and the Soviet big intercontinental range ICBMs are conspicuous examples of such weapons.

This is the fundamental reason why we have proposed dismantling the entire class of Soviet intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in exchange for our promise not to make or deploy Pershing II and intermediate range ground launched nuclear cruise missiles. The equality we seek between the United States and the Soviet Union is equality in deterrent capacity. To achieve that result in the area of intermediate range nuclear weapons fully justifies the President's proposal of November 18.

The Soviet Union criticizes our proposal as unfair and inequitable -- a proposal for unilateral disarmament. Soviet representatives stand, so far, on proposals designed to look like programs for equal reductions from an equal base. As I have pointed out, the base is not equal. But even if it were, it would not follow that equal reductions are the only possible road to an equal result. The United States and the Soviet Union are not peasants in a country market, haggling over the price of pigs. We are the two leading nuclear powers in the world, possessing arsenals of frightening power and menace. It is our responsibility -- our equal responsibility -- to do whatever is necessary to draw mankind back from the edge of the abyss. That is the perspective in which we approach the problem of negotiating with the Soviet Union about reducing the menace of intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear weapons.

5. Arms control verification. The history of arms control negotiations, including both their successes and

their failures, demonstrates convincingly the need for effective provisions to verify compliance. Such provisions can help establish confidence between the parties and permit them to enter into agreements affecting their vital security interests. Without such assurance, any agreement would be a source of uncertainty and instability. Soviet secrecy is in itself destabilizing and will have to be overcome if arms control is to succeed. It seems quite clear to me that the arms control agreements we are now seeking -- and this, of course, applies to START as well as to INF -- cannot rely exclusively on national technical means. If we are to achieve success, in other words, the Soviets will have to modify their historical resistance to cooperative methods of verification. The Soviet Union has agreed to the principle, although it will continue to place primary reliance on national technical means of verification. We have welcomed this assurance, and look forward to discussing the degree to which cooperation in verification will be necessary. But the fact that they will be necessary seems to me indisputable. Indeed, basing our proposal on a ban rather than on numerical limitations should ease the verification problem in any INF agreement.

6. Other limits. An agreement must, of course, provide against the future develoment of systems comparable to the ones it bans. At the same time, some collateral constraints will be needed to keep it from being undermined by unbanned systems of shorter range.

Unless the Soviet leaders see a blinding light on the road to Damascus -- we can hope for such a result, but hardly count on it -- we must assume that the road ahead will be long, slow, and hard. If the Soviet Union negotiates as it has in the past, we should not look for a break in the negotiating pattern until just before the Pershing IIs are due to be deployed. Until then, we must be steady and patient, keeping American and Allied public opinion thoroughly informed, and proceeding methodically with our plans for modernizing our armed forces. At this point, neither optimism nor pessimism is justified. Our attitude is one of determination to initiate, to persevere, and to imagine, seeking to understand the Soviet outlook fully and sympathetically, and to take advantage of every opportunity to persuade. It is most unlikely that we shall be able to convince the Soviet Union within the framework of the nuclear equations alone. We are therefore approaching the task of arms control negotiation, as I have emphasized from the beginning of my term last June, by viewing arms control as an integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

In that perspective, we note that the Soviet Union has profound reasons to want a period of stability in its relations with the West. Its situation in Poland has grave and far-reaching potentialities. Its economic and social problems are real. Above all, the Soviet Union ought to be ready, after nearly sixty-five years of devoting an extraordinarily large fraction of its resources to pursuing the chimera of empire, to embrace the tasks of peace on the basis of the humanity we all share and our common obligation to avoid the unthinkable horror or nuclear war. I must tell you, however, that unless extraordinary change should occur in the Soviet Union, the present Soviet leadership; and any likely combination of its successors would accept such an outcome of our negotiating effort only if it is apparent that continuing on its present course will surely confront the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks.

Mr. Rosenthal [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Rostow. Mr. Burt.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD R. BURT, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Burt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In view of Gene Rostow's splendid presentation, I will just ask that my statement be submitted for the record and I will make just a very brief comment.

Mr. Rosenthal. So ordered.

Mr. Burt. Thank you. I would like to step back from the detailed presentation that Gene Rostow made today and try, if I could, to remind all of us that some broader issues are at stake, both in our pursuit of arms control in Europe and our desire to maintain alliance cohesion.

DECEMBER 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION

The issues that have been raised by the December 1979 decision to deploy a number of new intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe and to pursue an arms control initiative go to the heart of America's relationship with Europe and to the Atlantic partnership which we have fashioned since World War II.

The partnership has allowed the members of the alliance to live in freedom, peace, and prosperity for over 30 years. And the way this partnership has done this is by bridging the Atlantic with a pledge that an attack on one is an attack on all and by giving substance to this pledge through the integration of conventional forces, nuclear forces based in Europe, and strategic nuclear forces in a single continuum of deterrent power.

Now, if we look at the December 1979 decision in terms of that basic concept of NATO strategy, I think we can conclude that the Soviet Union's ambition, as reflected in its own force decisions as well as its efforts to derail that December 1979 decision, is to dissolve this partnership that I have talked about, derailing the implementation of both tracks—that is, the deployment and the arms control track of NATO's 1979 decision.

The alliance is now demonstrating its resolve to turn back these Soviet threats and to preserve the structure of alliance security which has maintained the peace in Europe for more than three decades. I would like to make some brief points concerning the 1979 decision, to deploy these weapons and to seek an arms control agreement.

MYTHS ABOUT THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION

The first point is that a number of myths have unfortunately grown up surrounding this decision. Sometimes those myths are expressed here. More frequently, these myths are expressed across the Atlantic. And I think if we look at these myths and spend just a minute or two examining them, we can conclude that in fact they have little foundation.

First, the deployment of cruise and ballistic missiles to Europe does not move NATO away from its strategy of flexible response. Rather, the decision to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles is essential to sustaining existing NATO strategy. In particular, it will link more firmly the American strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe itself.

Second, this deployment was not thrust by the United States upon the Europeans. Rather, it reflects a considered American response to a widely felt European need for an evolutionary adjustment of NATO's capabilities to take account of the onset of strategic parity and the massive and continuing buildup of Soviet theater forces, such as the SS-20.

Third, the December 1979 decision does not give the alliance a qualitatively new capability. The United States has had systems in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union since 1952. Rather, this deployment will permit NATO to preserve that capability and retain that element of our deterrent strategy despite improvements in Soviet air defense, the aging of our own systems, an increasing need to commit NATO's aircraft resources to conventional roles and, as Gene Rostow has pointed out this morning, the large-scale new deployments of Soviet intermediate-range systems.

Fourth, this deployment does not increase the alliance's reliance upon nuclear weapons. Rather, in providing NATO a more balanced nuclear posture, this planned deployment has already permitted a significant net reduction in total nuclear weapons located in Europe.

And fifth, this deployment does not represent a step toward the development of a NATO nuclear war-fighting capability. It is the Soviet Union which is developing this capability to fight and win a nuclear war in Europe. This deployment will force upon them the realization that NATO will not fight a war on their terms, will not permit them to regionalize the conflict in Europe to exclude Soviet territory, and will not permit them to hold Europe a nuclear hostage.

SOVIET TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO INF

Second, Mr. Chairman, in view of the Soviet effort to hold Europe as a nuclear hostage, I think it might be worthwhile to point out that the Soviet Union itself has a two-track approach to INF. On one track they seek to decouple the United States from Europe with forced deployments. And on the other track they seek to do so through arms control and propaganda. And I believe that their objective is clearly revealed in the substance of the proposals they have put forward to date.

FEBRUARY 9 PROPOSAL

I would like to reiterate briefly what Gene Rostow said just a moment ago. Looking at the proposal that was outlined in Tass on February 9, it calls for reductions in NATO and Soviet medium-range systems down to 600 by 1985 and back to 300 by 1990. But included on the Western side would be United States aircraft, including carrier-based and land-based aircraft not in Europe, and French and British systems.

On the Soviet side the limits would include the SS-20's, the SS-4's and SS-5's, and the Backfire, Badger, and Blinder aircraft in Europe.

The point, however, of this proposal is that by allowing the Soviet Union to deploy as many as 300 SS-20 launchers—and that is more than they have deployed in Europe now—with at least 900 warheads in the European U.S.S.R. alone, it would constitute a significant increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities. There would not be any reduction in Soviet capabilities.

In short, the Soviet proposal would not require the destruction of a single SS-20 missile. It is anything then but a reduction proposal as far as the Soviet forces are concerned.

This proposal the Soviets have tabled is consistent with an apparent Soviet view that the U.S.S.R. has a right to maintain forces as strong as those of all other countries combined and, therefore, must be superior to those of the United States.

So, in sum, the Soviet's so-called reduction proposals, would not result in effective arms control; would codify a Soviet nuclear predominance; and would serve longstanding Soviet political ambitions toward Western Europe, with the decoupling of the United States from Europe as an essential first step, thus turning NATO Europe into a nuclear hostage to the Soviet Union.

ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a little bit about alliance consultations, because I think the INF process, the implementation of both tracks of the December 1979 decision, has really been a unique experience in our ability to talk and discuss these highly sensitive and crucial political issues with our allies.

It is particularly important, I think, that the U.S. position in these negotiations enjoys the full support of our NATO allies because, as I pointed out, they are unique negotiations. They involve for the first time in a bilateral United States-Soviet negotiation U.S. systems deployed on the territory of our allies, and Soviet systems designed to strike our allies.

New, truly effective consultative mechanisms have been created within the alliance in response to the unique nature of these issues: The High-Level Group, the so-called HLG, which is chaired by my colleague to the right here, Richard Perle, and the special consultative group, the so-called SCG.

These groups, chaired by the United States and composed of officials from capitals, have insured a firm alliance consensus on both tracks of the December 1979 decision. In particular, the position adopted by the United States in Geneva was the result not only of careful work here in Washington but of extensive discussions within the alliance. Both of these groups continue to meet in order to sustain allied support for a viable nuclear posture in Europe and for a realistic approach to arms control.

It is critical to underscore the importance of maintaining support for both tracks of the December 1979 decision. The modernization program is a response to a challenge to the central basis of the alliance: That an attack on one is an attack on all.

Without visible and continuing support for our modernization efforts, the Soviets would have little incentive to negotiate seriously. It was only in the face of alliance unity that the Soviet Union even came to the negotiating table at all.

Arms control cannot move forward in a political vacuum. The arms control approach chosen by the United States and supported by the alliance offers a serious opportunity for effective arms limitations to eliminate the threat which made the modernization program necessary in the first place.

But, as the Secretary of State has pointed out, Soviet behavior in Poland cannot but influence the prospects for progress in these negotiations. As he has said, events in Poland cast a long shadow over all aspects of East-West relations and threaten to erode the basis for arms control.

The Reagan administration remains committed to implementing both tracks of the December 1979 decision and so do our allies. As the depth of this alliance-wide commitment is made manifest, the Soviets, we hope, must come to realize that they are to be denied their primary political and military objective: To divide the United States from its allies and to shatter the unity which has given NATO its strength and resilience for the past three decades. They must be brought to recognize the need to accept substantial limits on their own forces if they are to achieve comparable limits on U.S. Forces.

It is in the belief that this recognition will come that we must base optimism for the prospects of the negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Burt's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THIS ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON NATO, EUROPEAN SECURITY, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL. THESE ISSUES GO TO THE HEART OF AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE, AND TO THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP WHICH WE HAVE TOGETHER FASHIONED. THIS IS A PARTNERSHIP AMONG FREE NATIONS WHICH SHARE A CONCEPT OF MAN'S PLACE IN SOCIETY AND OF THE MANNER IN WHICH INTERCOURSE BETWEEN SOCIETIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. BY BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC WITH THE PLEDGE THAT AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK ON ALL, AND BY GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THIS PLEDGE THROUGH THE INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EUROPE, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES INTO A SINGLE CONTINUUM OF DETERRENT POWER, THIS PARTNERSHIP HAS ALLOWED ITS MEMBERS TO LIVE IN FREEDOM, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY FOR OVER 30 YEARS.

THE SOVIET UNION'S AMBITION -- REFLECTED IN ITS FORCE POSTURE, ITS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO DERAIL NATO MODERNIZATION AND ITS INF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL -- IS TO DISSOLVE THIS PARTNERSHIP, TO TURN THE UNITED STATES INWARD, AND TO TURN WESTERN EUROPE INTO A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES WILL NOT

ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. BY MOVING AHEAD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH TRACKS OF NATO'S 1979 DECISION, THE ALLIANCE IS DEMONSTRATING ITS RESOLVE TO TURN BACK THESE SOVIET EFFORTS, AND TO PRESERVE THE STRUCTURE OF ALLIANCE SECURITY WHICH HAS MAINTAINED THE PEACE FOR MORE THAN THREE DECADES.

THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION

THE DECISION OF NATO MINISTERS IN DECEMBER 1979 TO DEPLOY NEW US GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II MISSILES IN EUROPE, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANY DISCUSSION OF CONTEMPORARY NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. THIS DECISION WAS THE CULMINATION OF NATO'S EFFORTS OVER SEVERAL YEARS TO COME TO TERMS WITH SOME FUNDAMENTAL -- AND TROUBLING -- SHIFTS IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS SHIFT WAS THE GRADUAL EROSION OF US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. THROUGHOUT MOST OF ITS HISTORY, NATO HAS RELIED FOR DETERRENCE ON A TRIAD OF FORCES -- CONVENTIONAL FORCES, NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EUROPE, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DEFINES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE LEGS OF THIS TRIAD. IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION NATO WOULD RESPOND AT A LEVEL APPROPRIATE TO THE NATURE OF THE AGGRESSION, AND WOULD RETAIN THE OPTION OF DELIBERATE ESCALATION SHOULD THE INITIAL RESPONSE FAIL TO CAUSE THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW.

THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE, THOUGH INFERIOR TO THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT, WOULD SERVE TO MAKE A CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE TO NON-NUCLEAR AGGRESSION CREDIBLE; NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EUROPE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE POSSIBILITY OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RESPONSE TO WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND, AND WOULD SERVE AS A VISIBLE AND CREDIBLE LINK TO THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WERE, AND CONTINUE TO BE, THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT.

UP THROUGH THE EARLY 1970S, NATO HAD HIGH CONFIDENCE THAT THIS POSTURE WOULD DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY ON THE GROUND IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE ALLIANCE HAD THE MEANS TO EXTRACT A HEAVY PRICE FOR ANY CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION, AND HELD THE OPTION OF BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL, WHERE THE WEST HAD CLEAR-CUT SUPERIORITY, BOTH IN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, AND IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

BUT AS WE MOVED INTO THE MID-TO-LATE 1970S THE WEST BEGAN TO LOSE THIS NUCLEAR EDGE BOTH IN THEATER AND IN STRATEGIC FORCES. THE RESULT OF THIS PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT WAS THAT IT WAS NO LONGER CLEAR THAT THE POSTURE NATO HAD DEVELOPED AND MAINTAINED OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES WOULD SUFFICE INDEFINITELY TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS FEARED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD COME TO BELIEVE -- HOWEVER MISTAKENLY -- THAT THEY COULD THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASED IN THE USSR AGAINST OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WITHOUT RISKING NUCLEAR RETALIATION AGAINST THE SOVIET HOMELAND.

These fears were substantiated by developments in the Soviet force posture which demonstrated that they were indeed seeking to weaken the link between US strategic forces and European defense. For not only did the Soviets continue their decade-long buildup of conventional and strategic nuclear forces; they introduced in the mid-1970s a new system into their arsenal, the MIRVed SS-20 missile, whose range and mobility was designed to exploit the new strategic relationship between the US and the USSR, and to expand significantly their capability of launching strikes against our Allies from the sanctuary of their own territory. This was only part of an across-the-board nuclear modernization program which included new shorter range missiles and aircraft.

The Alliance recognized that these developments threatened to undermine the central principle upon which the Alliance was formed -- that an attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack on all its members -- and to decouple the US strategic deterrent from the defense of Europe. The European Allies were the first to express concern about these developments. The United States responded positively. The result was the Alliance decision to deploy in Europe new systems which could reach deep into the Soviet Union, in order to demonstrate that the Soviet Union could not devastate Europe from a Russian sanctuary, and thus to ensure the Soviet recognition that any war in Europe would result in unacceptable damage to the USSR.

WHEN INF MODERNIZATION IS SEEN IN THIS BROADER CONTEXT OF WESTERN DETERRENCE STRATEGY, THE MYTHS -- SOMETIMES EXPRESSED HERE, AND FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED ACROSS THE ATLANTIC -- WHICH HAVE COME TO SURROUND THE ALLIANCE DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979 MELT AWAY.

o THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES TO EUROPE DOES NOT MOVE NATO AWAY FROM ITS STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. RATHER, THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION IS ESSENTIAL TO SUSTAINING NATO STRATEGY. IN PARTICULAR, IT WILL LINK MORE FIRMLY THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

o THIS DEPLOYMENT WAS NOT THRUST BY THE UNITED STATES UPON THE EUROPEANS. RATHER IT REPRESENTS A CONSIDERED AMERICAN RESPONSE TO A WIDELY FELT EUROPEAN NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ONSET OF STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE MASSIVE AND CONTINUING BUILDUP OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES, SUCH AS THE SS-20.

o THE DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT GIVE THE ALLIANCE A QUALITATIVELY NEW CAPABILITY. THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD SYSTEMS IN EUROPE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1952. RATHER THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL PERMIT NATO TO PRESERVE THAT CAPABILITY AND RETAIN THAT ELEMENT OF OUR DETERRENT STRATEGY DESPITE IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET AIR DEFENSE, THE AGING OF OUR OWN SYSTEMS, AN INCREASING NEED TO COMMIT NATO'S AIRCRAFT RESOURCES TO CONVENTIONAL ROLES, AND LARGE-SCALE NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF SOVIET INF.

o THIS DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT INCREASE THE ALLIANCE'S RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. RATHER, IN PROVIDING NATO A MORE BALANCED NUCLEAR POSTURE, THIS PLANNED DEPLOYMENT HAS ALREADY PERMITTED A SIGNIFICANT NET REDUCTION IN TOTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOCATED IN EUROPE.

o THIS DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT A STEP TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATO NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITY. IT IS THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS DEVELOPING THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN A NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE. THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL FORCE UPON THEM THE REALIZATION THAT NATO WILL NOT FIGHT A WAR ON THEIR TERMS, WILL NOT PERMIT THEM TO REGIONALIZE A CONFLICT TO EXCLUDE SOVIET TERRITORY, AND WILL NOT PERMIT THEM TO HOLD EUROPE A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE.

THE ROLE OF INF ARMS CONTROL

AT THE SAME TIME, NATO RECOGNIZED THAT EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL COULD SERVE THE SAME END -- REINFORCEMENT OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES. WHEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE, IT RECOGNIZED THAT THIS "TRACK" OF NATO'S 1979 DECISION WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. IN ONE OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST FOREIGN POLICY STEPS, IT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTIONS TO PURSUE BOTH TRACKS OF NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 DECISION.

THROUGHOUT 1981 THE ADMINISTRATION CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF US INF ARMS CONTROL POLICY AS PART OF ITS OVERALL REVIEW OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY. THIS REVIEW, AND INTENSE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, CULMINATED IN THE OFFER MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN HIS

NOVEMBER 18 ADDRESS, TO CANCEL US PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II MISSILES IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SOVIET SS-20, SS-4, AND SS-5 MISSILES.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THIS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHT-FORWARD PROPOSAL IS SIMPLE: IF THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO ELIMINATE THE SYSTEMS OF MOST CONCERN TO THE WEST, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE SYSTEMS THE SOVIETS DECLARE ARE OF MOST CONCERN TO THEM -- THE GLCM AND PERSHING II. THIS PROPOSAL HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE. IT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE US POSITION IN THE ONGOING INF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION WHICH BEGAN IN GENEVA ON NOVEMBER 30 OF LAST YEAR.

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDED THE US TO ADOPT THIS POSITION ARE WORTH HIGHLIGHTING BECAUSE THEY ILLUSTRATE THE PLACE OF OUR INF OBJECTIVES IN OUR OVERALL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, AND UNDERSCORE OUR COMMITMENT TO A MILITARILY MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL:

-- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MOST DYNAMIC AND THREATENING ASPECT OF THE THREAT: LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES. A NEGOTIATION WHICH ATTEMPTED TO ENCOMPASS A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER SYSTEMS WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THIS THREAT, AND INTRODUCE COMPLEXITIES WHICH WOULD IMPEDE OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT.

-- Limitations should be global in scope. Because of the range, mobility, and transportability of modern INF missiles, such as the SS-20 missile, limits applied only to those in Europe would not effectively limit the threat to Europe.

-- Limits must be equal. Equality between the US and the Soviet Union is the only acceptable basis for an agreement. The US can not permit the Soviet Union to achieve superiority either through negotiation or through military buildup.

-- Third-party systems should neither be limited nor compensated for in any agreement. In a bilateral US-Soviet negotiation it would be totally inappropriate to negotiate on systems of countries not present at the negotiating table. The Soviet Union cannot in any case expect to be granted the right to maintain forces as large as all other combined, for the pursuit of total security by any country must result in total insecurity for all the rest.

-- Any agreement must be verifiable. Given the smaller size and greater mobility of INF systems, this will be an even greater challenge in INF talks than in those on strategic arms.

The approach chosen by the President, and endorsed by the Allies, adheres to these principles.

-- The proposal would place limits on those Soviet systems which are of greatest concern to NATO: longer-range land-based INF missiles such as the SS-20, and on those US systems about which the Soviets have expressed most serious concern, the new ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.

-- THE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR LIMITS ON A GLOBAL BASIS, RATHER THAN LIMITS CONFINED TO A SPECIFIC, ARBITRARY REGION. IN SEEKING THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SS-20s, SS-4s, AND SS-5s, THE US IS WILLING TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GLCM IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

-- THE PROPOSAL WOULD SET EQUAL LIMITS AT THE ZERO LEVEL. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT THEY WANT MAJOR REDUCTIONS AND PARITY; OUR PROPOSAL PUTS THAT CLAIM TO THE TEST.

-- THE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PUT FORTH WITH VERIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS CLEARLY IN MIND. A TOTAL BAN ON A SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE BAN WE ARE SEEKING ON LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES, WILL BE EASIER TO VERIFY THAN ANY NUMERICAL LIMIT ABOVE THE ZERO LEVEL.

THE SOVIET APPROACH

THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN TWO TRACK APPROACH TO INF. ON ONE TRACK THEY SEEK TO DECOUPLE THE US FROM EUROPE WITH FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. ON THE OTHER TRACK THEY SEEK TO DO SO THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND PROPAGANDA. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS CLEARLY REVEALED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE PUT FORWARD TO DATE.

FOR YEARS THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO PLACE THEIR MISSILES AIMED AT EUROPE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY ARGUED THAT SINCE THESE SYSTEMS COULD NOT STRIKE THE UNITED STATES, BUT ONLY THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, THEY SHOULD BE OF NO CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS ONLY WHEN FACED WITH THE PROSPECT OF NEW INF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO EUROPE THAT THEY

AGREED TO PUT THEIR SYSTEMS ON THE TABLE AT ALL. THEY HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF "MEDIUM - RANGE" SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. THIS PROPOSAL IS TRANSPARENTLY DESIGNED TO PERPETUATE THE CURRENT SOVIET MONOPOLY ON LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, EFFECTIVELY BLOCKING NATO'S PLANNED MODERNIZATION. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD DO NOTHING TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM CONTINUING DEPLOYMENTS EAST OF THE URALS, DEPLOYMENTS WHICH WOULD STILL POSE A THREAT TO OUR ALLIES. FIRST MADE PUBLICLY IN OCTOBER 1979 AND REPEATED IN VARIOUS FORMS SINCE, THIS MORATORIUM PROPOSAL CONTINUES TO BE PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIETS, BUT MORE RECENTLY IT HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ANOTHER APPROACH DESIGNED TO SERVE THE SAME ENDS, THROUGH SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT MEANS.

THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY OUTLINED THIS SECOND PROPOSAL IN TASS ON FEBRUARY 9. IT CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS IN NATO AND SOVIET "MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS" DOWN TO 600 BY 1985, AND DOWN TO 300 BY 1990. INCLUDED ON THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD BE US AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING CARRIER-BASED AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT NOT IN EUROPE, AND FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS. ON THE SOVIET SIDE THE LIMITS WOULD INCLUDE SS-20'S, SS-4'S AND SS-5'S AND BACKFIRE, BADGER, AND BLINDER AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE. EXCLUDED WOULD BE ALL SOVIET SYSTEMS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE OF COMPARABLE RANGE AND CAPABILITY TO THOSE US AIRCRAFT INCLUDED. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS THE RIGHT TO HAVE, AT THE END OF NEARLY A DECADE OF SUPPOSED REDUCTIONS, AS

MANY AS 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS WITH AT LEAST 900 WARHEADS IN THE EUROPEAN USSR ALONE -- A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, DESPITE THEIR CLAIMS OF A TWO-THIRDS REDUCTION. IT WOULD NOT LIMIT IN ANY WAY EXISTING SOVIET SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN USSR. THESE WOULD THUS BE ALLOWED TO INCREASE WITHOUT LIMIT -- AND COULD BE FURTHER AUGMENTED UNDER THE LOOPHOLE ALLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGEDLY "REDUCED" SYSTEMS FROM THE EUROPEAN USSR. AN SS-20, IT MUST BE NOTED, IS RENDERED NO LESS THREATENING IF IT IS MOVED OUT OF EUROPE BUT CAN STILL REACH ALLIANCE TERRITORY.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IN SHORT, WOULD NOT REQUIRE THE DESTRUCTION OF A SINGLE SS-20 MISSILE. SOVIET REDUCTIONS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED SOLELY BY RETIREMENT OF OLDER SYSTEMS SUCH AS SS-4S AND 5S, WHICH BREZHNEV HIMSELF HAS STATED HAVE OUTLIVED THEIR USEFUL SERVICE LIFE. IN SHORT, IT IS ANYTHING BUT A REDUCTION PROPOSAL AS FAR AS SOVIET FORCES ARE CONCERNED.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RESTS ON THE CLAIM THAT A "BALANCE" IN "MEDIUM-RANGE" NUCLEAR ARMS EXISTS IN EUROPE. THEY CANNOT SUPPORT THIS CLAIM EXCEPT BY MANIPULATION OF THE FACTS -- FOR EXAMPLE BY INCLUDING US SYSTEMS NOT DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, US SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT EVEN MEET THE SOVIET CRITERION FOR "MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS", AS WELL AS UK AND FRENCH INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES. THE SOVIETS IGNORE THE FACT THAT IF THEIR

NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OF COMPARABLE RANGES ARE ALSO INCLUDED IN THE COUNT, THE DISPARITY IN THEIR FAVOR IS MADE EVEN WORSE. THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT A BALANCE EXISTS IS DESIGNED TO CONCEAL THE SOVIET MONOPOLY IN LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES.

FOR NATO, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET SO-CALLED REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WOULD BE A SEVERE CURTAILMENT OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES. US LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES WOULD BE HELD TO THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ZERO. OTHER US INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED FROM EUROPE.

THE PROPOSED OUTCOME IS CONSISTENT WITH AN APPPARENT SOVIET VIEW THAT THE USSR HAS A RIGHT TO MAINTAIN FORCES AS STRONG AS THOSE OF ALL OTHERS COMBINED AND THEREFORE MUST BE SUPERIOR TO THE UNTED STATES.

IN SUM, THE SOVIET SO-CALLED REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL:

- WOULD NOT RESULT IN EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL;
- WOULD CODIFY A SOVIET NUCLEAR PREPONDERANCE,
- AND WOULD SERVE LONG-STANDING SOVIET POLITICAL AMBITIONS TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE, WITH THE DECOUPLING OF THE US FROM EUROPE AS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP, THUS TURNING NATO EUROPE INTO A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE ONLY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF BOTH SIDES WERE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE START OF TALKS. THE SOVIETS HAVE SINCE

TO PUT DETAILS OF THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION AT GENEVA INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, IN A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION AND TO UNDERMINE ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION. CONTINUED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES MUST RAISE DOUBTS AS TO THEIR TRUE OBJECTIVES IN PURSUING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE US, FOR ITS PART, REMAINS COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND IN GOOD FAITH IN GENEVA. IT REMAIN OUR CONVICTION THAT THE SIMPLE, STRAIGHT-FORWARD US APPROACH, DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS, OFFERS THE BEST AND MOST EQUITABLE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY AGREEMENT LEADING TO REAL REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE TABLED A TREATY CONTAINING DETAILED PROVISIONS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE OUR DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA FORWARD.

CONSULTATIONS

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE US POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS ENJOY THE FULL SUPPORT OF OUR NATO ALLIES. THESE ARE UNIQUE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY INVOLVE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION, US SYSTEMS DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY OF OUR ALLIES, AND SOVIET SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO STRIKE OUR ALLIES', NOT OUR OWN, TERRITORY. NEW, TRULY EFFECTIVE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS HAVE BEEN CREATED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN RESPONSE TO THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THESE ISSUES: THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) AND THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP (SCG).

These groups, chaired by the US and composed of officials from capitals, have ensured a firm Alliance consensus on both tracks of the December 1979 decision. In particular, the position eventually adopted by the US in Geneva was the result not only of careful work here in Washington, but of extensive discussions within the Alliance. Both of these groups continue to meet, in order to sustain Allied support for a viable nuclear posture and for a realistic approach to arms control.

It is critical to underscore the importance of maintaining support for both tracks of the December 1979 NATO decision. The modernization program is a response to a challenge to the central basis of the Alliance -- that an attack on one is an attack on all. Without visible and continuing support for our modernization efforts, the Soviets would have little incentive to negotiate seriously. It was only in the face of continuing Alliance unity behind the modernization program that the Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating table in the first place.

Arms control cannot move forward in a political vacuum. The arms control approach chosen by the US, and supported by the Alliance, offers a serious opportunity for effective arms limitations to eliminate the threat which made this modernization program necessary. But Soviet behavior in Poland cannot but influence the prospects for progress in

THESE NEGOTIATIONS. EVENTS IN POLAND CAST A LONG SHADOW OVER ALL ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND ERODE THE BASIS FOR ARMS CONTROL.

THE US REMAINS COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTING BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION AND SO ARE OUR ALLIES. AS THE DEPTH OF THIS ALLIANCE-WIDE COMMITMENT IS MADE MANIFEST, THE SOVIETS MUST COME TO REALIZE THAT THEY ARE TO BE DENIED THEIR PRIMARY POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVE: TO DIVIDE THE US FROM ITS ALLIES, AND TO SHATTER THE UNITY WHICH HAS GIVEN NATO ITS STRENGTH AND RESILIENCE FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES. THEY MUST BE BROUGHT TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL LIMITS ON THEIR OWN FORCES, IF THEY ARE TO ACHIEVE COMPARABLE LIMITS ON US FORCES OF CONCERN TO THEM. IT IS IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS RECOGNITION WILL COME THAT WE MUST BASE OPTIMISM FOR THE PROSPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN GENEVA.

Chairman **Zablocki** [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Burt.

Mr. Perle, if you will proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. **Perle**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I correctly anticipated that my colleagues, Gene Rostow and Rick Burt would persuasively assess the Soviet approach to these negotiations and, in the course of so doing, demolish the Soviet case. So I will not repeat that ground.

ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL

I would prefer to talk about arms control in general and our experience in the recent past that forms the basis for what understanding we now have of the prospects ahead of us.

In the Department of Defense we deal, most of the time, with technical questions, with questions of weapons procurement and budgets, but these issues of arms control are equally important. Indeed, unlike the technical issues that attend the selection of one weapons system over another, those matters of national priority that resolve into levels of defense spending, clarity about the role of arms control in our national defense is as crucial as confusion about it is pervasive.

If we are wrong about the purchase of a plane or a missile or a ship, or if we spend too little for national defense, the effectiveness and capability of our forces will be diminished for however long it takes us to recognize our error and correct it.

But if we harbor illusions about our adversary and build policies of disarmament upon those illusions, if we sign treaties that create the impression but not the reality that our adversaries have joined us in a search for restraint and accommodation, we will set in motion the trends of history that weapons procurement and budget levels may prove powerless to arrest.

It is now more than 12 years since the first round of the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland. Twelve years after the talks began, the United States again finds itself involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting the nuclear arsenals of our two countries. In the intervening 12 years a generation of Americans then in the first grade has graduated from high school. And a generation of Government officials have had the benefit of an education about arms control with the Soviet Union.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NEGOTIATIONS

I want to take a moment to discuss some of what we have learned and how we in the Department of Defense intend to apply those lessons to the negotiations that lie before us.

I should say at once that a long and dismal history of disarmament preceded the lessons of the past dozen years. It was a history in which there was little in the way of disarmament that was worthy of the name, the history of disarmament that may be properly described has little more than a story of unsuccessful attempts to bring it about.

I hope that you will forgive me for beginning on a note of skepticism. The task before us is long and hard. We will not make the job easier or our policies wiser by ignoring what has come before or romanticizing about what is to come.

We have learned these last 12 years that Soviet willingness to negotiate is not the same as, and must not be confused with, Soviet willingness to accommodate. The Soviets have demonstrated a capacity to negotiate on arms control while building precisely those nuclear forces that are the subject of negotiation. Whatever they may say about the illegitimacy of negotiating from strength, it is standard Soviet practice to do so.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that Soviet spending on strategic forces actually increased in the period following the SALT I agreement. From two times U.S. spending prior to 1972, Soviet spending on strategic forces increased to three times ours in the years following the 1972 agreements.

SHIFT IN STRATEGIC BALANCE

Indeed, if one compares United States and Soviet strategic forces over the period during which we have been negotiating strategic arms limitations, the picture that emerges is one of a dramatic shift in the strategic balance.

Twelve years ago the United States was substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in virtually every indicator of strategic power except the number of warheads. Now, 12 years later, the Soviets are ahead of us in each of those same indicators except the number of warheads. And if current trends continue, as they are likely to do, it is only a matter of time—and not much time—before the Soviets will surpass us in number of warheads as well.

A dozen years ago all three major elements of our strategic triad were survivable, even under the most pessimistic assumptions about Soviet strength and American deficiencies. Today our land-based missiles have become vulnerable to Soviet attack, and our bombers face increasingly formidable air defenses that raise serious questions about their ability to penetrate and reach their targets.

The strategic balance is less favorable and more uncertain now than it was then. And all of this has taken place with arms control talks in virtually continuous session.

The United States now faces the prospect of vast expenditures, on the order of $180 billion, not to acquire strategic superiority, which is not our goal, but to restore and protect the security and effectiveness of our strategic deterrent. Our experience since SALT I got underway has shown that the Soviets have tried and have in large measure succeeded to negotiate arms control agreements that permit the continued growth of their strategic forces.

The principal argument of the Nixon administration that the SALT I interim agreement would halt the momentum of the Soviet buildup, to use the phrase most commonly used at the time, was proven false as the Soviets continued greatly to increase their forces within the confines of the agreement. One searches in vain for evidence that the continuing Soviet buildup has been deflected or diminished by the provisions of the SALT I or II agreements.

Of course, it can be argued that in the absence of either or both of these agreements, the increase in Soviet strategic forces would have been even larger and our situation today would be even worse. Indeed, it was the essence of the last administration's argument for the SALT II treaty that the number of Soviet weapons permitted under it, high as that was, would have been even higher without it. Yet that argument assumes that the absence of an agreement would in itself lead the Soviets to go on building strategic forces surplus to their needs, mindlessly adding weapon upon weapon, building for building's sake.

In my judgment, no such assumption is warranted. The Soviets plan the evolution of their strategic forces in order to meet their strategic objectives. They certainly prefer to meet those objectives within the confines of negotiated agreements. But everything we know of the development of Soviet arms control negotiating strategy reinforces the conclusion that they only accept limitations that accommodate their plans and objectives.

MEASUREMENT OF ARMS CONTROL SUCCESS

Mr. Chairman, there is no persuasive evidence of which I am aware that any of the agreements they have negotiated have caused them to change their plans or alter their objectives. In light of our experience, I believe that we ought to measure success in arms control not by comparing the levels agreed upon with the inevitably higher levels the Soviets could build in the absence of an agreement, but by comparison with the levels of forces actually deployed when the agreement takes effect.

In other words, our objective ought to be reductions from current Soviet force levels, and the test of any agreement indeed ought to be whether it diminishes the threat posed by Soviet forces to the United States and its allies. If we reason in the future as we have in the past, we will end up with agreements whose principal effect is to legitimize menacingly large Soviet deployments.

I believe that the term "cosmetic" aptly describes the arms control agreements of the recent past. "Having the capability to beautify" is the definition my dictionary gives of cosmetic, and I should think that the last thing we would desire to do is to beautify the massive nuclear arsenal the Soviets have so intently acquired. If we are to avoid cosmetic agreements in the future, we must insist that any arms control agreement with the Soviets must diminish the Soviet threat to us and to our allies in ways that are measurable and militarily significant.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE

If I may, I should like to conclude with a reflection on an earlier negotiation and one of the participants in it. The words are those of Sir Samuel Hoare. The negotiation took place in Munich in 1938. Writing later in his memoirs, Sir Samuel Hoare had this to say:

> Like Chamberlain, I had been caught up in the toils of the critical negotiation. The longer it went on and the more serious the issue became, the more anxious I grew to see it succeed. This is almost always the course of negotiations. As they proceed, the parties in them become increasingly obsessed with the need to prevent their final failure. If they are to continue, it is necessary to make concessions, and one concession almost invariably leads to another.

> The time comes when the question has to be faced, is the substance being sacrificed to the negotiation, and is it not better to admit failure rather than make further proposals and concessions. Throughout the Munich discussions I often asked myself whether the slide into surrender had not started.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, as we enter negotiations with the Soviet Union on the control of intermediate range nuclear forces, we are well positioned by an historic proposal by the President of the United States that promises a fair and equitable and a militarily significant balance if it can be achieved.

I would hope as those negotiations continue—as my colleagues have said, and I certainly agree, the road will be long and hard—that we will bear in mind the admonition of one participant in an earlier negotiation.

Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, Mr. Perle's prepared statement will be made a part of the record.

[Mr. Perle's statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before you to discuss national security and arms control. This is an issue that I was privileged to work on during several years as a member of the U.S. Senate staff.

Unlike the technical issues that attend the selection of one weapons system over another, or those matters of national priority that resolve into levels of defense spending, clarity about the role of arms control in our national defense is as crucial as confusion about it is pervasive. If we are wrong about the purchase of a plane or a missile or a ship, or if we spend too little for national defense, the effectiveness and capability of our forces will be diminished for however long it takes to recognize our error and correct it. But if we harbor illusions about our adversary and build policies of disarmament upon those illusions, if we sign treaties that create the impression, but not the reality, that our adversaries have joined us in a search for restraint and accommodation, we will set in motion the trends of history that weapons procurement and budget levels may prove powerless to arrest.

It is now more than 12 years since the first round of the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland. And 12 years after those talks began the United States again finds itself involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting the nuclear arsenals of our two countries.

In the intervening 12 years a generation of Americans then in the first grade has graduated from high school. And a generation of government officials have had the benefit of an education about arms control with the Soviet Union. I want to take a moment today to discuss some of what we have learned, and how we in the Department of Defense intend to apply those lessons to the negotiations that lie before us.

I should say at once that a long and dismal history of disarmament preceeded the lessons of the past dozen years. It was a history in which there was little in the way of disarmament that was worthy of the name; a history of disarmament that may be properly described as little more than the story of unsuccessful attempts to bring it about.

I hope that I may be forgiven for beginning on a note of skepticism. But the task before us is long and hard; and we will not make the job easier, or our policies wiser, by ignoring what has come before or romanticizing about what is yet to come.

We have learned these last 12 years that Soviet willingness to negotiate is not the same as, and must not be confused with, Soviet willingness to accommodate.

The Soviets have demonstrated a capacity to negotiate on arms control while building precisely those nuclear forces that are the subject of negotiation. Whatever they may say about the illegitimacy of negotiating from strength, it is standard Soviet practice to do so. Thus it is hardly surprising that Soviet spending on strategic forces actually increased in the period following the SALT I agreement: from two times U.S. spending prior to 1972 Soviet spending on strategic forces increased to three times ours in the years following the 1972 agreements. Indeed, if one compares U.S. and Soviet strategic forces over the period during which we have been negotiating strategic arms limitations, the picture that emerges is one of a dramatic shift in the strategic balance. Twelve years ago the United States was substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in virtually every indicator of strategic power except the number of warheads. Now, 12 years later, the Soviets are ahead of us in each of those same indicators -- except the number of warheads. And if current trends continue, as they are likely to do, it is only a matter of time before the Soviets will surpass us in numbers of warheads as well.

A dozen years ago all three major elements of our strategic triad were survivable, even under the most pessimistic assumptions about Soviet strength and American weakness. Today our land-based missiles have become vulnerable to Soviet attack and our bombers face increasingly formidable air defenses that raise serious questions about their ability to penetrate and reach their targets. The strategic balance is less favorable and more uncertain now than it was then. And all of this has taken place with arms control talks in virtually continuous session. The United States now faces the prospect of vast expenditures, on the order of $180 billion -- not to acquire strategic superiority, which is not our goal, but to restore and protect the security and effectiveness of our strategic deterrent.

Our experience since SALT I got underway has shown that the Soviets have tried, and have in large measure succeeded, to negotiate arms control agreements that permit the continued growth of their strategic forces. The principal argument of the Nixon Administration, that the SALT I Interim Agreement would "halt the momentum of the Soviet build-up," was proven false as the Soviets continued greatly to increase their forces within the confines of the agreement. This was accomplished in a number of ways. I will mention only one.

You will recall that the Interim Agreement contained limitations on the number of launchers for strategic missiles and on the volume by which existing launchers could be increased. This later limitation was intended to preclude the substitution of larger, or "heavy" missiles for smaller, or "light" ones. Shortly after the agreement was signed the Soviets began to flight test a new missile, the SS-19, that had a volume very substantially larger than the missile that it replaced. In fact, the SS-19 was so much larger than the missile it replaced that Secretary of Defense Laird regarded it as a "heavy" missile, and considered its deployment a violation of the agreement. When the precise language of the agreement was reviewed it became apparent that the Soviets had succeeded in building into the agreement a loophole that left the United States with no effective recourse. The end result was a three-fold increase in the throw weight of the Soviet "light" missiles and an eventual six fold increase in the number of warheads deployed on those missiles. What had been advertised as a "freeze" on the Soviet ICBM force gave way to a thaw which was followed by a flood of increased Soviet strategic offensive power. And it is that force, which is deployed today, that has rendered our Minuteman missiles vulnerable and imposed on this nation a burden to respond at a cost of many tens of billions of dollars.

One searches in vain for evidence that the continuing Soviet build-up was been deflected or diminished by the provisions of the SALT I or SALT II agreements.

Of course it can be argued that, in the absence of either or both of these agreements, the increase in Soviet strategic forces would have been even larger and our situation today would be even worse. Indeed, it was the essence of the last Administration's argument for the SALT II Treaty that the number of Soviet weapons permitted under it, high as that was, would have been even higher without it. Yet that argument assumes that the absence of an agreement would, in itself, lead the Soviets to go on building strategic forces surplus to their needs, mindlessly adding weapon upon weapon, building for building's sake. In my judgment no such assumption is warranted. The Soviets plan the evolution of their strategic forces in order to meet their strategic objectives. They certainly prefer to meet those objectives within the confines of negotiated agreements. But everything we know of the development of Soviet arms control negotiating strategy reinforces the conclusion that they only accept "limitations" that accommodate their plans and objectives.

There is no persuasive evidence of which I am aware that any of the agreements they have negotiated have caused them to change their plans or alter their objectives.

In light of our experience, I believe that we ought to measure success in arms control not by comparing the levels agreed upon with the inevitably higher levels the Soviets could build in the absence of an agreement, but by comparison with the levels of forces actually deployed when the agreement takes effect. In other words, our objective ought to be reductions from current Soviet force levels, and the test of any agreement ought to be whether it diminishes the threat posed by Soviet forces in being to the United States and its allies. If we reason in the future as we have in the past we will end up with agreements whose principal effect is to legitimize meaningly large Soviet deployments.

I believe that the term "cosmetic" aptly describes the arms control agreements of the recent past. "Having the power to beautify" is the definition my dictionary gives of cosmetic; and I should think that the last thing we would desire to do is beautify the massive nuclear arsenal the Soviets have so intently acquired. If we are to avoid cosmetic agreements in the future we must insist that any arms control agreement with the Soviets must diminish the Soviet threat to us and our allies in ways that are measurable and militarily significant.

We are now involved in negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces. In those negotiations it is the purpose of the United States

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to obviate the requirement for the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe by persuading the Soviet Union to dismantle the several hundred land-based missiles they have already deployed.

In his speech on November 18, 1981, President Reagan made an historic offer to the Soviet Union. He proposed that if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles the United States would cancel plans, agreed upon by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December, 1979, to deploy some 572 comparable missiles in several allied countries. The President has proposed a balance in intermediate range land-based missiles at a level that is equal and fair to both sides because it is zero for both sides. There is no other number that would better serve the interests of peace or better meet the aspirations of people the world over whose desire for genuine disarmament has found no fertile ground in past history.

For the past several years the Soviets have been deploying modern, accurate, multiple-warhead missiles that can strike NATO's deterrent forces in a matter of minutes. Today the United States has no comparable missiles in Europe. If we are successful in the Geneva negotiations that will remain the case. If we are not we shall implement fully NATO's decision to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, of which there are now some 270 deployed, each with three warheads, by the deployment of 572 ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles.

I have had the privilege in recent months to chair NATO's High Level Group which some weeks ago completed, and forwarded to Defense Ministers meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, two reports on which these negotiations will rely. These reports achieved a high degree of consensus within the Alliance -- and they point clearly to the need to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces in the face of a growing Soviet theater nuclear threat. The decision to respond to the Soviet deployment of recent years is now being implemented with a high degree of solidarity among the allies who made that decision two years ago. And despite protests and demonstrations in Europe, the program is on schedule and will lead to an initial deployment in December, 1983.

I believe it is clear that our effort to conclude the Geneva negotiations with a treaty reflecting the President's proposal depends fundamentally on the continuing resolve of the alliance to proceed with its own deployment. And I am confident that it will do so.

In the Geneva negotiations we are also seeking limitations on some Soviet systems of shorter range. A failure to limit them, by numerical ceilings and other limitations, would leave an agreement eliminating the Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles hopelessly vulnerable to circumvention; for the fact is that the Soviets can cover some 85% of the NATO targets assigned to the SS-20 with the shorter range, SS-22 if they are deployed in sufficient numbers and moved forward on Warsaw Pact territory. The SS-X-23, while shorter in range than the SS-22, can still strike much of European NATO -- as much as 50% -- when forward deployed.

At Geneva we are making it plain to the Soviets that any treaty agreed upon must include verification measures that will almost certainly go beyond the national technical means of verification on which the less complex agreements of the past have relied.

The Geneva negotiations will not be easy. They will take time. The Soviets never make concessions quickly and they never make them easily. It will take firm resolve and great patience to achieve success. When one recalls that it took a full ten years to get the Soviets to honor their wartime treaty obligation to withdraw the Red Army from post-war Austria, it is clear that in dealing with the Soviets patience and resolve have their own rewards.

Sometimes in the past we have made the mistake of presenting proposals to the Soviets only to abandon them when they met with Soviet resistance. In March of 1977 Secretary of State Vance made proposals to the Soviets for reductions in strategic forces that were withdrawn in mere six weeks later. Each subsequent new American proposal was more generous than the last. And in the end the treaty that resulted could not obtain support in the Senate sufficient for ratification. 1977 belongs to the history from which we have learned, to the experience from which we as a nation have graduated.

We will not repeat that mistake. We have gone to Geneva with a proposal that we can defend; and defend it we will.

I believe that we will succeed in Geneva if we are firm and deliberate, if we stand by the substance of our proposal. That substance is fair and equitable; it must not be sacrificed to the negotiation.

If I may I should like to conclude with the reflection on an earlier negotiation of one of the participants in it. The words are those of Sir Samuel Hoare. The negotiation took place in Munich in 1938. Writing later in his memoires Sir Samuel had this to say:

> "Like /¯Chamberlain_7 ... I had been caught up in the toils of a critical negotiation. The longer it went on and the more serious the issue became, the more anxious I grew to see it succeed. This is almost always the course of negotiations. As they proceed, the parties in them become increasingly obsessed with the need to prevent their final failure. If they are to continue, it is necessary to make concessions, and one concession almost invariably leads to another. The time comes when the question has to be faced: Is the substance being sacrificed to the negotiation, and is it not better to admit failure rather than to make further proposals and concessions? Throughout the Munich discussions I often asked myself whether the slide into surrender had not started."

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you, Mr. Perle.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your very thoughtful and well-prepared statements.

VERIFICATION OF DATA

Mr. Rostow, on page 12 of your statement in the middle of the first full paragraph, you stated that in "the proposals being made to the Soviets thus far, both regarding the INF and SALT negotiations, are insisting that each side take responsibility for data about its own forces."

It is my understanding this is one of the most difficult stumbling blocks in our negotiation in both Geneva and in Vienna.

Mr. **Rostow**. Vienna.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Would you amplify that statement? How are we to understand it?

Mr. **Rostow**. Surely. I should be glad to, Mr. Chairman. In August we had a preliminary conversation with Soviet representatives on two or three aspects of these arms control talks which we thought would be common to all of them before we were ready to talk about either INF or START. One was the problem of verification where we said that we thought there would have to be cooperative means to supplement national technical means in order to assure the possibility of verifying compliance in certain cases, and the other was the data question.

You may recall that the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in the spring said that while there had been some progress in the Vienna negotiations, and indeed there had been some progress in SALT II in Soviet provision of data the Soviets had still not come anything like halfway toward taking full responsibility.

So we emphasized this point with great force in August, and we are now struggling both in Vienna and in Geneva with problems about the provision and verification of data in reaching agreement on a data base. The Soviet Union has made both a public and a diplomatic statement with regard to cooperative means of verification, as I noted in my prepared statement. They made no formal statement on the subject of data, but we are pursuing it, as I stressed in my statement and as Mr. Burt did.

Agreement about data is absolutely indispensable to making any sense out of these negotiations. The whole Soviet argument, in public and in private, rests on the thesis that there is now a balance and that the introduction of the American Pershings and GLCM's in Europe would disturb that balance. So it is a subject on which we have made a commitment in principle, and we are pursuing the problem in the negotiations.

PRODUCTION OF LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chairman **Zablocki**. I believe all of you have touched upon and made the observation that the preservation of the NATO alliance is one of the primary foreign policy objectives of this administration. As we all know, we are having some problems with our NATO allies with respect to preserving a unified NATO alliance—if I may use the word, "solidarity" would be theirs and our goal. Many of us in Congress are deeply concerned about the U.S. decision to produce a new generation of lethal chemical weapons for deployment in Europe and concerned about its impact on the preservation of the alliance.

It is my understanding we have not yet made a decision to deploy binary chemical weapons to Europe—where they would ultimately have to be located to serve as an effective deterrent—but the Europeans are very concerned about U.S. chemical warfare policy enough so to possibly preclude implementation of Europe's agreement to deploy theater nuclear weapons in 1983.

To what extent does the U.S. decision to produce binary chemical weapons hamper our efforts with our NATO allies?

Mr. Rostow. I do not think it hampers them at all. It brings up the vital importance of allied consultation and the necessity for reaching common positions. Perhaps I should start my answer to your important question, Mr. Chairman, with a comment on Mr. Perle's thoughtful and insightful reflections on the process of arms control negotiation.

There is the impulse to succeed which afflicts people once they get involved in a negotiation. I am often asked how I see the chance for success at these negotiations, and I answer, as perhaps I have answered before this committee at an earlier point, that there are two criteria for success. One is the possibility of an agreement with the Soviet Union compatible with our security interests, indeed one which would strengthen our own security and everybody else's security. The other is that we go through this effort to reach an agreement and maintain and indeed deepen allied solidarity in the process because the Soviet Union is using arms control as a powerful propaganda weapon to divide us from our allies.

Now, the question you have raised about chemical warfare is, of course, a most important one. The Soviet Union is active in the field of chemical warfare, in manufacturing, in research, and indeed in the testing of various kinds of chemical and biological weapons going back to 1967, and in 1967 by a strange chance I was involved in the discussions about the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union in the Yemen, in the war that Egypt was conducting against the Yemen at that time.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION

Of course, verification problems in the field of chemical and biological weapons are intensely difficult. The manufacture of chemical weapons is much harder to detect than the deployment of a submarine. The only way in which the use of chemical weapons can be prevented is through deterrence. We must never forget that chemical weapons were used in World War I but were not used in World War II, and they were not used in the Second World War because it was known that the United States had chemical weapons in reserve, had no interest in using them, did not want to use them, but that it would respond by way of retaliation, and that retaliatory power prevented the use of these weapons.

COMPREHENSIVE TREATY BANNING USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The President has recently approved a comprehensive memorandum on our policy in this field, and we are now before the Committee on Disarmament, hard at work with our allies, and with the full support of our allies pressing forward in the preparations for a comprehensive treaty banning the use of chemical weapons. The problem of verification facing that treaty is the problem which confronts treaties in the field of nuclear arms only in a far more acute form, and that is why our pursuit of the yellow rain episodes is so important, important not only in the field of chemical weapons but in the field of verification of all arms control agreements.

So, here, I think in this difficult and sensitive subject of chemical warfare, I fully recognize the importance of what you said about political sensitivities abroad, about the potentiality for being the theater for such deployment. Preparation has to be made, has to be made to be capable of retaliating if chemical weapons are used, and on that point our allies thoroughly understand our position. They are working with us in full agreement on the preparations for the examination of the problems involved in a new treaty or a supplement to existing treaties.

It is a difficult subject, it is a disagreeable subject, but our adversaries, our potential adversaries, our real adversaries, however we want to describe them, are very active in the field and have been testing these weapons in the Third World against defenseless populations. They have been scornfully rejecting all proposals for a cooperative group, scientific committees, whatever, that could investigate the charges that have been made and the concerns that have arisen.

The Soviet attitude toward these charges has simply deepened suspicion and fear, so that under these circumstances we have all concluded that it is indispensable that we retain and modernize our retaliatory capacity.

POSITION OF U.S. ALLIES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. My time has expired, Mr. Rostow, but if I may pursue the question, is it not true that our allies are concerned and nervous because we have not really adequately emphasized defense against chemical use in warfare? We have not really prepared. The Soviet Union has indeed expended quite a bit of its resources for protection against the use of chemical warfare.

Mr. ROSTOW. I had better remit that question to Mr. Perle. I know, of course, that Soviet tanks and Soviet armored personnel carriers are prepared defensively, but I think it is more appropriate for the Defense Department to address that question than for me.

Mr. PERLE. Mr. Chairman, if one looks at the full program the administration has proposed, $4 out of every $5 will be spent on defensive measures. Only 20 percent of the program is aimed at improving our offensive capability, and that is principally to modernize an aging stockpile of chemical weapons that have become increasingly cumbersome and expensive to handle, in some cases even dangerous to handle, so that we will have an adequate retaliatory capability coupled with a defense capability that we do not now have.

The Soviets have thoroughly integrated chemical weapons into their force structure. It is a subject they take seriously. They have five graduate institutions in the Soviet Armed Forces exclusively dedicated to instruction in chemical warfare. They have upward of 70,000 specially trained troops whose exclusive battlefield training is in the use of chemical weapons. Their doctrine and their tactics are suffused with discussion of the use of chemical weapons, and we have come reluctantly to the conclusion that our own present capabilities are inadequate in the face of that Soviet effort.

Chairman Zablocki. I would like to pursue that but my time has expired.

Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say with significant reservation, I do not sense that either of you seem to me to have any great enthusiasm for your assigned responsibilities, at least in this particular area, and to use the words of Dean Rostow, maybe there is an impulse to fail rather than an impulse to succeed. I am probably as depressed as you are about the prospects and I do not expect to be jumping up and down with enthusiasm for this assignment, but I sense a very, very negative tone.

TNF CHANGED TO INF

Dean Rostow, why is the name of the negotiations now "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force," INF, rather than "Theater Nuclear Forces" as they were previously known?

Mr. Rostow. Well, the reason is very simple, Congressman Rosenthal. In Europe and elsewhere people said in effect, "For us, our own country is strategic and not a mere theater." We accepted their sensitivities, and made the distinction far more accurate by distinguishing among these weapons in terms of their range. We have battlefield nuclear weapons, intermediate-range weapons, and intercontinental weapons.

Mr. Rosenthal. The answer to the question was that you took into account the sensitivities of the European population.

Mr. Rostow. That is right.

Mr. Rosenthal. Nowhere in your statement do you mention your sensitivity of Europeans. Are we responding to them in policy in any way?

Mr. Rostow. Of course we take their policy concerns into account. We want to reach a common position and we have reached a common position, but the basic policy represented by the 1979 two-track decision was a decision made in order to address a security problem which had become more and more obvious with the development of the SS-20's.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Rosenthal. Do you believe it is realistic to expect the Soviets to bargain meaningfully for limitations in a missile system which is already deployed, in exchange for limitations on undeployed NATO systems? As I listened to you read through your statement, we are asking them to dismantle existing systems against a proposal, albeit a threat, we have of installing new systems. That seems to me a very deep psychological barrier to hurdle. How do you expect them to do that meaningfully?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, that is the reason that I said this is not a bargain at a country fair between two peasants over the price of pigs. It is not a question of that kind. Behind our proposal stands the reality of the American capacity to outbuild the Soviet Union. Their major concern is to prevent us from modernizing our forces. Now we say we think we can get their attention even at this stage before we have rebuilt our capacity. It may be a psychological problem, as you say, of that kind, but we think it is a psychological problem of another kind: We are trying to appeal to them and to convince them that the Soviet process of expansion has reached its natural limit.

I would like to comment in that connection on your comments about my gloom. I am very enthusiastic about this assignment. I am taking it on at considerable expense to my own pleasure in that I gave up a sabbatical year in Cambridge, which was a delightful prospect, in order to take on this tough job.

Now, I do not want to exude enthusiasm that could be interpreted as foolish optimism for the reasons that Mr. Perle brought out, and I think, therefore, we all have to walk a very careful line and we all have to be very respectful of reality, the record of past arms control agreements, to which Mr. Perle referred, and the danger of euphoria.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am not anticipating any euphoria at all, but—I sense almost a pallbearer attitude among the three of you, but I do not want to put it in such colloquial terms. How do you get a party who has existing missiles on the ground to take them down vis-a-vis the threat of installing new missiles from the other side? I think that is a tough psychological barrier to deal with, and my question is how have you formulated your arguments to them and fortified yourself in the process in dealing with that argument?

Mr. ROSTOW. I will ask my friend Mr. Burt to comment further, but I would simply say that we are relying on the credibility of any clear expression of American will. The Soviet Union has learned over a long period of time that when the United States makes up its mind, then that decision has to be taken seriously, and that fundamentally, is what all our arguments are built around.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Obviously they are taking it seriously. They can read the papers about the buildup in the defense budget. I was just trying in my own mind to formulate the tenor of the arguments one would make when you are asking them to withdraw, to take down, to destroy what is already in existence in exchange for an anticipatory gesture on our part.

Mr. ROSTOW. In terms of the theory of equal deterrence, which they ought to accept as deeply as we do, but let me ask——

EQUALITY OF DETERRENCE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you make this argument for equal deterrence, how do you deal with their argument that they want to take into account the missile capacity of our NATO allies? We say to them, no, you cannot do that.

Mr. ROSTOW. No problem about that. We have said it for 10 or 11 years now. They have made this argument all the time because they know very well that we are not going to negotiate about the British and the French systems.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is there any validity to their argument?

Mr. ROSTOW. None.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Tell me why.

Mr. ROSTOW. The decision of Britain and France to maintain and modernize their nuclear forces even at the expense of their conventional forces represents a profound conviction that those forces are needed for ultimate national survival in the event of a period of American weakness or collapse.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is not a realistic assessment, American weakness or collapse, is it? If we collapse, they can pack it in. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, people do not think that way, Mr. Rosenthal. They believe that they reinforce the deterrent and increase the difficulties and uncertainties of Soviet decisionmaking. In any event that is their decision. Those are national forces. They are not for us to negotiate about.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I understand that. I am just wondering whether you think that that is really a pervasive argument.

Mr. ROSTOW. There is no way in which we can deal with the British and French forces as if they were part of our own or part of the NATO forces, because they are not.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The Soviets know that they will be used in tandem with anything we do, that they will be as responsive as any forces that we have, and it is almost naive to think that they will not be put together and used in a one-track effort. I am just wondering how well you fortified the arguments on our behalf.

I think the arguments seem to be portrayed, at least to me, more by stubbornness than by any logic, and I say that with deference and respect.

Mr. ROSTOW. I thank you for the deference and respect, Congressman. In view of the fact that we have an agreement with the Soviet Union about not disclosing the details of the negotiating process, I might come up sometime with some cables and other papers indicating to you how the tenor of the arguments go.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. My time is up and I will not pursue it. I think that would have been useful today because even today to understand the frailty of the argument or the strength of the argument, one has to look graphically at what the resources of the respective sides are, and to see that, have to see all the resources are put together into one potential usefulness. To separate the British and the French and ours I do not think is a realistic way to make an argument with the Soviets. But I am not on the ground.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Findley.

Mr. FINDLEY. On that point Mr. Rosenthal just raised, even if the French and the British nuclear resources were combined with ours, there would still be a substantial disparity from our standpoint, would there not?

Mr. ROSTOW. Oh, yes, of course there would.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Perle, I was certainly impressed by that quotation from Sir Samuel Hoare, and it inspires me to make a recommendation to you, Dr. Rostow. You know, the Kiwanis Club has the

Kiwanis Creed that they all recite in unison, either at the end or the beginning of the program, and the Jaycees also have a creed. I suggest you have everyone in your agency commit the Hoare quotation to memory and recite it in unison at the beginning of each day. I think it might have some benefit on thought processes. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROSTOW. I thank you, Congressman Findley.

"PEACE AND FOREIGN POLICY" ARTICLE

Mr. FINDLEY. I will not ask you to comment on this today, but if one of you gentlemen or perhaps all three have read Lawrence Freedman's "Peace and Foreign Policy" in which he dealt with the NATO strategy of flexible response, I would like to have an assessment of you gentlemen in the record on that article. I was quite impressed with the points he made, including the point that maybe we have reached a dead end on nuclear weapons policy.

Mr. ROSTOW. We will be glad to respond to that.

[The information follows:]

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., March 12, 1982.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During my testimony before two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23, 1982, Congressman Paul Findley asked me to comment for the record on Lawrence Freedman's article NATO Myths in the Winter, 1981, issue of Foreign Policy. This letter is my response to his question.

Mr. Freedman is an able contributor to the literature about strategy and arms control and I always read his articles with profit and respect, although I do not often fully agree with him. In the article to which Congressman Findley drew my attention, Mr. Freedman argues that the NATO nuclear strategy is losing credibility both in the West and in the East, and should be replaced by a strategy based on much larger Western conventional forces.

Mr. Freedman argues—quite correctly—that the increase in the size and power of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces during a period of American passivity has transformed the strategic environment, exposing the United States and its allies to the pressures of an unprecedented Soviet threat. The change in the military balance since 1970 is astonishing and has grave implications for the United States and the West generally.

I certainly agree—and I know the President agrees—that we need to improve the capabilities and deterrent value of Western conventional forces in relation to Soviet conventional forces. The difficulty with Mr. Freedman's argument lies elsewhere. He takes it for granted that the Soviet threat to NATO in Western Europe is primarily conventional in character, and he seems to imply that the Soviets would respect a NATO emphasis on conventional forces by eschewing the first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, it does not address the possibility that the Soviets might use their preponderance in nuclear and conventional weapons for purposes of political coercion.

Mr. Freedman fails to take account of Soviet military doctrine or the structure and composition of the Soviet forces arrayed against NATO. Unlike the West, the Soviets follow a combined arms doctrine that is based on exploiting both conventional and nuclear capabilities. Their training, equipment, and deployment reflect this approach. While their conventional capabilities have improved, the Soviets continue to place great emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons at every level of combat.

Against such a combined arms approach, the West requires a credible defense posture that deters aggression across the entire spectrum of Soviet threats—conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic-nuclear. There is no reason to suppose that, if NATO followed Mr. Freedman's advice, the Soviet Union would follow suit, either in capability or in doctrine. We have just passed through a decade in which the

United States exercised unilateral restraint in the hope that the Soviet Union would do the same. The result is the dilemma the West is now struggling to resolve.

Mr. Freedman appears to be advising us to repeat the mistakes of the 1970's in another sphere. It is not wise counsel.

Yours sincerely,

EUGENE V. ROSTOW.

Mr. BURT. Just very briefly——

Mr. FINDLEY. I would appreciate brevity because I have a couple of other questions.

Mr. BURT. I have seen that article. It is indeed provocative. I think it makes one major error and one major contribution. The error is the idea that the strategy of flexible response, that is, the potential for escalating through the use of American strategic nuclear forces, is no longer credible. We believe it is credible, that we have to modernize our capabilities, and these INF systems are critical to maintain that credibility.

But he also argues that we cannot ignore the conventional side of the deterrent, and we believe that is extremely important. This is something we cannot do just ourselves. It is something the Europeans have a major responsibility and burden for, and something that we have to emphasize along with nuclear modernization in our defense posture.

Mr. FINDLEY. If one or more of our NATO allies should refuse to accept basing on their soil cruise or Pershing II's or cruise missiles, what effect would that have on our prospect for success in the negotiating process with the Soviets?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, it would obviously have an impact. That is what the Soviets are playing for.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would you use the word "devastating"?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, because I have great faith that a solution would be found one way or the other. I think we have a tendency in all this, Congressman Findley, a very natural tendency to take out the frustrations we feel about Soviet policy and about dealing with the Soviets by becoming irritated with our allies. It is a much safer thing to do and it discharges our feelings very well.

Mr. FINDLEY. Well, I want you to know it is refreshing to hear officials from the Arms Control Agency speaking about the need for cohesion and military strength within the NATO community because I have long felt that the best way to get concessions on arms control from the Soviets is to strengthen in every way possible the cohesion of the West.

SEA LANE SECURITY

One of the concerns I have with the new administration as well as with past administrations is the seeming absence of emphasis within the Western community on sea lane security. If we could move dramatically and visibly to construct some sort of a NATO-like alliance of some of the major NATO sea powers to deal with sea lane security, I think you would find a marked difference in attitude on the part of the Soviets in negotiating arms control, and so far I do not see much evidence of that.

U.S. INVENTORY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Dr. Rostow, one of the hopes I have had is that our Government might be able unilaterally to take what could be viewed as a step toward a sane world on its own and not require the cooperation of the Soviet Union, and I suspect that in our inventory are a good many nuclear warheads that were built many years ago and perhaps missiles that were taken out of Turkey many years ago, and I suspect they are in a warehouse someplace. They have no military application today but they are probably in inventory and very carefully protected.

Am I correct that we have just about every warhead that we ever built since day one?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would have to ask Mr. Perle to answer that one.

Mr. PERLE. Actually, Congressman Findley, we have today fewer nuclear warheads than we had at the peak period, which was in the sixties. Some nuclear warheads are mined for the nuclear material in them. That is, they are dismantled and the nuclear material used——

Mr. FINDLEY. Is that pretty standard practice? Has that been the standard practice for years?

Mr. PERLE. It has been, and we have become increasingly dependent on the retirement of older warheads in order to manufacture new ones. There are, however, some——

Mr. FINDLEY. I do not think that is widely known. I think if it were widely known there would be some rejoicing because I suspect many people have the notion I had, that we have the very first one and every one built since then, and we have them stacked all over the world, which would make for extra danger.

What is the practice of the Soviets in this realm? Do you happen to know?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think that I can comment on the Soviet practice generally except to observe that their numbers have been steadily increasing. I might mention that we have in the past withdrawn warheads, sometimes in considerable numbers. In 1979——

Mr. FINDLEY. Withdrawn and dismantled, you mean?

Mr. PERLE. Withdrawn and dismantled or used as part of the reserve supply of nuclear material. In 1979 we unilaterally withdrew from Europe some 1,000 nuclear warheads. It was believed by the previous administration that this sort of unilateral gesture would produce some reciprocal accommodation on the part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I just have one final observation. Mention was made of the independent nuclear forces of France and Britain. For many years we ignored French activities in this realm, refused to cooperate. We have always cooperated with Britain. I hope at long last we are now dealing with both countries on the same cooperative basis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, since time is limited I will try to make my questions brief. If you can respond in kind, I would appreciate it.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET ADHERENCE TO SALT II

First of all, Mr. Perle, are both the United States and the Soviet Union currently adhering to the terms of SALT II?

Mr. **Perle.** That is a difficult question to answer categorically. It depends on what you mean by adhering and how precisely you wish to apply——

Mr. **Solarz.** Acting as we would have acted if the treaty had been formally ratified and approved. In other words, living up to the terms and obligations of the treaty.

Mr. **Perle.** What I think is very clear, Congressman Solarz, is that our expectations about the limitations that would flow from those treaties have been sadly disappointed, and the Soviets are now doing things that at the time the treaties were ratified we anticipated they would not do pursuant to them. We have discovered serious loopholes in the treaties that permitted this activity.

Mr. **Solarz.** Is the Soviet Union acting in a way which we would consider to be in violation of SALT II if SALT II had been ratified? That should be easy to answer yes or no.

Mr. **Perle.** Well, it turns out that these things are never easy to answer because there are always ambiguities and the terms of the agreements themselves are never sufficiently precise. I think, to answer your question in the larger sense, they have taken no action that would fundamentally alter the burdens and obligations of the treaty.

Mr. **Solarz.** As a matter of policy, are we adhering to the terms of that treaty?

Mr. **Perle.** Yes, we are.

Mr. **Solarz.** We are. OK.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT I AND II

Now could you tell us whether in your view there are any clear examples of violations of the terms of SALT I or SALT II by the Soviet Union.

Mr. **Perle.** I believe there are some areas in which the evidence is persuasive that the Soviets have been in violation.

Mr. **Solarz.** Could you briefly indicate what the violations were, and which treaty was violated?

Mr. **Perle.** Perhaps the most prominent has to do with limitations affecting the testing of air defenses under the ABM treaty, and here I believe the evidence is persuasive that the Soviets, in violation of the ABM treaty, tested their defenses in what we regard as an ABM mode, contrary to the provisions of that treaty.

COOPERATIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Mr. **Solarz.** Now, Dean Rostow, you indicated that if we were going to have an INF agreement, we were going to have to go beyond national technical means of verification as a way of determining compliance. Did I also understand you to say that the Soviet Union has agreed in principle to that proposition?

Mr. **Rostow.** Yes.

Mr. **Solarz.** And could you let us know briefly what it is about this particular negotiation which requires cooperative means of verification rather than merely national technical means?

Mr. **Rostow.** It is not simply the INF negotiation; it is the whole array of nuclear arms negotiations, and we said that we felt that under SALT II, and SALT I as well, problems of verification were critical and that we were reaching the limit of national means of verification through photography and so on, and that there are aspects of the problem beyond the reach of such means. If you have limitations, for example, on production, very clearly you will have to go beyond national technical means to verify compliance; and so for a number of the aspects of the treaties or possible treaties, I think we will not see the problems concretely until we have agreed on the treaties, or more or less agreed on them. I think that then there are many aspects of the problem which will require cooperation.

Mr. SOLARZ. If in principle they have agreed to this, I would consider that at least an encouraging indication that it may be possible to move in that direction.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

SOVIET DESIRE FOR EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. I would like to ask each of you very briefly whether in your personal judgment you believe that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in equitable reductions in INF forces, leaving aside for a second the precise definition of "equitable" and whether our proposal is equitable. Do you think they genuinely want this, or are they primarily interested in an agreement which would either confirm existing advantages or give them greater advantages than they have at present?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, my belief is that at the present time they are interested in arms control agreements which enhance their capacity to move ahead in military power and restrict ours. I think there is a possibility that if we look at the situation as a whole and negotiate very firmly, they may be persuaded, as I say, that there is no alternative to an equitable agreement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Perle.

Mr. PERLE. Yes. I do not think they desire an equitable agreement. Whether we can create circumstances in which an equitable agreement is to be preferred to the alternative remains to be seen.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right. And Mr. Burt.

Mr. BURT. I think the Soviet approach to the INF negotiations is consistent with their approach toward Western Europe since the end of World War II; that is, to achieve political, military hegemony over Western Europe. The only way, in my view, that the United States together with its allies can obtain an equitable agreement in those negotiations is to demonstrate a continuing resolve to deploy those systems in Europe.

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Burt, as I understand it, in your presentation you put forward the argument that we had to be prepared to deploy the Pershings and the cruise missiles in order to demonstrate that the Soviet Union could not get away with a nuclear attack against Western Europe because there would be nuclear weapons in place in Western Europe to strike at the Soviet Union in retaliation. It seems to me that that argument would make perfectly good sense if control over those nuclear weapons were, in effect, given to the West Europeans, who would then be in a position to press the button and retaliate against the Soviet Union if they were attacked.

However, so long as the Pershings and the cruise missiles remain under our control, which I gather they are supposed to do, it is hard for me to understand in what way this contributes to the deterrent. I should think that from the Soviet point of view, what counts is not where the missile that strikes Moscow comes from but who presses the button. I should think that if we destroy Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities and facilities with missiles fired from Western Europe but which we are responsible for firing, that that would inevitably trigger an attack against the United States. In other words, it would not make any difference to them whether we destroyed those cities with ICBM's based here or on submarines in the Mediterranean or whatever, or with the Pershings and cruise missiles.

So in that sense, if that analysis is accurate, I would like to know in what way this actually constitutes a deterrent against the use of the SS-20's against Western Europe.

Mr. **Burt**. Well, Congressman, I think you asked two different questions. One, why aren't the intermediate-range systems controlled by the Europeans?

Mr. **Solarz**. I understand that.

Mr. **Burt**. The second question is why does it matter whether these systems are based in Europe or——

Mr. **Solarz**. I am saying if they are not controlled by the Europeans.

Mr. **Burt**. I think the point is that we have a system, that has existed for 30 years, of an indivisibility within the alliance. There is no special territory within the alliance. As I said, an attack on one is an attack on all. The presence in Europe of American systems capable of escalating conflict beyond Europe provides a physical reassurance to the allies that the system of extended deterrence, of managed escalation, the principle deterrent to conflict in Europe remains intact.

But I think the principal point is that in the SALT process we decided to limit intercontinental range systems, and the Soviet Union recognized in essence that there was a loophole, that they could deploy a new class of systems that were not limited in the SALT process that, while not necessarily threatening the United States, could threaten our allies.

Our response to that was to recognize that there was a gap in the deterrent spectrum, and that without new deployment we would have to attack or respond with intercontinental-range forces. The new deployments will provide a physical, concrete reassurance to our allies that we have a means of responding to SS-20's.

Mr. **Solarz**. I must say I find your rationale unpersuasive although originally I supported the decision to deploy the Pershings and cruise missiles if that is what the Europeans wanted.

FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AND ELIMINATION OF SS-20'S

Just one final question related to the INF position we have taken. As I understand the argument we have made in response to the Soviet contention that this agreement should include forward-based systems, we have taken the position that if you have a fair count of the forward-based systems on both sides and you count their Floggers and the other fighter bombers they have, that they actually have a substantial advantage over us.

Well, if in fact that is the case, and I think you have some good figures here, why not accept their position and say, good, let's include the forward-based systems with a rigorous definition of systems that are capable of using nuclear weapons against Western Europe or the Soviet heartland. If that were accepted, presumably they would have to get rid of many more weapons than we would.

Secondly in that regard, I gather our position has been that they should eliminate all of their SS-20's because it is a mobile system, and even if they deploy it on the Chinese border, it can quickly be brought back to the European border. On the other hand, we have contended that you should not include forward-based systems because planes, even if they are taken out of Europe, can be based in the United States and flown back to Europe very quickly, so it adds an additional complication. It does not make much sense.

It strikes me that there is a contradiction in our argument. If we are in favor of including all of the SS-20's because you can move the ones from the Chinese border to the European border because they are mobile, how can we argue against including forward-based aircraft on the ground that they are mobile too?

Mr. **Burt**. I will just make a quick comment and give the microphone to Gene, but I think you have answered your first question with your second question. You introduce incredible complexities into these negotiations by trying to compare apples and oranges. Aircraft and missiles are in fact different.

One important difference is that for NATO, many of the aircraft that we count as nuclear capable are assigned very important conventional missions, and thus we have to take that into account when we think about limiting aircraft. But more to the point, we have not ruled out in the long run the possible inclusion of aircraft in these negotiations.

What we want to focus on in order to get a straightforward, fairly simple agreement, and not get into a bean-counting exercise, is the most disturbing and destabilizing element in this picture, which is these long-range land-based missiles. The SS-20 deployment and some of the other missiles that are coming along led to the December 1979 decision, and it is clear from what the Soviets say that they are most concerned about the GLCM's and the Pershing 2's.

Mr. **Rostow**. I entirely agree with what Mr. Burt said. The only thing I can add to it is that we are not focusing only on Europe, and that fact is extremely important. The Soviet Union keeps saying that these negotiations are about Euromissiles and about Europe, hoping to split the United States not only from its European allies but from its allies and other interests in Asia and the Middle East. So it is not the mobility of the SS-20 that is the only reason why we want complete dismantlement.

Mr. **Solarz**. If the chairman will indulge just one final comment here, if in fact you gentlemen are correct in saying that a fair definition of forward-based systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the enemy heartland would require the Soviet Union to get rid of many more systems than it would require us, because as I understand your figures, you are talking about disparities here in the range of 3,800 for the Soviet Union, and 560 for the United States, it would seem to me that we might turn that position on its head and gain a significant political and propaganda advantage. And if they were to agree, we would gain a significant military advantage as well since by their own standards they would have to get rid of many more systems than we would.

Mr. ROSTOW. As Mr. Burt said, we have by no means excluded the possibility of negotiating about aircraft. We have simply said that in terms of the overall objectives we have for nuclear arms negotiations against the background of our bitter experience with SALT I and SALT II, we believe it is fruitful and sensible to start with the most destabilizing elements of the problem. With all the air defenses and so on that exist, aircraft are retaliatory weapons and are not really first strike weapons, whereas these other monsters are very destabilizing as we can see now.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. LeBoutillier.

SALT I AND II VIOLATIONS

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. What was the verdict on Congressman Solarz' question about violating the SALT I and SALT II treaties? Did you say that they definitely did or did not?

Mr. PERLE. I said that in my judgment the evidence was persuasive that the Soviets had tested air defenses in an ABM mode in contravention of the ABM treaty.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. Wasn't there another one about telemetry encryption that they were not supposed to be doing that we think they did and that was a violation of the agreement?

Mr. PERLE. The limitations on telemetry encryption were contained in the SALT II treaty, and it is a personal judgment, but in my judgment the language relating to encryption of telemetry was so badly flawed that it would be difficult to establish that a violation had taken place.

Mr. ROSTOW. Congressman, could I add a word on that? I think that the subject to which Mr. Perle referred first is under investigation and under exchange of views through the consultative procedures that we have established in these matters. I think the far more important source of concern in this field, rather than open violations of this sort, the far more important source of concern is actions which are inconsistent, as Mr. Perle's statement brought out very well, actions which are inconsistent with our interpretation or our expectations with regard to the text. That makes anyone engaged, as we all three are, in the prospect of drafting new texts particularly cautious and careful when we see the history of loopholes and unjustified expectations which characterize our experience with SALT I.

THE SOVIET PLAN

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. There was something else Mr. Perle said in his statement, and I tried to write it down real fast, that despite the agreements between the two sides, there really has been no change in the Soviet plan. What is the Soviet plan?

Mr. PERLE. What I was referring to was an effort, looking at the Soviet deployment of strategic weapons over the period in question, to find perturbations in that program. I am unaware of any. That is, if one looks at their deployment plans over the period, they seem to have been unaffected by agreement.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. So in other words, all the agreements that we have agreed to have been to limit us and not to hinder them in any way; right?

Mr. PERLE. I think the agreements we have previously entered into have permitted them to do the things they desired to do. In some cases they have limited us, but more to the point, they conveyed an impression, not justified by the reality that there was restraint on the Soviet side.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. They must be champing at the bit every time we tell them we want to negotiate more. They figure it will be great, we will just give up more.

Mr. PERLE. I think they have some significant advantages in negotiation, most of which have to do with the fact that this is an open society and theirs is closed. They have no public opinion to satisfy. They can lay out their plans in great secrecy. They find no problem increasing defense budgets while negotiating arms control agreements or in laying plans to build the very weapons that it is proposed be limited.

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. All right. You mentioned an open society. Is it too conspiratorial for us to hypothesize that the constant wave of anti-Americanism and the demonstrations in Western Europe, all coinciding with the starting of these talks, are those in any way helped along by the Soviets covertly?

Mr. PERLE. I believe they are. At the same time, I think it would be a mistake to believe that in the absence of friendly assistance from the Soviet Union, there would not be some opposition in Europe to the deployment of nuclear weapons.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. Right, but it all just goes together to put you all in a very bad position when you are negotiating with them. They know what we are after, right, from this. They see the stuff on the TV, they see elections coming up, and they know that the leaders have to go with whatever the mood is. It is not the greatest position to be bargaining in, is it?

Mr. PERLE. I agree with you, and I think Congressman Rosenthal's questions implicitly brought out the problem we face. As I understood the implication of his question—I am sorry he is no longer here—it was that it was difficult to get the Soviets to trade forces in being which they now possess for forces that we are only planning to build, and I hope he will reflect upon that understanding the next time he has to vote on the defense budget.

THE DEFENSE BUDGET

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. I was going to ask you about that. We have all been home the last couple of weeks, and the fashionable thing to say, I think, to Congressmen now is, well, gee, you know, we have to make some cuts in social programs, but the Pentagon should not be absolved of blame in that they waste money also. I am sure that is true. But the question is maybe Reagan really is right when he says that cutting the military at this time would have the most disastrous impact in exactly the kind of thing you guys are engaged in; that the threat to rebuild the military is not enough, and that we actually have to carry through for a few years so that they really want to come to the table because they know we are not going to deviate from our plan either.

Is that right?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that a cutback now in the defense program that the administration has adopted to redress imbalances that have developed over many years would gravely weaken the President's hand in these and other negotiations.

Mr. ROSTOW. Can I add a word to that, Congressman LeBoutillier? I had lunch recently with two of my predecessors in this exercise, and they gave me some advice. The first piece of advice they gave me, with enthusiasm and drive, was that the ACDA should strongly support the military budget in full and that any cuts in the military budget or any inadequacies in the military budget would make the task of ACDA in arms control impossible.

Mr. LEBOUTILLIER. Just to add, I have to think it is just a very confusing signal to give to the Soviets where you have a guy who is the symbol of hard-line negotiating which Reagan is and to have him be the one to cut his own military budget after he starts to increase it. That has got to be a sign of internal domestic weakness that the Soviets will exacerbate, and I hope that we can do the right thing domestically here and not forsake this increased strength militarily.

I guess my time is up. Sorry. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Shamansky.

Mr. SHAMANSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT TREATY OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO U.S. AND U.S.S.R.

Mr. Perle, you repeated your formulation about the Soviet attitude toward the treaty. You said it permitted them to do what they wanted to do. It seems to me that does not exclude the very real possibility that that treaty prohibits and does in fact restrain what each side wants the other one not to do, so there is validity in that sense. Instead of denigrating it because they are able to do that which they want to do, there could be an area on both sides and we could get something out of it mutually.

Mr. PERLE. There could be, Congressman Shamansky, but unhappily in the case we are talking about, there was not. The thing that we most hoped the Soviets would refrain from doing as we embarked on these negotiations in 1969 was develop the capability to attack a significant element of our own strategic force. Indeed the bargain that was struck in 1972, in which we agreed not to build antiballistic missile defenses to protect our strategic deterrent in order to elicit from the Soviets restraints on the offensive capability that we would otherwise need to counter with defenses—that bargain failed; we agreed not to proceed with antiballistic missile defenses of our strategic forces, but the Soviets, exploiting loopholes and ambiguities in the SALT I treaty, went right on building strategic offensive forces to the point where we have to face the question of allocating tens of billions of dollars to correcting the vulnerability that has resulted.

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

Mr. **Shamansky**. Did they or did they not continue the antiballistic missile, which is not an offensive but a defensive weapon? Now, are you saying they pursued that fully or not?

Mr. **Perle**. They in fact have been vigorously pursuing research and development in the ABM area, with the result that whereas we were significantly ahead of the Soviets technologically in 1969, we are no longer significantly ahead of the Soviets.

Mr. **Shamansky**. There is nothing about the treaty that would prevent us doing the same thing should that be our choice.

Mr. **Perle**. No, there is nothing in the terms of the agreement, but I think past history has demonstrated that there is a reluctance to spend money in this country on systems the deployment of which is prohibited by agreement. But the more important point——

Mr. **Shamansky**. We do that with chemical warfare.

Mr. **Rostow**. May I intervene——

Mr. **Shamansky**. Yes.

Mr. **Rostow** [continuing]. To try a hand, really, at the same argument that Mr. Perle made. Our interest in 1969 primarily was to get an agreement limiting intercontinental range offensive weapons, to put a cap on Soviet expansion and on our own expansion. The Soviet interest in that respect seems very clearly to have been to stop our ABM development, in which they felt we were way ahead.

The net result is we came up with an agreement in 1972 which stopped our ABM development but did not stop the expansion of Soviet forces.

Mr. **Shamansky**. Thank you.

U.S. ARMS SALES PROPOSALS

We have a representative of the Defense Department, Arms Control and State Department. Given the recent statements emanating from different branches of the executive part of our Government, I find myself referring to the Secretary of State Weinberger, and I mention that because what the Defense Department does affects control of armament generally, and it affects our foreign policy; namely, it seems to me part of our foreign policy is that when in doubt, send in F-16.

The latest manifestation is with Jordan. We have Venezuela wanting and getting F-16's. It seems that the lessons that we are trying to learn from our relationship with the Soviets in bargaining, we seem to be undercutting ourselves by proliferating through not nuclear but certainly in quantum jumps in sophistication of weaponry that we are spreading around, I think almost irresponsibly.

Is there a connection or does just one thing not affect the other?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, there certainly is a very real connection, and the statutory responsibilities of ACDA include commenting on conventional arms sales from the point of view of the stability of the political system and compliance with other foreign policy objectives, and you find all three groups within the Government, the two big departments and ACDA, working very closely on all these problems.

Of course, there are some differences from time to time, but you will find that they are minimal compared to the areas of agreement. There is much more to foreign policy, Congressman, than one might think sometimes from the press.

U.S. EVALUATION OF SOVIET POLICIES

Mr. SHAMANSKY. I would like to ask this question. We are using the Soviet policies as some kind of an example of what we should emulate. There are many things about Soviet behavior of which we disapprove, and I assume if it applies in a nonmilitary area, it might also apply in the military merely because they are spending incredible sums with respect to warheads and delivery systems. That does not necessarily mean that we are enhancing our security or debilitating our deterrent capacity if we do not choose to follow them.

My question, then, is: Is there an absolute point beyond which it does not behoove us to emulate them just because they keep on spending?

Mr. ROSTOW. We are not emulating them at all. We are trying to build up our forces from the point of view of establishing or reestablishing deterrence in terms of what our best military estimates and political estimates are as to what is required. We are not planning to match them tank for tank or bomb for bomb in any area.

Mr. SHAMANSKY. At what point does—9,000, assuming that is an approximation of our nuclear warheads. Do we—have we decided we need 15,000 or 10,000, or do we think we can make do with 9,000?

Mr. ROSTOW. It all depends on what they do.

Mr. SHAMANSKY. I am not asking what they are doing. I am simply saying, from our point of view, have we decided, given that we know that 9,000, where is a sufficiency at a particular number?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, it cannot be that way. Our problem is deterring Soviet expansion which threatens our interests. How much is necessary to deter depends at each stage, each year, each 5 years, on our estimate of what the Soviets have. It may take a different amount each year to deter.

Mr. SHAMANSKY. You think there is an absolute correlation between those two things?

Mr. ROSTOW. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAMANSKY. OK, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Winn?

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to include my opening remarks at the start of the hearing.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WINN. I thank the chairman.

SEA-BASED DEPLOYMENT OF TNF WEAPONS

I would like to focus attention, if I can, on the subject of deployment of TNF weapons at sea. What are the reasons for not deploying the new theater weapons in Europe at sea?

Mr. PERLE. In 1979, Congressman Winn, the question of how to respond to the developing Soviet SS-20 threat was addressed within the NATO alliance. And among the options examined at the time was the possibility of sea-based deployment. That was rejected by the alliance as a whole for several reasons, not the least of which was the desire on the part of the alliance to demonstrate that risks and burdens within the alliance are shared, and visibly shared among all members.

A sea-based deterrent does not have the visibility, it does not entail the burden-sharing that is involved with the deployment, on the territory of several countries, of missiles of the type we are talking about.

Beyond that, there are advantages of land-based systems that have to do with the relative ease of commanding and controlling them, with the relatively greater certainty of communications links and the like, a number of technical considerations. So both political and technical considerations reinforced each other and the alliance made a decision in December 1979 for land-based deployment.

I think my colleague from the State Department may wish to add.

Mr. WINN. That will be fine.

Mr. BURT. I would like to reinforce what Richard Perle said on the political side. We have deployed nearly 300,000 troops in Europe, not only to defend against an attack in Europe, but also to provide a powerful reminder that Americans are willing to die for the defense of Europe. It would be a very different political message, say, if rather than those troops were in Europe, they were on ships off the coast of Europe. They could be introduced into a conflict or in fact, they could be held back under certain circumstances.

I think the same kind of logic is at work with these deployments in Europe. We are, as Richard Perle pointed out, asking our allies to share with us the risks and burdens of maintaining an indivisible alliance, an idea where a square mile of the Federal Republic of Germany is no different than a square mile of the State of Iowa in the sense of having the same deterrent protection within the alliance.

BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. WINN. Mr. Rostow, do you agree with the September 1981 report released by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies that the balance of nuclear forces in Europe is continuing to move in favor of the Soviet Union, which can deliver 3.3 times as many nuclear warheads to European targets as NATO can to Soviet targets?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; I do.

Mr. WINN. Well, would you say then that you agree with the same organization's assessment that the tactical nuclear balance is distinctly unfavorable to NATO and is becoming more so?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; I do.

Mr. WINN. Would you care to elaborate on that a little more?

Mr. ROSTOW. Surely. I was just being respectful of your time, Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Thank you.

Mr. ROSTOW. The trends that are now in motion in Soviet procurement plans, design, research plans, and development plans for weapons are absolutely astonishing. They have been expanding at a very high rate in all categories, and especially in the nuclear category, for many years, they have had an enormous momentum. Therefore, those trends continue almost unabated. And they mean a rapid accumulation of weapons in all categories.

Meanwhile, the Western powers, including the United States, have been moving ahead in the nuclear field in the last few years trying to reverse gears and to develop new programs, programs for new weapons and for the modernization of old weapons. But it is not remarkable that it has taken time to give those programs momentum and they have not yet caught up in speed with the ongoing programs of the Soviet Union, so that in this period, the gap between the Western powers and the Soviet Union continues to widen. It is not peculiar at all.

EFFECT OF EVENTS IN POLAND ON SOVIET-WESTERN RELATIONS

Mr. WINN. One last question. In your opinion, have the events in Poland increased support for INF deployment among the Western European governments?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, I think so. I think that the people who have organized demonstrations have since those events, and since the episode of the Soviet submarine in Swedish waters a few months ago—have found increasing difficulty in bringing out the troops for demonstrations. Yes, I think the events in Poland are the most important set of political problems in the world now, and they should profoundly affect Soviet-Western relations, including the prospects for these arms talks.

Mr. WINN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DATA BASE ISSUE

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, you have given the subcommittee a great deal of your time however, perhaps we can pursue just a few questions which I would like further clarification to previous questions. For instance, my question to you, Dr. Rostow, as to the data base issue. Do we have an agreed data base at the INF talks in Geneva?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, not yet.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What are the prospects?

Mr. ROSTOW. Fair. We are hopeful. We are moving ahead in an effort to obtain one.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Would you base your assessment on some recent Soviet activity?

Mr. Rostow. Well, I think, Congressman, I really ought to draw the veil over details of negotiations. We have an agreement with the Soviet Union that neither side will disclose details of negotiation. We made it clear from the beginning that we certainly will inform our people and the allied publics about the general principles we are pursuing and the general lines of the negotiation, and the distinctions between general principles and broad approaches and details on the other side are sometimes hard to draw. But I think it would be better, much more in the spirit of that agreement, not to go into too much detail.

Chairman Zablocki. I understand that.

ALTERNATIVES TO ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

Have we had any discussions with our NATO allies on a fallback position if progress cannot be made on the United States zero option proposal?

Mr. Rostow. No. On that I will simply refer you to two remarks in the President's speech of November 18, that we will negotiate in good faith and we will consider any proposals that the Soviet Union may make.

Mr. Burt wants to——

Mr. Burt. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to add that there was a meeting of this alliance group that I mentioned in my opening remarks, the Special Consultative Group, in Brussels 2 weeks ago, to discuss our negotiating position. That meeting ended with a statement of strong support for our existing position and strong criticism of the Soviet position.

So there is no discussion in the alliance now of any changes to our approach in those negotiations.

ADMINISTRATION VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL

Chairman Zablocki. I assume that all three of our witnesses are in agreement as to the U.S. policy, which appears to be a policy not of strategic superiority, but one of preserving the security and effectiveness of strategic deterrence, as Mr. Perle stated.

I disagree that we may have to make too many concessions or we may have to concede in the issue of forward-base systems in order to reach an agreement.

But the testimony, particularly from Mr. Perle, concerns me because—I hope I can be corrected if I misinterpreted your testimony—but I had the impression that the Department of Defense doesn't view arms control as a vital element and a constructive contribution to the United States and Western security interests. Is that impression correct, particularly when you quoted Sir Samuel Hoare that it is better to admit failure than to make further proposals or concessions?

I thought that negotiations were to further preserve a dialog and table proposals which do not necessarily involve concessions. You do not mean to say that you are totally intransigent and inflexible. I think we have to negotiate firmly while always preserving necessary flexibility.

Are you advising that perhaps it would be better to admit failure and close the books, stop the negotiations, which would I think be very much to our disadvantage, causing an uncontrollable strategic arms race and result in less security not more.

I hope I have not misunderstood you.

Mr. **Perle**. Mr. Chairman, I certainly did not mean to suggest that we are anywhere near the point at which one ought to admit failure. We are at the beginning of these negotiations.

Chairman **Zablocki**. I must caution: Whenever you think about failure, you are inviting it.

Mr. **Perle**. We have to be very careful not to repeat some historic mistakes, and one of those historic mistakes—and I think on reflection one can find this in the previous negotiations on strategic arms—was to make a series of proposals to the Soviets, each more generous than the preceding proposal, in the absence of any significant movement on the Soviet side.

Now, the President has said that we will negotiate in Geneva in good faith, and he has put forward a proposal that would accomplish what I think most citizens of the United States and the other countries of the alliance would recognize as fair and equitable. The burden is now on the Soviet Union to demonstrate that it is sincere in presenting itself to the world as willing to achieve accommodation.

Thus far they have not made a proposal that encourages me very much. But it is going to take a long time. We are just at the beginning. And I would hope that we would keep at it and that we would retain the general principle that any agreement concluded should be one that is militarily significant, not merely cosmetic. And that is what I meant, and I think that is what Sir Samuel Hoare meant, when he talked about sacrificing the substance to the negotiation. As long as there is substance in the negotiation, we ought to keep on negotiating, by all means.

FUTURE SOVIET NEEDS

Chairman **Zablocki**. Well, gentlemen, do you see any possibility that there may be domestic pressure in the Soviet Union for butter as well as guns? I think that would be our greatest hope, that they would have some pressure from their own populace. I fully understand their system, but even the most rigorous system can have cracks and weaknesses.

Mr. **Rostow**. Well, I referred at the end of my opening statement, to the fact that the Soviet Union ought to want a period of stability in its relations with the West now for a number of reasons which I mentioned. Their economic and social problems which are very real were mentioned among those reasons.

Now, for the first time in the last few years the rate of growth of the Soviet military establishment has exceeded the rate of growth of the gross national product. That is, the Soviet Union is enlarging its military establishment now at the expense of the actual standard of living of its people and not the potential increase in the standard of living of the people. So that pressure is there.

The question is, will the Soviets, will the leaders respond to it. To that I have no answer.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Well, the Soviet leaders will have to respond, if the people in the Soviet Union are fully informed that they are being denied some of the goodies of life because of the very high and unnecessary expenditure for military purposes.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY (ICA)

My final question is: Are we doing enough in International Communication Agency media in letting the people of the Soviet Union know what their Government is actually doing?

Mr. Rostow. Well, I do not know what enough is. Clearly, we are doing a good deal.

Chairman Zablocki. Too much is never enough.

Mr. Rostow. That is right.

Chairman Zablocki. Thank you very much, gentlemen. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned.]

OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE STRATEGY IN NATO

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS AND ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 11:30 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The subcommittees will please come to order. The members are on their way. The Chair wishes to apologize for the interruption and delay due to several votes in the House.

This is the second in a series of hearings to be conducted jointly by the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The purpose of our hearings is to determine the Reagan administration's policies in support of NATO's long-range theater nuclear force modernization program and in the conduct of negotiations with the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on the limitation of intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe.

Our hearing today is especially timely in view of the speech made 2 days ago by Soviet President Brezhnev promising an immediate halt to Soviet missile deployments in the European theater, but warning that the deployment of U.S. missiles as planned in alliance countries would evoke corresponding Soviet deployments aimed at the United States.

Mr. Brezhnev's speech may signal several significant considerations for the United States and NATO in managing their own affairs and in dealing with the Soviet Union.

First, it sharpens our awareness that the Soviets' overriding objective is to prevent any deployment of U.S. LRTNF's on Western Europe.

Second, the Soviet pattern of response to NATO's deployment plans for GLCM's and Pershing II's, treating U.S. LRTNF's as clearly different from tactical or U.S.-based systems, shows the continued validity of the NATO dual-track decision. The news that Soviet SS-20 deployments have reached the level of 300 reinforces the need to carry out the two-track NATO decision to modernize its nuclear forces while striving for improved security through arms control.

Third, the speech raises, in my opinion, the intensity of Soviet efforts to appeal to concerned Europeans who might favor a moratorium despite the resulting Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range missiles; and it represents an intensified effort to paralyze NATO and force the United States into a no-win situation with our allies.

Therefore, I think these hearings are very timely, and I believe that the United States must redouble its efforts to reinforce the consensus. This will be a time for the United States to demonstrate its leadership in our alliance. Undeterred by the threat of Soviet countermeasures in the Western Hemisphere, the United States must reassure its European allies of our firm commitment to carry out the arms control initiatives of NATO's 1979 decision and the force modernization program as necessary to insure European security and a successful outcome from the INF negotiations.

In our previous hearings on February 23, leading administration officials responsible for United States arms control efforts appeared before these subcommittees to present their views on the progress in talks with the Soviet Union and the prospects for agreement, and to examine the United States position in the Geneva talks.

The administration witnesses shared low expectations for any near-term results from the talks. Such judgments by the administration, I fear, may prove self-fulfilling. The absence of negotiations on strategic arms adds to my fears. It is for these reasons that yesterday I introduced legislation calling for an immediate beginning to United States-Soviet talks on strategic arms aimed at reducing, as opposed to simply freezing, the current levels of nuclear arms.

I know that the resolution that I have introduced yesterday as an intended bridge between the versions that are being considered, the resolution does not please either the administration or the sponsors, the 140-some sponsors, of a prior resolution on this same subject. Since nobody, or at least the two parties, are unhappy about it, that must give some credibility to the desirability of the compromise that I introduced.

Earlier this week, talks in Geneva recessed until May 20, marking the end of the INF negotiations' second session. I would hope that the teams will reconvene for the third session in a new atmosphere of progress created by the U.S. Government's entrance into negotiations for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons called for in the resolution I introduced. Such a development would be strongly supported by our NATO allies, whose commitment to the December 1979 dual-track decision was premised upon the resumption of strategic arms control negotiations by the superpowers.

Accordingly, our task today is to explore a range of perspectives on the dynamics of the Geneva talks, alternative approaches that might yield more optimistic assessments for their prospects, and other insights into how a dedicated pursuit of an INF agreement can be sustained effectively.

Today we are pleased to welcome three distinguished witnesses: Hon. Raymond Garthoff, former U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria; Dr. Lynn Davis, who is with the Woodrow Wilson Center; and Mr. Leon Sloss, a former Department of Defense official.

Before we call upon our witnesses, I understand the gentleman from Michigan, the ranking Republican member of the committee, has a brief statement.

Mr. **Broomfield**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to join in welcoming the second of the three hearings by the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East in regard to the NATO nuclear strategic and European theater arms control. As my colleagues well know, NATO's historic December 1979 decision whereby the United States and its alliance partners agreed to not only modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces, but also to seek arms reduction at Geneva, will hopefully contribute to the alliance's ability to execute its basic strategies against the adversary.

Despite the 1979 decision being complicated by fears over the deployment of nuclear weapons, the continuation of Soviet disinformation in Western European countries, as well as the recent announcement of Moscow's moratorium on Euromissiles, I firmly believe that it is important that the United States and its European friends sustain strong support for the dual track NATO decision.

In particular, the March 16 announcement by the Soviet Union appears to have only directed away attention in a propaganda fashion from the quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet theater nuclear forces which have especially called into question NATO's political and military capabilities to continue deterring the growing adversary threat.

Perhaps these negotiations at Geneva would not be needed if the Soviets had chosen to exercise real restraint before building up their numbers of SS-20's at the same time the United States and its European friends have refrained for years from modernizing their theater nuclear missile forces and have yet to deploy any missiles—and I think that ought to be emphasized—compared to the nearly 300 SS-20's that the Soviets have deployed.

As a result, I believe that the North Atlantic Alliance must continue to establish a military base while attempting in an equally important fashion to exercise effective and realistic arms control within the difficult and complex INF framework, in order to better assure the security of the Western World. Among other things, it is my hope that this second of several hearings will better reveal the many complexities of current NATO nuclear strategy, as well as the difficulties of negotiating an arms control agreement which enhances the security of all parties concerned.

I thank the Chairman.

Chairman **Zablocki**. The gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. **Findley**. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for your opening remarks today. They were statesmanlike and they accurately presented the issues that we face regarding Western security and arms control questions.

Chairman **Zablocki**. The Chair thanks both gentlemen for your kind and generous remarks.

We will begin with Ambassador Garthoff, if you will proceed, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND GARTHOFF, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA

Mr. GARTHOFF. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today.

CREDIBLE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY NEEDED

We need a credible negotiating strategy in order to assure continued alliance solidarity in implementing the dual track decision. We need it even more if we are seriously interested in arms control. I for one welcome and support the chairman's initiative yesterday.

Mr. Rostow on February 23 set forth in hearings here what he described as the six "most important principles underlying our position."

First was the proposal to focus on land-based missiles of intermediate range, of which we presently have none. From the Soviet perspective, an attempt to obtain dismantling of their entire force of 600 land-based intermediate range missile launchers would mean a sharp and one-sided change from a longstanding posture. After all, before the SS-20 deployment began, for many years NATO had considered that an adequate overall balance had existed when the Soviet Union had more than 600 missiles facing Europe.

GLOBAL STRATEGIC PARITY

Global strategic parity makes a difference, and the SS-20 makes a difference. But why should the Soviet leaders be prepared to eliminate all their missiles, new and old, in exchange for nondeployment of certain new U.S. missile systems, but no limits on others? Such a proposal, if it remains the only approach we will consider, is bound to appear to the Soviet leaders not only as unacceptable, but as reflecting lack of a serious U.S. interest in reaching a negotiated agreement.

Mr. Burt gave a different reason. Efforts to include aircraft and sea-based systems would, he suggests, "introduce complexities which would impede our efforts to achieve agreement." It would introduce complexities, very trying ones. But, for example, when in SALT I the Soviet side urged a simple ABM treaty alone as a first step because of the "complexities" which consideration of offensive arms would involve, the United States successfully insisted it was not enough to consider only the ABM, despite the complexities.

Recognition of a balance of concerns and negotiation of a balance of concessions are necessary to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

Inclusion of aircraft will indeed involve difficulties. Depending on the range selected, the comparative balance and types for limitation vary greatly. The Soviet Union has loaded its balance by including only medium bombers on its own side, while including F-4 fighter bombers on the U.S. side. Rather than rebut that inclusion, the United States retaliated with a contrived 6 to 1 East-West comparison including no less than 2,700 Soviet fighter bombers, mostly of much shorter range and for various missions. Incidentally, the administration shows what it really thinks about its own comparison by declining to include these forces in the negotiations.

LIMITATIONS ON MISSILE SYSTEMS

Any prospective limitations on certain systems immediately raises questions of other systems which can substitute for them. If limitations were placed only on land-based missiles, either side could greatly increase the number of its aircraft or sea-based cruise missiles or other systems in pursuit of an advantage. The Soviets have such a concern. Perhaps we should as well.

The only system we have raised is shorter range land-based missiles. Mr. Rostow stated only that "some collateral constraints will be needed." What this really means is spelled out by its author, Mr. Perle,

> We are also seeking limitations on some Soviet systems of shorter range. A failure to limit them, by numerical ceilings and other limitations, would leave an agreement eliminating the Soviet S[illegible], SS-5 and SS-20 missiles hopelessly vulnerable to circumvention.

So we are very keen to possible circumvention by shorter range Soviet land-based missiles. But we do not want even to discuss, for example, our sea-based cruise missile systems. Yet, in October President Reagan announced our intention to deploy new sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range strategic nuclear strikes against land targets. The present planned procurement is 400.

Why should the Soviet Union agree to dismantle its land-based missiles to preclude our future deployment of cruise missiles on land, and be indifferent to our deploying these same missiles at sea, capable of striking the same targets in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Rostow's second principle is "the need to limit systems without regard to location." He says the SS-20 is "sufficiently mobile and transportable so that efforts to ban it with respect to specific regions would not be meaningful arms control." The Soviet leaders for their part have talked only about limiting their missiles "in Europe," and that of course was the focus of Mr. Brezhnev's moratorium the other day.

We need a third perspective.

SS-20'S

The SS-20 has a very long range, almost 5,000 kilometers. It is being deployed in roughly equal numbers in three different regions of the Soviet Union: in the western, European part; just east of the Ural Mountains in western Siberia; and in eastern Siberia. Those in the Urals area occupy a "swing" position and could be employed against targets either in the European and Mediterranean area or in South or East Asia.

Thus, roughly two-thirds of the SS-20's, currently about 200, could be brought to bear against NATO. The Soviet position and Brezhnev's moratorium is too limited. NATO is covered not only by SS-20's in the European USSR, but also by those just east of the Urals. All SS-20's deployed within striking range of Western Europe clearly need to be included.

But the United States/NATO position is too far-reaching. The fact that SS–20's in eastern Siberia are mobile or even transportable is of little significance. The system as a whole is not easily moved about. It has, after all, taken more than 5 years to deploy the current 297 launchers, with work on each complex extending over a number of months.

Any attempt to redeploy a number of SS–20 units from the Far East to within range of Europe would be readily observed long before they could be used. Incidentally, the argument on transportability also underlines the much greater ease with which the United States could deploy additional aircraft, aircraft carriers and sea-based cruise missiles to within striking range of the Soviet Union in the European theater.

NEGOTIATIONS ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET SYSTEMS

The third principle outlined by Mr. Rostow is "negotiations on United States and Soviet systems only." He argues that in bilateral negotiations it would be "inappropriate" to negotiate over the systems of any third country and states flatly that the United States "will not agree to include or compensate for British and French forces."

From the Soviet perspective, it is one thing to accept equal global force levels with the United States, but quite another to dismantle or even to limit their European theater nuclear forces without taking into account the whole of the strategic forces of the Western alliance they face. Why should they commit themselves to limit, let alone eliminate, their missile forces facing Great Britain and France while those countries are free to build up their strategic forces without constraint?

Nor is the matter hypothetical. France even has a few, 18, land-based intermediate-range missiles. But much more important, France has announced its plans to expand its existing submarine-launched ballistic missile force from 80, soon to be 96, launchers and to replace each single-warhead missile with 7 MIRV's, and Great Britain has announced plans somewhat later to replace its 64 Polaris with Trident II missiles carrying 8 to 14 MIRV warheads each.

That would be nearly three times the number of warheads on the British and French missile forces as compared to the total number planned for the American Pershing II and GLCM force, and a much larger number of warheads than the Soviet Union has even on its estimated future SS–20, SS–4 and SS–5 missile force. Great Britain and France also both have strategic bombers.

BILATERAL UNITED STATES-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

There is a solution to the problem of dealing with these forces in bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations. Third-country alliance forces need not themselves be limited; they can instead be taken into account in setting United States and Soviet force levels, and the Soviet Union compensated in setting its INF levels. This is the solution adopted in NBFR with respect to French Army forces in

West Germany. The Soviet Union has said it would accept this solution in INF.

Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt object very strongly to this idea. But Mr. Rostow's statement that it "cannot be discussed or negotiated" will not add to the credibility of our claims to be negotiating seriously. Nor does Mr. Burt's contention that the Soviet Union is engaging in a "manipulation of the facts" by including British and French forces in the balance, forces avowedly maintained to provide the capability for strategic nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt stress the central importance to the NATO alliance of the commitment that "an attack on one is an attack on all," and that this principle underlies the dual TNF decision. Yet, if NATO should be regarded as integral as a target of possible Soviet attack, why should it not also be regarded as integral in considering the nuclear strike forces it marshals to deter such an attack?

EQUALITY AND VERIFICATION

The fourth principle is equality. Mr. Rostow does refer to equality for the two sides, although clearly he means, and Mr. Burt strsses, equality of forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R. alone. Equality for the two sides is equitable.

The fifth principle is verification. While everyone can agree on the need for effective verification, not everyone would agree with Mr. Rostow that an INF arms control agreement would necessarily require measures beyond national technical means. After all, we are quite confident in our ability to identify precisely all Soviet SS-20 deployments.

We must always consider carefully what verification measures are necessary to monitor specific limitations, and in some cases this will extend beyond national means. But to insist in advance of defining limitations that more than national means will be needed, and to relate it to other purposes, as has occasionally been done by senior administration spokesmen, only excites suspicion that political purposes extraneous to arms control are involved and makes the Soviets less inclined to be forthcoming on additional verification measures.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

The present American proposal and negotiating strategy as described to this committee offer no prospect whatsoever of providing the basis for an agreement. Let us look at the proposal as a whole from the Soviet perspective. The United States proposes the elimination of all 600 Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles, including those deployed for two decades and those located well beyond striking range of NATO, but declines to reduce or even to preclude further increases in American nuclear strike aircraft in Europe or in aircraft carriers deployed near Europe.

We propose no limitations on allied strategic striking forces deployed on land, at sea, or in bombers, and no limit on American sea-based cruise missiles comparable to the land-based GLCM. In addition, we call for elimination of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Asia, deployed beyond range of Europe, with no limitation on forces they confront.

We would limit Soviet tactical missiles to 350-kilometer range in Europe, while we have recently announced plans to upgrade and slightly extend the range of West German Pershing IA missiles now of 750-kilometer range, and these forces would not be limited. We reserve the right to give GLCM's to our allies, who would not be constrained from deploying those or other systems.

We also seek more than national means of verification and with an avowed political interest in changing Soviet society.

I have known Paul Nitze well for over 25 years and we worked together in negotiating SALT I. I have the highest regard for his abilities as a negotiator. But no one could gain Soviet acceptance of such a deal.

ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

The zero option may or may not remain adequate for public relations purposes in sustaining alliance belief in the credibility of U.S. interest in negotiation, but it is patently nonnegotiable. Equally important, the six principles as outlined by Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt provide no foundation for negotiation of an agreement even if the zero option were set aside.

Of course, at this early stage of negotiation the administration cannot be expected to disclose any fallbacks it may be considering, nor should we wish it to do so. The zero option as a tough initial bargaining position can perhaps be justified.

The President stated on November 18 that "we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts." That would seem to provide a sound approach to negotiation. But some of the statements by the administration witnesses in these hearings are not encouraging.

Mr. Rostow asserts that "the Soviet Union is not yet negotiating." While it is difficult to determine Soviet, or anyone's, intentions and purposes by inference from an initial position, the claim that they are "not negotiating" is belied by his own account. As to purposes, what are the Soviet leaders to think of our purposes based on our position as viewed from their perspective?

Again, to be sure, it is early in the negotiation. But one of the administration witnesses in these hearings suggests that negotiation means merely asserting one's proposal and then standing pat. Mr. Perle, with a long history of opposing the SALT agreements, draws from the SALT experience one lesson: stand firm. He does not believe we did so in SALT, so he resolutely asserts: "We will not repeat that mistake. We have gone to Geneva with a proposal we can defend; and defend it we will. We will succeed in Geneva if we are firm."

Well, firmness, like many virtues, can be carried to the point of becoming a vice. Views on negotiating strategies and tactics may vary, but if there can be one sure prediction it is that if both sides assume widely differing positions, as they have, and then stand firm, there can be no real negotiation and no agreement.

It is one thing to insure that the Soviet side does its share to negotiate. It is quite another to set as one's goal to compel the Soviet Union to capitulate to a position fashioned to our advantage.

LIMITS ON SOVIET FORCES

In concluding, I note that Mr. Burt suggests that the Soviet leaders "must be brought to recognize the need to accept substantial limits on their own forces if they are to achieve comparable limits on U.S. forces of concern to them." That is a sound proposition—if applied to both sides.

The Soviet leaders do want to head off the planned U.S. TNF deployments, and the two-track approach does give us bargaining leverage, at least until deployment actually occurs. Moreover, they are negotiating. They are offering reductions in their own forces. This is not to say the Soviet proposal is acceptable. But negotiation requires a search for mutually acceptable outcomes, and it is not encouraging to see prominent administration spokesmen fail to recognize that the other side is negotiating or argue that our only purpose must be to stand and defend our initial position.

Having made a critique of our present position, I should like to offer an idea for another approach which I believe would be more fruitful. But my time is up. Perhaps someone will be interested to inquire about it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Mr. Ambassador, I must observe that you stopped when it just started getting interesting.[Laughter.]

Mr. **Garthoff**. I am ready to go on for 1 minute more if you want to hear it.

Chairman **Zablocki**. If you will, we are most interested in your proposal.

Mr. **Garthoff**. Very well.

UNITED STATES-NATO-SOVIET WARSAW PACT LIMITATIONS

I think the most logical and equitable approach for United States-NATO-Soviet Warsaw Pact limitations would be one covering all nuclear delivery systems of members of each alliance capable from their deployment locations of striking the territories of the members of the other alliance. This would include shorter range systems deployed close to the border of the other side, in addition to medium- and intermediate-range systems in and around Europe, in the INF talks, and would leave no loopholes between INF and SALT–START coverage.

It would demonstrate and reinforce the fact that the security of the members of our respective alliances was in fact being treated equally with the security of the United States and the Soviet Union, but without raising the concerns and openings for new arms competition through excluding and exempting weapons of any arbitrary category or range or national ownership.

I leave open the question of the scale of reductions that might be made from existing levels, but would propose a result of equal levels as between the two alliances in Europe, as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union in global strategic forces.

INF AND START TALKS

The INF and START talks could be conducted separately in parallel, coordinated, or could be merged at some point.

I think that agreement along these lines, even a real effort to reach agreement along these lines, would do far more to limit the arms race, to lessen East-West tensions and to serve NATO alliance solidarity than would pursuit of our present approach to INF arms control or, for that matter, our present planned Pershing II and GLCM deployment program on the alternative track, which is increasingly divisive within the alliance and confrontational in the East-West arms competition.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Garthoff's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

NATO'S Negotiating Strategy in the INF Talks

The negotiating strategy of the United States (and of NATO, on behalf of which the United States is negotiating) is not only of importance in terms of the prospects for successful negotiation of an agreement, but also in terms of American relations with our allies--and with our adversaries. By historical accident, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations may have critical significance for Alliance unity, and also as a sign to the Soviet Union whether the United States retains any genuine interest in negotiated arms control. It therefore behooves us to look beyond tactical political and negotiating questions--by no means ignoring them, but not limiting ourselves to them.

To recapitulate very briefly, the NATO decision in December 1979 to proceed with deployment of new long-range theater nuclear weapons (TNF), the American Pershing II ballistic missiles and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), was based on an Alliance consensus that the Soviet deployment of new weapons in this general category, above all the SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile system, required a political-military. response Specifically, the NATO Governments concluded that continuation of such an unmatched Soviet buildup could "cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression". The response decided upon was two-fold: "the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control".

Arms control was given coequal standing with TNF modernization by deployment of the new missile systems. The NATO Governments declared that they "regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states". They also stated that they "attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente." Finally, they unanimously welcomed "the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes toward achieving these objectives", and decided TNF (now termed INF) limitations "should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework".

I recall these words from the official NATO Communique of December 1979 because they highlight two important subsequent changes from the context of the original decision. First, the Soviet Union very soon thereafter occupied Afghanistan in a military intervention. This Soviet action was condemned by all members of the Alliance and the vast majority of the world community. But while the United States reacted by repudiating its whole policy of detente with the Soviet Union, our Allies did not. Second, and only partly related to the first, the United States did not ratify the SALT II treaty and in fact discontinued the SALT process. In addition, TNF talks were only belatedly and briefly convened in October-November 1980 by a lame-duck

Administration, and were resumed only a full year later with less than enthusiasm by the new Administration. This fact greatly contributed to the growth of popular opposition to the NATO TNF deployment plans in many NATO European countries: the credibility of American interest in pursuing the second, arms limitation, track diminished.

It is true that, although the present American Administration has rejected ratification of what it calls the "fatally flawed" SALT II treaty, it has declared its intention and current policy of not taking any actions contravening provisions of that treaty, and of the expired SALT I Interim Agreement, so long as the Soviet Union does the same, as it is doing. Both countries, for example, have deactivated older submarines as ballistic missile launching ships, under agreed SALT dismantling procedures, as new replacements enter sea trials in order not to contravene the terms of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Also, the Administration has affirmed its intention to resume strategic arms talks, now dubbed START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) to emphasize reductions. This is highly important in its own right, and also because INF limitations, even if negotiated, could never come into effect in the absence of broader U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations. Our Allies would insist on political ("coupling") grounds, and the Soviets on military grounds.

Now the INF talks, if belatedly, have been launched, and the President in his address of November 18, 1981, seized the high-ground of Western public opinion by proposing a "Zero Option", under which the United States would entirely forego deployment of the 572 missiles planned under the 1979 NATO decision, if the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its nearly 600 medium and intermediate range missile launchers. I should like to return to a closer look at that proposal in a minute.

To sum up the situation, as we are beginning the INF negotiations, the Alliance is proceeding on both "tracks" of the 1979 decision, and in prospect is a resumption of American-Soviet negotiations on intercontinental strategic arms. We are, however, more than two years--more than half-way--from the NATO decision to the date deployment is scheduled to begin, and European NATO public and political opinion is increasingly restless as to whether the deployment decision should be reconsidered, and as to whether the United States is really prepared to work toward agreed INF arms limitations. It has been abundantly clear that the overriding consideration in leading President Reagan to go forward with the INF talks was the perceived political necessity to do so in order to hold European support for deployment, and there remain widespread doubts as to whether the United States really seeks an agreement limiting deployment--to some extent in spite of, and to some extent because of, the sweeping and, frankly, one-sided nature of the Zero Option.

We need a credible negotiating strategy in order to assure continued Alliance solidarity in implementing the dual "track" decision; we need it even more if we are seriously interested in arms control.

It is very important that we recognize that the perspectives and perceptions--as well as the positions--of the two sides differ greatly. When we do not, and regrettably both sides frequently fail to do so, differing perspectives of the other side are often misconstrued as representing hostile purposes and intentions rather than merely differing perceptions or misperceptions. A review of the approaches of the two sides to the INF talks clearly illustrates this phenomenon, and awareness of the importance of differing perceptions is, in turn, a necessary element to a sound understanding of what our negotiating strategy should be.

Mr. Rostow, in testifying before these subcommittees on February 23, set forth what he described as the six "most important principles underlying our position" in the INF talks. Let us look at them from the standpoint of differing perspectives, as well as noting other implications.

First is the proposal to focus on land-based missiles of intermediate range. The argument, and clearly it has some force, is that these are seen to be "the most threatening" and "most destabilizing" weapons. He rightly notes that these systems are seen as threatening by both sides, although his contention that the expressed Soviet concern also over nuclear delivery aircraft is only a "negotiating tactic" is offered as a flat judgment, and is not supported by the long Soviet effort to include such systems in SALT or by other evidence of real Soviet concern. From the Soviet perspective, an attempt to obtain complete dismantling of their entire force of 600 new and old land-based intermediate range missile launchers in exchange for U.S. non-deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM systems would mean a sharp and one-sided change from a long-standing posture. After all, before the SS-20 deployment began, for many years the U.S. and NATO had considered that an adequate over-all balance existed when the Soviet Union had more than 600 such missiles facing Europe. Granting that the SS-20 is more effective than the older systems it is replacing, why (from the Soviet standpoint) should it have to eliminate all of its missiles, new and old, in exchange merely for non-deployment of certain new U.S. missile systems but not others? Such a proposal, if it remains the only approach we will consider, is bound to appear to Soviet negotiators and decision makers not only as unacceptable, but as reflecting lack of a serious U.S. and NATO interest in reaching a negotiated agreement.

The United States has also been stressing the increase in Soviet TNF capability because of the fact that the SS-20 missile has MIRV warheads. The number of Soviet medium and intermediate range missile launchers has not increased, and the megatonnage and throw-weight has actually decreased, but the number of independently targetable warheads has indeed grown as a result of the Soviet replacement of large single warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the SS-20, having three smaller MIRV warheads on each missile. On the other hand, in the many comparisons of U.S. and Soviet global strategic forces, it is often said that the United States "stood still" during the 1970s--the SALT decade, the decade of detente--while the Soviet Union carried out a relentless buildup. Yet throughout the decade of the 1970s the United States increased the number of its warheads by a larger number than did the Soviet Union, and at the end of the decade we actually had a larger superiority in numbers of strategic warheads than we had at the beginning. Moreover, in SALT we insisted on counting only the number of launchers (which we had not increased since 1967), and not warheads. Now the shoe is on the other foot in the INF talks.

Mr. Burt of the Department of State, in his testimony, gives a different reason for insistence on trying to limit the INF talks to land-based missiles. Efforts to include aircraft and sea-based systems would, he suggests, "divert attention away from the threat, and introduce complexities which would impede our efforts to achieve agreement". In any negotiation, no one side can determine what the other regards as threatening, nor what would "impede" progress toward an agreement, and we cannot ignore the strong Soviet insistence that aircraft be considered. Of course it would introduce complexities, very trying ones. But, for example, when in SALT I the Soviet side urged a simple ABM treaty alone as a first step because of the "complexities" which consideration of offensive arms would involve, the United States insisted that it was not enough to consider only the then "most threatening" ABM, despite "complexities".

Recognition of a balance of concerns, and negotiation of a balance of concessions, are necessary to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

Inclusion of aircraft in the INF discussions (and the Soviet Delegation has already included them) will, indeed, involve complexities. American aircraft are, on the average, longer-range than Soviet counterparts. But depending on the range selected (and even on how range, or "combat radius" to be more accurate, is defined) the comparative balance, and list of types for limitation, varies greatly. The Soviet Union has "loaded" its balance by including only medium bombers on its side, while including F-4 fighter bombers on the United States side. Rather than rebut that proposition, the United States retaliated with a vengeance with a comparison first cited by President Reagan, in which he included in a "six to one" East-West comparison no less than 2,700 Soviet fighter bombers mostly of much shorter range, and of which only a fraction would actually be used for nuclear weapons delivery. (This "six to one" comparison, by the way, had never before been made in official or unofficial Western estimates of the TNF balance, and clearly was contrived "overkill" to counter the Soviet contention that an equal balance of TNF forces now exists, with their selection of forces said to represent such a balance.) But having made this comparison claiming that the Soviet Union enjoyed a six to one superiority in intermediate range nuclear forces, the Administration shows what it really thinks about its own comparison by declining to include these forces in the negotiations! Whatever the final disposition of aircraft limitations, it would be more reasonable and equitable to wrestle with the problem than to claim disingenuously that it is not a real issue, or attempt to brush it off as just introducing "complexities". It is, moreover, an issue on which neither the current U.S./NATO, or Soviet, perspectives are adequate. We need a third perspective.

There is another important aspect of this question. Any prospective limitations on certain systems--even at present or planned higher levels, to say nothing of a possible zero land-based intermediate missile level--immediately raises questions of other systems which can, if not also limited, substitute for them. If limitations were placed only on land-based missiles, either side could greatly increase the number of its aircraft, or of sea-based cruise missiles, or other unlimited systems, in pursuit of an advantage. The Soviets have such a concern, and perhaps we should as well. But the only system we have selected is shorter-range land-based missiles, an area of comparative Soviet advantage. (Incidentally, this was an element not mentioned in President Reagan's speech, and not part of the basic NATO position). Mr. Rostow states only that "some collateral constraints will be needed to keep it [an agreement] from being undermined by unbanned systems of shorter range". What this really means is spelled out more fully by its author, Mr. Perle of the Department of Defense. He disclosed: "In the Geneva negotiations we are also seeking limitations on some Soviet systems of shorter range. A failure to limit them, by numerical ceilings and other limitations, would leave an agreement eliminating the Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles hopelessly vulnerable to circumvention". Thus we are very keen to possible "circumvention" by shorter-range Soviet land-based missiles (for example the SS-23, one which Mr. Perle mentioned, has a 350 km. range). But we do not want even to discuss our sea-based long-range cruise missile systems (also, incidentally, not covered by SALT). Yet in October, President Reagan announced our intention to deploy new submarine and surface ship launched cruise missiles for long-range nuclear strikes against land targets, and the present planned procurement has more recently been officially stated to be 400. Why should the Soviet Union agree to limit its shorter-range missiles when we won't include even long-range sea-based ones? And why should the Soviet Union agree to dismantle its land-based missiles to preclude our future deployment of cruise missiles on land, and be indifferent to our deploying these same missiles at sea, capable of striking the same targets in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Rostow's second "principle" is "the need to limit systems without regard to location". Mr. Burt defines this same point as making limitations "global in scope". Mr. Burt refers only to the "range, mobility and transportability" of the SS-20 as making it not "effective" limitation if applied only to missiles deployed "in Europe". Mr. Rostow says the SS-20 is "sufficiently mobile and transportable so that efforts to ban it with respect to specific regions would not be meaningful arms control". The Soviet leaders, for their part, have talked only about limiting their missiles "in Europe" and "in the western parts of the Soviet Union".

Here, again, we need a third perspective. The SS-20 has a very long range, estimated at almost 5,000 km. It is being deployed in roughly equal numbers in three different regions of the Soviet Union: in the western, European part of the USSR; just east of the Ural mountain range in western Siberia; and in eastern Siberia. Those in the Urals area occupy a "swing" position, and could be employed against targets either in the European and Mediterranean area, or in south and east Asia. Thus, roughly two-thirds of the SS-20s could be brought to bear against NATO. The Soviet position (and Brezhnev's moratorium) is too limited: NATO is covered not only by SS-20s in the western USSR, but also by those just east of the Urals and not "in Europe". All SS-20s deployed within striking range of Western Europe clearly need to be included. But the U.S./NATO position is too far-reaching.

The fact that SS-20s in eastern Siberia are "mobile" or even "transportable" is of little significance. Although the SS-20 missile is mounted on a large, heavy vehicle, the system as a whole is not easily moved about. It has, after all, taken over five years to deploy the current 297 launchers, with work on each complex extending over a number of months. Any attempt to redeploy a number of SS-20 units from the Far East to within range of Europe would be readily observed long before they could be used. (The argument on transportability also underlines the much greater ease with which the United States could deploy additional aircraft, aircraft carriers, and sea-based cruise missiles to within striking range of the Soviet Union in and around Europe.)

Perhaps it was in recognition of the weakness of this argument that Mr. Rostow offered an additional one for seeking to include all Soviet SS-20s: "even those deployed in the far eastern part of the USSR present a threat to the basic security interests of the United States in the Far East and the Middle East". But this argument makes hash out of the basic regional European framework of the INF talks--as well as indirectly pointing up that we would not propose to include any American systems in the Far East, and that the Soviet Union faces a hostile missile-armed China there.

The third principle outlined by Mr. Rostow is "negotiations on U.S. and Soviet systems only". He argues that in bilateral negotiations it would be "inappropriate" to negotiate over the systems of any third country, and states flatly that the U.S. "will not agree to include or compensate for British and French forces". This is, of course, not only a U.S. position but one endorsed by NATO. It may seem reasonable, and from our perspective fair. Moreover, the Soviet Union did--albeit very reluctantly--agree to equal SALT II strategic forces limitations with the U.S. without including British and French forces.

From the Soviet perspective, it is one thing to accept equal global force levels with the United States, but quite another to dismantle, or even to limit, their European theater nuclear forces without taking into account the whole of the strategic forces of the Western Alliance they face. Why should they commit themselves to limit--let alone eliminate--their missile forces facing Great Britain and France while those countries are free to build up their strategic forces without constraint? Nor is the matter hypothetical. France even has a few (18) land-based intermediate range missiles. But much more important, France has announced its plans to expand its existing SLBM force from 80 (soon to be 96) launchers and to replace each single-missile warhead with 7 MIRVs, and Great Britain has announced plans somewhat later to replace its 64 Polaris launchers with Trident II missiles carrying 8 to 14 MIRV warheads each. That would be nearly three times the number of warheads on the French and British missile forces as compared to the total number planned for the American Pershing II and GLCM force--and a much larger number of warheads than the Soviet Union has on its present or even on its estimated future SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile force. Great Britain and France also both have strategic bombers capable of striking the Soviet Union. (And while France is not a member of the integrated NATO military structure, it is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.)

There is a solution to the problem of taking account of these forces in bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Third-country alliance forces need not themselves be limited; they can instead be taken into account in setting U.S. and Soviet force levels. This is the solution adopted in the MBFR negotiations with respect to French forces in West Germany. Thus the Soviet Union could be "compensated" in setting its INF levels. If, for example, France or Great Britain later added X number of intermediate range missiles to its forces, either the Soviet Union could then have the right also to add X missiles or the United States could reduce by X missiles. A number of American and other

Western analysts have suggested this approach to TNF. The Soviet Union has said it would accept this solution in the INF talks. NATO has not. Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt object very strongly to this idea. But Mr. Rostow's suggestion that the Soviet proposal to take account of all Western TNF is "a claim of a right to hegemony which cannot be discussed or negotiated" will not add to the credibility of our claims to be negotiating seriously. Nor does Mr. Burt's contention that the Soviet Union is engaging in a "manipulation of the facts" by including British and French forces in the balance--forces avowedly maintained to provide the capability for strategic nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt repeatedly note that the United States and NATO have stressed the central importance to the NATO Alliance of the commitment that "an attack on one is an attack on all", and that this principle underlies the dual TNF decision. Yet, if NATO should be regarded as "integral" as a target of possible Soviet attack, why should it not also be regarded as integral in considering the nuclear strike forces it marshals to deter such an attack?,

The fourth principle is equality; in Mr. Rostow's words: "equal limitations and equal rights: reductions in order to achieve truly equal deterrent capacity". Apropos of the discussion above, it is of interest that he refers to equality for the two "sides" (although clearly he means, and Mr. Burt stresses, equality of forces of the U.S. and the USSR alone). Indeed, equality for the two sides is equitable and (though, I'm sure, only with much hard effort) probably negotiable. The Soviets call for equality. The NATO TNF decision in December 1979 called for "equality between the sides" in arms limitations.

While equality at a "zero option" level, or at the reduced levels of a few hundred missiles and bombers proposed by the Soviet Union, would seem to be acceptable to both sides if the crucial questions in determining the forces to be included could be resolved, we should note that a failure to agree on INF arms limitations could pose a future problem in the Alliance. Parity as a principle in arms limitation is one thing; parity in intermediate range weapons in Europe is another matter.

The central purpose of the NATO TNF deployment program has always been seen as strengthening the "coupling" effect of the Alliance deterrent. Many European advocates of the TNF have stressed that the number of TNF forces deployed by NATO should not be equal to the Soviet forces; that could have a "decoupling" effect. A "Eurostrategic balance" would, in the words of a prominent West German advocate of the TNF decision, Minister of State Peter Corterier, "create a danger of a Euro-strategic nuclear exchange and thus a nuclear war in Europe totally decoupled from a simultaneous direct strategic involvement of both Super Powers". He made this comment in supporting the more limited numbers of Pershing II and GLCM missiles planned on the deployment "track" as compared to Soviet TNF forces. "The principle of parity", he noted, "relates to a balance of options and not to a numerical equality of individual weapons systems". (NATO Review, August 1981, pp. 5 and 7).

It should also be noted that NATO does not plan to build up to equality in land-based missile systems on the deployment "track one"; it seeks that result only on the arms control "track two".

The fifth principle is verification. While everyone can agree on the need for effective verification, not everyone would agree with Mr. Rostow that an INF arms control agreement would necessarily require measures beyond national technical means. After all, we are quite confident in our ability to identify precisely all Soviet SS-20 deployments (and deployments of other present systems). One can easily envisage some possible limitations that would be very difficult or even impossible to verify by national means. Cruise missiles, if deployed, present a serious problem for verification. We must always consider carefully what verification measures are necessary to monitor specific limitations. But to insist in advance of defining limitations that more than national means will be needed--and to relate it to other purposes, as has occasionally been done by senior Administration spokesmen, although not in the present hearings--only excites suspicion that political purposes extraneous to arms control are involved. Desirable as the "opening up" of the Soviet system may be from our perspective, attempts to impose internal political change under the guise of "verification" would not produce any result except to kill any prospect for attainable arms limitations. It will only make the Soviet leaders less inclined to be forthcoming on additional verification measures.

The sixth principle, concerning "other limits", is of generally undisclosed dimension. The "collateral constraints" on shorter-range missile systems suggests that "other limits" we envisage will not be confined to deployments or dismantling of intermediate range land-based systems, but it is clear they do not include American air or sea-based systems, or any system of our Allies--including GLCMs and other intermediate range missiles.

The present American proposal and negotiating strategy as described to this Committee offer no prospect whatsoever of providing the basis for an agreement. Let us look at the proposal as a whole from the Soviet perspective: The United States proposes the elimination of all 600 Soviet medium and intermediate range missiles, including those deployed for two decades, and those located well beyond striking range of NATO, but declines to reduce or even to preclude future increases in American nuclear strike aircraft in Europe (such as the long-range F-111, the number of which based in Europe was doubled to 170 in 1977), or on aircraft carriers deployed near Europe; we propose no limitations on Allied strategic striking forces deployed on land, at sea, or in bombers (numbering currently several hundred); and no limit on American sea-based cruise missiles comparable to the land-based GLCM (of which we plan several hundred). In addition, we call for elimination of Soviet intermediate range missiles in Asia deployed beyond range of Europe, with no limitation on forces they confront. We would limit Soviet tactical missiles of 350 km range in Europe, while we have recently announced plans to upgrade and slightly extend the

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range of West German Pershing IA missiles now of 750 km. range, and these forces would not be limited. We reserve the right to give GLCMs to our Allies, who would not be constrained from deploying those or other systems. We also seek more than national means of verification of the Soviet dismantling of its intermediate range missiles, perhaps to include monitoring production sites, and with an avowed political interest in changing Soviet society.

I have known Paul Nitze well for over twenty-five years, and we worked together in negotiating SALT I. I have the highest regard for his abilities as a negotiator. But no one could gain Soviet acceptance of such a deal.

The "zero option" may or may not remain adequate for public relations purposes in sustaining alliance belief in the credibility of U.S. interest in negotiation, but it is patently non-negotiable. Equally important, the six principles as outlined by Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt provide no foundation for negotiation of an agreement even if the "zero option" is set aside.

Of course, at this early stage of negotiation the Administration cannot be expected to disclose any "fall-backs" it may be considering, nor should we wish it to do so. The "zero option", as a tough initial bargaining position, can perhaps be justified. The President stated on November 18 that "we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts". Only time will show what that means. It would seem to provide a sound approach to negotiation. But some of the statements by the Administration witnesses in these hearings are not encouraging.

Mr. Rostow asserts, with no evidence to cite, that "the Soviet Union is not yet convinced of the need to negotiate seriously". He categorically states, I am sure with earnest conviction, that the Soviets are only conducting the talks "as a tactical effort to divide the United States from Europe" and "to destroy the credibility of the American nuclear guaranty. In short, the Soviet Union is not yet negotiating". While it is difficult to determine Soviet (or anyone's) intentions and purposes by inference from an initial position, the claim that they are "not negotiating" is belied by his own account of the Soviet presentation of its position. As to purposes, what are the Soviet leaders to think of our purposes, based on our position as viewed from their perspective?

To be sure, it is early in the negotiation. But one of the Administration witnesses in these hearings suggests that negotiation means merely asserting one's proposal and then standing pat. Mr. Perle, with a long history of opposing the SALT agreements, draws from the SALT experience one lesson: stand firm. He does not believe we did so in SALT, so he resolutely asserts: "We will not repeat that mistake. We have gone to Geneva with a proposal that we can defend; and defend it we will". He continues: "we will succeed in Geneva if we are firm and deliberate, if we stand by the substance of our proposal. That substance is fair and equitable; it must not be sacrificed to the negotiation". Firmness, like many virtues, can be carried to the point of becoming a vice. Views on negotiating strategies and tactics may vary, but if there can be one sure prediction it is that if both sides assume widely differing positions, as they have, and then stand firm, there can be no real negotiation and no agreement. Simply standing firm is not a tactic for negotiation; it is an alternative to negotiation. Mr. Perle's approach suggests there is very little to look forward to in terms of a negotiation, much less in the prospect for an agreement. It is one thing to ensure that the Soviet side does its share to negotiate; it is quite another to set as one's goal to compel the Soviet Union to capitulate to a position fashioned to our advantage.

Mr. Rostow states that we should neither be optimistic nor pessimistic at this stage, but persevere and seek to persuade. So far, so good. But he comments enigmatically that "It is most unlikely that we shall be able to convince the Soviet Union within the framework of the nuclear equations alone". He places the INF talks in the frame of his image of the general political confrontation of the two sides, "of our foreign and defense policy as a whole". He continues, in the final sentence of his testimony, to suggest that "unless extraordinary change should occur in the Soviet Union" the present Soviet leadership or its likely successors should be expected to "accept" a successful outcome of our negotiating effort "only if it is apparent that continuing on its present course will surely confront the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks". Not costs of an arms race, or lost opportunities, but "unacceptable risks".

I don't know quite what Mr. Rostow means, or what more charitable interpretation may be put on that statement, but it is beyond my imagination to see any possible Soviet interpretation of it other than as a threat and an attempt to negotiate by duress.

Mr. Burt, while hewing to the same substantive position, closes by suggesting that the Soviet leaders "must be brought to recognize the need to accept substantial limits on their own forces, if they are to achieve comparable limits on U.S. forces of concern to them." That is a sound proposition, if applied to both sides. The Soviet leaders do want to head off the planned U.S. TNF deployments, and the "two-track" approach does give us bargaining leverage--at least until deployment actually occurs. Moreover, they are negotiating--they are offering reductions in their own forces. This is not at all to say that the Soviet proposal is acceptable. But negotiation requires a search for mutually acceptable outcomes, and it is not encouraging to see prominent Administration spokesmen fail to acknowledge that the other side is negotiating, or argue that our only purpose must be to stand obdurate and "defend" our initial position.

Before concluding, having made a critique of our present approach, I should like to offer an idea for another approach which I believe would be more fruitful. If, as Mr. Rostow and Mr. Burt stress, a major Soviet purpose both in their INF deployments and in their INF negotiating strategy is to divide the United States from its Allies, why not devise an INF arms control strategy of our own which would integrate us more securely? The Soviet Union has pursued a consistent line defining "strategic" weapons, for purposes of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations, as any nuclear weapons system capable of striking either the Soviet Union or the United States. We have not accepted that definition in SALT for good and sufficient reasons, but without having a real alternative. Now, in INF, neither side has a compelling basis for defining which systems, or even whose, should be limited. We seek to focus only on U.S. and Soviet intermediate range land-based missiles, but that selection is unbalanced and not viable. And even we wish also, for example, to limit shorter-range Soviet missiles because they too can strike targets in Western Europe. The Soviet Union has proposed an arbitrary but not unreasonable cutoff of 1,000 km. range for all nuclear delivery systems on both sides in Europe. The Soviet Union also seeks to include the American FB-111 strategic medium bombers based in the United States because they were not included in SALT and would now represent a loophole or gap between SALT/START and INF, a one-sided one to the extent that comparable Soviet medium-range bombers in Europe were now included in INF, as they propose. But they err in counting them as part of the European balance. The approaches of each side find some valid objections from the other.

The most logical and equitable approach for U.S./NATO - Soviet/Warsaw Pact INF limitations would appear to be one covering all nuclear delivery systems of the members of each alliance capable from their deployment locations of striking the territories of the members of the other alliance. This would include shorter-range systems deployed close to the border of the other side in addition to medium and intermediate range systems in and around Europe in the INF talks, and would leave no loopholes between INF and SALT/START coverage. It would demonstrate and reinforce the fact that the security of the members of our respective alliances was in fact being treated equally with the security of the United States and the Soviet Union, but without raising the concerns and openings for new arms competition through excluding and exempting weapons of any arbitrary category, or range, or national ownership. (Compensation within equal overall levels for the two sides could be used if any member, for example France, declined to participate.)

There would be many negotiating issues, but such an approach may offer even greater advantages, including a greater possibility of ultimate acceptance, than either the current U.S./NATO or Soviet proposals. In any event, I offer this idea for consideration, leaving open the question of the scale of reductions that might be made from existing levels, but proposing a result of equal levels as between the two alliances in Europe, as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union in global strategic forces. INF and START negotiations could either remain separate and coordinated, or they could be merged.

Agreement along these lines, even a real effort to reach agreement along these lines, would do far more to limit the arms race, to lessen East-West tensions, and to serve NATO Alliance solidarity than would pursuit of our present approach to INF arms control--or, for that matter, our planned Pershing II and GLCM deployment program on the alternative track, increasingly divisive within the Alliance and confrontational in the East-West arms competition.

In closing, I would like to endorse another statement by Mr. Rostow which I hope better reflects the ultimate frame of reference of the Administration in the INF talks than some I have noted earlier. In his words:

> We are the two leading nuclear powers in the world, possessing arsenals of frightening power and menace. It is our responsibility--our equal responsibility--to do whatever is necessary to draw mankind back from the edge of the abyss. That is the perspective in which we should approach the problem of negotiating with the Soviet Union about reducing the menace of intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear weapons.

The only liberty I have taken with this statement (quoted from page 18 of Mr. Rostow's testimony) is to insert the word "should" in the final sentence. I would only wish such qualifying amendment did not seem necessary.

Chairman **Zablocki.** Thank you, Ambassador.

We will next hear from Dr. Lynn Davis, if you will proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF LYNN DAVIS, FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, AND FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY PLANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Ms. **Davis.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to participate in this panel of witnesses on U.S. negotiating strategies for the TNF talks in Geneva. My statement briefly discusses the background to the TNF negotiations, the current positions of each side—except that since I wrote my statement Brezhnev has announced a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the Soviet Union.

The statement concludes with a recommended TNF negotiating strategy. I would like to briefly summarize the elements of that strategy, which begin on page 8 of my statement.

1979 NATO DECISION

Most important for the United States is that we continue to give high priority to the decision taken by NATO in 1979. NATO needs especially to demonstrate its ability to carry out this decision following the massive Soviet campaign to prevent U.S. missile deployments.

The United States should insure that its programs for ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles stay on schedule to give the Soviet Union an incentive to negotiate seriously and so that deployments can begin in late 1983 if arms control fails. In its negotiating strategy in Geneva, the United States should make every effort to demonstrate its commitment to arms control, in implementation of that part of the 1979 decision. If the negotiations do not produce an agreement, the Soviet Union should bear the responsibility.

COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Second, to demonstrate its seriousness about arms control, the most important step the United States should take is to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear forces. SALT or START must also provide the substantive framework for the TNF negotiations. Without limits on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, an agreement on theater nuclear forces is neither militarily nor politically sensible. In the absence of a U.S. policy on SALT, the Soviet Union could also seek to split the alliance by offering concessions to the Europeans on theater nuclear forces upon the condition that the United States ratifies SALT II or agrees to some other SALT proposals.

The TNF negotiations in Geneva should, however, continue to proceed separately from SALT to increase the chances for success and to avoid the difficulties of integrating theater nuclear forces into SALT ceilings. The modalities of how the two negotiations will be linked can remain open at this point, but the United States should not conclude a TNF agreement until a substantive SALT framework is defined.

LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES

Third, the United States should continue to seek an agreement in Geneva focused narrowly on land-based intermediate-range missiles. These weapons are clearly the most threatening and troublesome for each side. The more comprehensive a potential TNF agreement, the more difficult it will be to design and negotiate.

LEVEL OF WARHEADS DEPLOYED

Fourth, when the negotiations on zero deployments reach an impasse, as I believe they will, the United States should introduce a proposal for a level of land-based intermediate range missile warheads at the number of SS–20's deployed at the time Brezhnev made his freeze proposal in February 1981. That is approximately 600 to 650 warheads worldwide, 400 to 450 warheads within range of Western Europe. NATO would have the right to deploy equal numbers. The Soviet Union would have to retire their older SS–4 and SS–5 missiles.

Such a level is consistent with the analysis which formed the basis of the 1979 decision by providing for the deployment of between 200 and 600 warheads, and with the Reagan administration's avowed arms control objectives by requiring Soviet reductions from current force levels. NATO would also be able to test Brezhnev's willingness to accept the levels of SS–20's deployed when he proposed the freeze a year ago.

ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

The proposal for zero deployments has had a salutary effect on the peace movement in Europe, but if NATO holds to this position it risks demonstrating a lack of seriousness about actually achieving an arms control agreement and could bear the onus for arms control failing. By moving away from the proposal for zero deployments, the NATO TNF negotiating position will become more consistent with NATO strategy, which calls for a spectrum of nuclear capabilities. This new TNF arms control proposal would also improve somewhat the chances that the negotiations would succeed, thereby reducing the scale of NATO's overall TNF modernization program.

SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE TNF POSTURES

Fifth, the United States should seek an agreement prohibiting the flight testing or deployment of new types of land-based intermediate-range missiles after the SS–4 and SS–5, the SS–20, the ground-launched cruise missile, and the Pershing II ballistic missile. Arms control would thereby be served by the introduction of greater predictability in the size and characteristics of future TNF postures.

Sixth, to protect against Soviet deployments that would negate the limits on intermediate-range missile warheads, the United

States should seek a ban on reload missiles and a noncircumvention agreement on intermediate-range nuclear aircraft. Soviet shorter range missiles and aircraft present a potential problem, but they should be discussed in a more comprehensive follow-on TNF negotiation.

VERIFICATION

Finally, the TNF agreement should include provisions to supplement national technical means of verification.

Now, the Soviet Union rarely gives prominence in their arms control proposals to negotiability. But I think NATO will need to analyze the attractiveness for the Soviet Union of any TNF arms control approach, in part to be able to persuade publics of the reasonableness of its arms control position.

This recommended U.S. negotiating approach would offer the Soviets a means of getting the overall SALT process back on track. The Soviet Union would be able to retain the number of SS-20's deployed at the time Brezhnev made his freeze proposal, rather than having to eliminate all their intermediate-range missiles. They would achieve constraints on U.S. ground-launched missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles below the planned NATO modernization program. Of course, this will not be important to the Soviets until they actually believe that we are going to be able to implement that 1979 decision. And through the noncircumvention provisions they would achieve indirect limits on U.S. intermediate range nuclear aircraft in Europe.

I appreciate that this negotiating strategy will require the resolution of many difficult technical issues, that it will need to overcome potential political opposition in Europe, and it is obviously not acceptable to the Soviet Union at this time. But I do believe that it offers probably the best chance that we have of achieving an agreement, and I think, probably more importantly, to provide the political basis for modernizing our TNF posture, and therefore implement the 1979 decision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. Davis' prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF LYNN E. DAVIS, PH. D., FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in this panel of witnesses on U.S. negotiating strategies for the TNF talks in Geneva. My statement briefly discusses the background to the TNF negotiations, the current positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the major issues for the United States. The statement concludes with a recommended TNF negotiating strategy.

Background

In 1979, NATO took an historic decision. Both the characteristics and the consultation process were unique. NATO Ministers defined a modernization program for long-range theater nuclear forces to ensure the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy in an age of strategic nuclear parity; to respond to the buildup of Soviet nuclear forces, in particular the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber; and to improve the flexibility and survivability of NATO's nuclear force posture. The motivation was primarily political, to respond to European concerns about the SS-20 and the cruise missile limits in the SALT II Protocol. The 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) also had a military purpose: to increase the potential costs of Soviet aggression in Europe by the capability to put at risk targets in the Soviet

Union. In advance of the actual deployments, NATO Ministers also agreed to begin arms control negotiations and, if successful, to modify the scale of NATO's modernization program. The United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany agreed to the stationing of the new missiles beginning in late 1983. Belgium and the Netherlands deferred their decision on basing pending the results of the arms control negotiations.

Since 1979, the political framework in which this decision was taken has changed quite dramatically. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The United States failed to ratify the SALT II Treaty. The TNF negotiations did not begin until November 1981. Widespread public opposition to nuclear weapons has arisen throughout Western Europe. President Reagan's decision to produce the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) has fueled this opposition, as have American statements on the possibility of a limited nuclear war. The Soviet Union has also pursued a very effective peace campaign.

In November 1981, President Reagan was able to mute public opposition in Europe by proposing the elimination of all intermediate range missiles* and by promising negotiations on strategic nuclear forces in early 1982. But the prospects for implementing the 1979 NATO decision remain most uncertain.

TNF Negotiations

The negotiations in Geneva on theater nuclear forces are viewed in a number of different ways. The United States and the Soviet Union have stated that their aim in the discussions is to achieve an arms control agreement. They also quite obviously see the negotiations as a public forum for gaining European support for their respective positions. The primary Soviet objective is to divide the United States and the Europeans and to prevent the United States from deploying the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. NATO seeks to reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. For many Europeans, the negotiations provide the means to avoid deployments of new U.S. missiles.

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* The same ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II ballistic missiles have been called: "long-range theater nuclear forces" in the 1979 NATO decision; "medium-range missiles" by the Soviet Union and most Europeans, and "intermediate range missiles" by President Reagan.

The U.S. objective in the TNF arms control negotiations is the elimination of U.S. and Soviet land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles. If the Soviet Union would dismantle all its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles, the United States would cancel plans for the deployment of 572 GLCM and Pershing II missiles. The U.S. proposal focuses on the most dynamic weapon systems on each side and calls for a substantial reduction in the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. It would postpone consideration of aircraft and other nuclear weapons in Europe until follow-on phases of the TNF negotiations.

The Soviet Union has made a number of different arms control proposals. Each one would prohibit the deployment of any new U.S. intermediate range missiles. Chairman Brezhnev offered in 1979 to reduce, compared with the present level, the quantity of these systems in the western part of the Soviet Union, if similar systems were not deployed in Western Europe. In February 1981, he called for a freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, on the deployment in Europe of these systems. This freeze would enter into force at the commencement of negotiations. In February 1982, he proposed a reduction (to 600 units by the end of 1985 and to 300 units by 1990) in medium-range nuclear weapons deployed on "the territory of Europe and on adjacent sea areas or destined for use in Europe." During the negotiations, each side would freeze quantitatively and qualitatively the medium-range weapons in Europe. Brezhnev also said that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate "a complete renunciation of all types of medium-range arms aimed at targets in Europe" and to go even further and agree "on completely ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, tactical as well as medium-range."

By including and excluding various countries and categories of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union judges the current balance of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe to be roughly equal, whereas the United States maintains that the Soviet Union has a six-to-one advantage. (See Appendix A)

Issues

The initial negotiating positions of the United States and Soviet Union are very far apart. The two sides differ on the weapons to be included both in a potential TNF agreement and in the balance of intermediate range nuclear forces. For political reasons, the United States will not be able to accept limits on British and French nuclear systems. The United States will need to insist upon global limits on the SS-20 missile because of its range and mobility. The United States must also ensure de jure equality in ceilings and in rights in any TNF arms control agreement.

As the negotiations proceed, the United States will need to address the following four issues.

(1) How should the TNF negotiations be linked to SALT?

TNF and SALT negotiations have in the past been linked quite closely. NATO proceeded in 1979 upon the assumption that SALT II would be ratified and called for TNF negotiations within the framework of SALT III. This linkage aimed to avoid any impression of a separate Euro-strategic balance and grew out of a belief that limits on theater nuclear forces made very little sense without constraints on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Union has also linked strategic and theater nuclear forces, first in seeking limits on cruise missiles in the SALT II Treaty and second in 1980 in conditioning any future TNF agreement upon ratification of SALT II.

The United States has three choices:

a) Integrate limits on intermediate range nuclear forces into overall SALT (or START) ceilings. Such an approach would avoid any impression of a separate Euro-strategic balance and would couple strategic and theater nuclear weapons in U.S. arms control policy as well as military strategy. The enormous complexity of the SALT process and the difficulty of excluding British and French nuclear forces argue against such an approach.

b) Pursue separate TNF negotiations but maintain a close substantive and procedural link with SALT, as envisioned in the 1979 NATO decision. The United States would need to define a SALT policy before concluding a TNF agreement.

c) Proceed with separate TNF negotiations, leaving uncertain the future linkage to SALT.

Given the current uncertainties surrounding the future of SALT (or START), the intellectually most attractive course--close linkage--may not be possible.

(2) Should the scope of the negotiation be expanded to cover: intermediate range aircraft; nuclear systems on the periphery between TNF negotiations and SALT, e.g., the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. sea-based cruise missiles; and/or shorter range nuclear weapons in Europe?

Introducing aircraft into the TNF negotiation will raise complex problems of inclusion and exclusion. Aircraft are very mobile and can be introduced quickly into the European theater during a crisis or war. The range of aircraft varies according to flight profile. No satisfactory measures exist for comparing the capabilities of different kinds of aircraft or for establishing equality. Many aircraft can perform both nuclear and conventional missions. Aircraft limits based on peacetime deployments, range, or capability will be inherently arbitrary and potentially controversial.

The Soviet Union avoids these definitional problems by calling for inclusion of all U.S. forward-based nuclear aircraft capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union and by specifying the systems: FB-111, F-111, F-4, and carrier-based A-6/A-7. They are prepared to include the Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers, but they omit their fighter aircraft (SU-17, SU-24, SU-27), all of which threaten targets in Western Europe and have capabilities comparable to those aircraft included for the United States.

NATO in 1979 singled out land-based missiles for negotiation because of their "immediate and serious threat." Other U.S. and Soviet nuclear missile systems can, however, cover the same targets. When deployed in Eastern Europe, the shorter-range Soviet missiles (SS-21, SS-22, and SS-X-23) have basically the same capabilities against Western Europe as the SS-20. (NATO shorter-range weapons do not have comparable capabilities against targets in the Soviet Union). If deployed in the European theater, U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) will have roughly the same military capabilities as GLCM. A TNF arms control agreement involving only land-based intermediate range missiles may, therefore, not adequately cover the threat for either side.

The issue for the alliance is whether a negotiation based only on land-based intermediate range missiles is militarily sensible (given Soviet deployments of Backfire and shorter-range missile systems), realistically negotiable (given Soviet demands for inclusion of U.S. forward-based systems) or politically sustainable in Europe (if it means no arms control agreement).

(3) If the offer of zero deployments proves non-negotiable, should NATO modify its position and seek a numerical ceiling on both sides intermediate range missile warheads? What should be the ceiling? Will any level be acceptable which is negotiable? Or must NATO hold out for a level below the full NATO program of 572 warheads?

European leaders will find it politically difficult to move away from the zero arms control proposal, for by setting any level they become committed to U.S. missile deployments. But given Soviet deployments of over 280 SS-20 missiles, NATO will almost certainly have to show some flexibility on the levels of intermediate range missiles if arms control is to succeed.

Setting a level will also be conceptually difficult. It could be defined in terms of Soviet SS-20 deployments: the projected size of the program; the number estimated to have been deployed in 1981 at the time Brezhnev made his freeze offer. Alternatively, the alliance could set the level in terms of NATO deployments: to protect the full modernization program of 572 warheads; to provide some number between 200-600 warheads, as called for in the report of the NATO High Level Group. In each of these cases, the Soviet Union would have to retire or count their older SS-4/SS-5 missiles, which is consistent with their claim that the SS-20 represents only a modernization of these older systems.

(4) What provisions for verification will be required?

Whatever levels of intermediate range missiles are sought, the mobility of these systems will require intrusive verification provisions. Estimates of the current size of the SS-20 force are based upon the observation of base construction, not the actual production or deployment of missiles. Before agreeing to reciprocal limits on its intermediate range missiles, NATO will need to have considerably greater confidence than it now has in the actual size of the SS-20 missile force. This will probably require provisions for cooperative methods of verification.

NATO will confront two additional verification issues. The Soviet Union continues to deploy SS-20s. If the level is to be set below the existing size of the SS-20 force, the United States would have to find the means to verify reductions. If the unit of limitation is "warheads on launchers" the United States can probably design an adequate verification regime. Whether that regime could be negotiated is a separate question. But such a unit of limitation may not be satisfactory, given that each SS-20 launcher may have one or more reload missile. To monitor just the number of warheads may not be possible and would certainly require very intrustive verification provisions.

A Recommended TNF Negotiating Strategy

(1) The United States should continue to give high priority to implementing the 1979 NATO decision. NATO needs especially to demonstrate its ability to carry out this decision following the massive Soviet campaign to prevent U.S. missile deployments. The United States should ensure that its programs for GLCM and Pershing II stay on schedule to give the Soviet Union an incentive to negotiate seriously and so that deployments can begin in late 1983 if arms control fails. In its negotiating strategy in Geneva, the United States should make every effort to demonstrate its commitment to arms control.

If the negotiations do not produce an agreement, the Soviet Union should bear the responsibility.

This last objective will not be easy to achieve. For political reasons, the United States did not agree to TNF arms control negotiations until late 1981. The Reagan Administration has been unwilling to begin discussions on strategic nuclear forces. It is not clear how seriously Europeans view the United States objective of zero deployments. At the sametime, they have found the Soviet position quite appealing, particularly its coverage of aircraft and British and French nuclear systems.

(2) To demonstrate its seriousness about TNF arms control, the most important step the United States should take is to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear forces. SALT (or START) must also provide the substantive framework for the TNF negotiations. Without limits on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, an agreement on TNF is neither militarily nor politically sensible. In the absence of a U.S. policy on SALT, the Soviet Union could split the alliance by offering concessions to the Europeans on TNF upon the condition that the United States ratifies SALT II.

The TNF negotiations in Geneva should, however, continue to proceed separately from SALT to increase the chances for success and to avoid the difficulties of integrating TNF into SALT ceilings. The modalities of how the TNF negotiations will be linked with SALT can remain open. But the United States should not conclude a TNF agreement until a substantive SALT framework has been defined.

(3) The United States should continue to seek an agreement in Geneva focused narrowly on land-based intermediate range missiles. These weapons are clearly the most threatening and troublesome for each side. The more comprehensive a potential TNF agreement, the more difficult it will be to design and negotiate.

(4) When the negotiations on zero deployments reach an impasse, the United States should introduce a proposal for a level of land-based intermediate range missile warheads at the number of SS-20s deployed at the time Brezhnev made his freeze proposal in February 1981, approximately 600-650 warheads worldwide and 400-450 warheads within range of Western Europe. NATO would have the right to deploy equal numbers. The Soviet Union would have to retire their SS-4/5 missiles.

Such a level is consistent with the analysis and recommendations of the NATO High Level Group (by providing for the deployment of 200-600 warheads) and with the Reagan Administration's avowed arms control objectives (by requiring Soviet reductions from current force levels). NATO would also be able to test Brezhnev's willingness to accept the levels of SS-20s deployed when he proposed the freeze in 1981.

The proposal for zero deployments has had a saluatory effect on the peace movement in Europe. But if NATO holds to this position, it risks demonstrating a lack of seriousness about actually achieving an arms control agreement and could bear the onus for arms control failing. By moving away from the proposal for zero deployments, the NATO TNF negotiating position would become more consistent with NATO strategy, which calls for a spectrum of nuclear capabilities. This new TNF arms control proposal would, also, improve somewhat the chances that the negotiations would succeed, thereby reducing the scale of NATO's overall TNF modernization program.

(5) The United States should seek an agreement prohibiting the flight testing or deployment of new types of land-based intermediate range missiles, after the SS-4/5, SS-20, GLCM, and Pershing II. Arms control would, thereby,

be served by the introduction of greater predictability in the size and characteristics of future TNF postures.

(6) To protect against Soviet deployments that would negate the limits on intermediate range missile warheads, the United States should seek a ban on reload missiles and a non-circumvention agreement on intermediate range nuclear aircraft. Soviet shorter range missiles and aircraft present a potential problem, but they should be discussed in a more comprehensive TNF negotiation.

(7) The TNF agreement should include provisions to supplement national technical means of verification.

The Soviet Union rarely gives prominence in their arms control proposals to negotiability. NATO will, however, need to analyze the attractiveness for the Soviet Union of any TNF arms control approach, in part to be able to persuade publics of the reasonableness of its arms control position. This recommended U.S. negotiating approach would offer a means of getting the overall SALT process back on track. The Soviet Union would be able to retain the number of SS-20s deployed at the time Brezhnev made his freeze proposal rather than having to eliminate all their intermediate range missiles. They would achieve constraints on U.S. GLCM and Pershing II deployments below the planned NATO modernization program. Of course, this will not be important to the Soviets until they believe that NATO will be able to implement the 1979 decision. Through the non-circumvention provisions, they would achieve indirect limits on U.S. intermediate range nuclear aircraft in Europe.

In December 1981, NATO Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the 1979

NATO decision. The principal reason for their support is that the decision combines TNF modernization and arms control. The critical question is what happens if arms control does not provide an alternative to missile deployments. In that likely event, U.S. and European governments will need to define a persuasive rationale for deploying these missiles as well as for the overall U.S. nuclear force posture in Europe.

Such a rationale should combine two themes: NATO has no choice but to deter potential Soviet aggression through the threat of nuclear retaliation as long as the Soviet Union possesses nuclear weapons; but NATO's nuclear requirements can be delineated and boundaries established.

While NATO's strategy of flexible response does not resolve all the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence in Europe, it does contain the elements of such a rationale. By posing the risk of unacceptable costs, it seeks to deter the potential use of Soviet nuclear weapons. It calls for multiple nuclear capabilities and targetting options but does not require NATO to engage in an arms race or even to ensure parity in nuclear deployments with the Soviet Union. It provides for the first use of nuclear weapons only to redress NATO conventional force deficiencies. If deterrence fails, it establishes the objective of achieving significant military results while avoiding all out nuclear war.

Although this strategy cannot be translated directly into nuclear forces and plans, the new land-based intermediate range missiles are particularly appropriate. They are designed to strike military targets throughout Eastern Europe and the western part of the Soviet Union but not to match Soviet SS-20 deployments or to inflict massive destruction. By putting at risk targets in the Soviet Union, they make it most unlikely that a war could be confined to Europe. They will replace nuclear capable aircraft and permit their use in the critical stages of a conventional conflict. Given their mobility, the U.S. President should not be under pressure to use them first or early in a conventional conflict. They more visibly demonstrate the U.S. commitment to European defense than do sea-based missiles.

To sustain public support for the new intermediate range missiles, the U.S. should also be prepared as the missiles are deployed to restructure its nuclear force posture in Europe. Given the improved capabilities and survivability of the new missiles, the United States will be able to reduce the number of warheads and reassign some of the nuclear capable aircraft and artillery to conventional missions.

The United States at the same time must make clear that it intends to maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons in Europe as long as Soviet nuclear weapons threaten Western Europe. Arms control negotiations are the only acceptable means for achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. While NATO will not have to maintain equality with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to Soviet nuclear capabilities and the relative balances. A substantial inferiority could send the wrong signals to the Soviet Union as to the commitment ot the United States to provide nuclear weapons for European defense. NATO strategy must also continue to provide for the first use of nuclear weapons so long as NATO's conventional military forces can be defeated. While economic conditions will constrain future defense budgets, European governments should not lose the opportunity presented by public opposition to nuclear weapons to seek support for improvements in conventional forces. Only through such improvements can NATO actually reduce its dependence upon nuclear weapons.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you, Dr. Davis.

Mr. Sloss, if you will proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF LEON SLOSS, CONSULTANT, LEON SLOSS ASSOCIATES, FORMER HEAD, STRATEGY TARGETING PLANNING GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. **Sloss**. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to have this opportunity to comment on the plans for long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe and on the related arms control negotiations now under way in Geneva. Because your excellent staff has tried hard to get differing perspectives on this panel, I think you will find that my views differ somewhat from those of my colleagues, as does my approach to the problem. I want to look at this primarily from the U.S. perspective and I have no specific proposals to make. I think perhaps we have enough on the table for discussion this morning.

THE NATO ALLIANCE

But I do want to provide a little perspective on the negotiations. Let me come directly to my point. It seems to me that our present position with respect to long-range nuclear forces in Europe is in deep trouble. We have a deployment plan which makes little military sense and which has created serious strains within the NATO alliance.

I say it makes little military sense because I believe the proposed deployments add very little to our existing nuclear strike capabilities and because the proposed systems are very vulnerable. We have an arms control proposal which is inconsistent with the deployment plan, as Dr. Davis has pointed out.

Furthermore, it is almost certainly not negotiable in its present form, as both the previous speakers have pointed out. And it is coming to be treated with considerable cynicism both by our allies and our adversaries.

Most importantly to me, we have put ourselves in a position where the Soviets have substantial leverage over what we and our allies do about our nuclear weapons programs in Europe.

ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

In order to understand how we got ourselves in this position, my paper, which I will not read in detail, to your relief I am sure, reviews the role played by nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy both in peacetime and in war. I think it is necessary to look beyond the details of the arms control negotiations in order to understand how we are in this position. In the paper, I give quite a bit of attention to the peacetime role of nuclear weapons, because I think that is a subject not adequately understood or adequately discussed.

I also examine NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in that strategy, with particular emphasis on how United States and European views have differed over the years. And the paper attempts to analyze the current debate within Europe over nuclear weapons and how the arms control negotiations relate to this debate.

ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

I hope that this will prove useful as a matter of background. But what I want to do this morning is to go right to my conclusions, which begin on page 11 of the paper. Frankly, I see little prospect that these negotiations can contribute significantly to European security in the narrow military sense, for even if we could negotiate a zero option, which I agree with my colleagues seems most unlikely, there would remain a very considerable nuclear threat to Europe from systems other than the SS-20, both shorter range and longer range. On the other hand, I see a real risk of these negotiations weakening European security.

SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS

Let me explain. It seems to me that one must interpret the Soviet negotiating tactics to date as designed principally to divide NATO rather than to achieve real arms control, and I think that the Brezhnev proposals of this week are very much in the same vein. This should not surprise us, as the weakening of NATO has long been a major Soviet goal. And it seems to me that our primary goal in pursuing the program of deployment and arms control negotiations must be to prevent this.

Thus, the goal is at heart a political one and arms control negotiations are a means to that end. Now, it does seem necessary that we achieve some progress in arms control in order to deal with European public pressure against NATO INF deployment, and I look at the arms control negotiations not solely, but very much, in that light.

On the other hand, my experience with arms control suggests that progress is likely to be very slow if we want a sound agreement. We cannot rush into these things. If we try to negotiate with the Soviets under intense domestic political pressures to achieve a prompt agreement, I think we are more likely than not to emerge with an unsatisfactory agreement.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

Now, at this point in time, the deployment and arms control issues are linked in such a way as to frustrate the desirable objectives of both. Particularly, what concerns me is that as the 1983 date for deployment nears, the pressures to conclude an agreement, any agreement, are likely to increase. Otherwise, the absence of an agreement will likely create very strong sentiment in Europe to defer deployment.

Thus, deployment has become hostage to Soviet manipulations of the arms control process, for, by putting forth plausible and yet unacceptable proposals, the Soviets create great pressures to continue the negotiations indefinitely and defer deployment. Their propaganda apparatus has been hard at work on European opinion to that end.

The arms control negotiations also have become highly politicized and hostage to European politics. For example, in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the deployment issue has become one on which governments could stand or fall. This does not make for objective analysis of security issues on their merits.

Finally, a deployment plan which I have suggested is of questionable or at least marginal military value, and certainly very far from the central issues of European security, has become the test of both East-West relations and European-American relations. This seems to me to be an unhappy situation.

What is needed now is a fresh look both at the deployment plan and the arms control proposals, recognizing that both have serious problems, but also that there is considerable political momentum that will be difficult to change. It is important that NATO not be seen as equivocating on an important joint decision in the face of Soviet blandishments and pressures.

It is also important that the United States not be pressed into an arms control agreement that is unsound, in order to carry European support for deployment. Yet, in 1983 we could well find ourselves on the horns of a very uncomfortable dilemma, to either defer deployment or accept an arms control agreement which we do not like. Such a choice could be forced upon us if our allies in Europe refuse to go along with deployment in the absence of an agreement or insist on delaying a deployment decision.

Now, of course, we could force the issue, but the resultant strains on the alliance would be serious and play to the very Soviet objectives which I think are at the heart of their proposal. We need to face the fact that we have permitted ourselves to be maneuvered, or have, perhaps permitted events to maneuver us into a very sticky position.

I do not see any easy solution to this dilemma, Mr. Chairman, but I believe that the U.S. Government should be working along two major lines to avoid, if possible, the scenario that I projected above for 1983. An overall strategy, as called for previously by you, Mr. Chairman, must link these INF negotiations to a viable defense concept for Europe, and, ultimately, to the strategic arms limitations talks on the other hand.

RENEWAL OF EUROPEANS' CONFIDENCE

First, then, there is a need to develop a NATO defense concept that Europeans can believe in. Today too many in Europe have lost conviction in their capability to defend themselves. Thus, such a concept must renew Europeans' confidence in their ability to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defend Europe without destroying it. It must include a role for nuclear weapons acceptable to Europeans and Americans.

But, such a concept, in my view, must rely very heavily on nonnuclear capabilities. Therefore, in addition to continung the modernization of NATO's nonnuclear forces, the new concept must update tactical doctrine. And finally, it must be achievable within reasonable defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic.

Now, this is not going to be easy, but I believe we can develop such a concept if we put our minds to it, and I can expand on some of the elements of that, if you wish, in our subsequent discussion.

The second part of this approach is that we need to begin planning on how to face the dilemma of 1983. This will require developing more precise understandings with our allies as to what is, and is not, an acceptable outcome of the negotiations.

It should also include consideration of whether there are alternative deployment plans that would be consistent with NATO security and which might prove more acceptable to the Europeans in the current political context.

SEA-BASED MISSILES

Specifically, I have in mind here the need to consider once again—and at this stage I want to stress I am only suggesting a consideration—deploying some portion of the missile force at sea to ameliorate some of the political and military problems I have described.

Obviously, any such discussions would have to be conducted very delicately in order to avoid undercutting the negotiations and the positions that some allied governments have very firmly taken on the present proposal.

For this reason, I would not expect the administration to greet such suggestions, at least publicly, with any enthusiasm, at this time. However, I would be disappointed if they did not at least consider them. It seems to me that some change in the present course is necessary if we are to avoid further major strains in the alliance and thwart new opportunities for Soviet political manipulation in the year ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Sloss' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEON SLOSS, PRESIDENT, LEON SLOSS ASSOCIATES

INTRODUCTION

I have been asked to comment on the plans for deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe and on the related arms control negotiations now underway in Geneva. These are issues which involve NATO nuclear strategy, a subject I have been following for a number of years from within and subsequently outside the government. However, I have had no direct responsibility for development of the current NATO position on long-range theater nuclear forces or for the U.S. arms control proposals either in the past administration or this one. This is a mixed blessing. On one hand, I have no special insights I can give you on how these positions were developed or the current status of the negotiations. On the other hand, I am perhaps in a better position to speak freely about recent and current U.S. policies in this area without having to defend past or present positions.

Someone has to say it and official representatives are not likely to, for understandable reasons: Our present position with respect to long-range nuclear forces in Europe is in deep trouble. We have a deployment plan which makes little military sense and which has created serious strains within the NATO alliance. We have an arms control proposal which is inconsistent with the deployment plan. Furthermore, it is almost certainly not negotiable in its present form, and is treated with considerable cynicism by both our allies and our adversaries. Most importantly, we have put ourselves in a position where the Soviets have substantial leverage over what we and our allies do about nuclear weapons deployment in Europe.

In order to understand how we got ourselves in this position, it is necessary to review the role played by nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy both in peacetime and in war; NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in that strategy, with particular emphasis on how U.S. and European views have differed over the years; and the current debate in Europe over nuclear weapons and how the arms control negotiations relate to this debate.

THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What is the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy? First, let me dissociate myself from two extreme views. One is that there is no role for nuclear weapons and that we should do away with them as rapidly as possible, or that we should seek to de-nuclearize Europe. The second is the view that nuclear weapons are just a more efficient form of artillery and should be considered in the same category as other weapons. In this view, it is possible to use nuclear weapons in war to compensate for deficiencies in non-nuclear capabilities. Neither of these extreme views stand up to examination. No nation can afford to treat lightly the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the profound political and social, as well as military, consequences should they ever be used in anger. On the other hand, nuclear weapons are here and they are going to be here for the forseeable future whether we like it or not. We must learn to live with that fact of life as best we can. They do play a significant role in overall U.S. security policy and in our diplomacy as well. Nuclear weapons have a role to play in peacetime as well as during a war.

In peacetime, nuclear weapons are a symbol of national power; they mark one of the principal distinctions between major powers and lesser powers. U.S. nuclear weapons underlie commitments that we have made to the security of a number of allies and provide them some assurance that the U.S will help to protect their security interests. Because many nations rely wholly on the U.S. to deter nuclear agression, U.S. nuclear weapons play a role in the longstanding U.S. policy of curbing nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear weapons also serve as a deterrent to adversaries. There is considerable debate about what actions can be deterred with nuclear weapons. Some would argue that nuclear weapons can only deter the use of nuclear weapons by other parties; that it is too much to expect nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear agression or the use of military power to exert political pressure. There is a growing view among U.S. commentators that nuclear weapons cannot be used to extend protection to third parties, although this so-called "extended deterrence" has been at the core of U.S. security policy for a number of years.

In my view, nuclear weapons do have a broad deterrent function. They certainly can deter the use of nuclear weapons by another country, either against the U.S. or an ally where the U.S. has a strongly perceived security commitment. Nuclear weapons also play a role in deterring non-nuclear aggression, although they cannot stand alone in this role, and as the nuclear balance has changed in favor of the Soviet Union it becomes more and more unrealistic to rely too heavily on nuclear weapons for this latter function.

Nevertheless, as long as they exist, nuclear weapons are going to impose caution upon any nation engaging in actions that could lead to a nuclear war. Thus, nuclear weapons have a role to play in deterrence even after a war begins. They can help to deter escalation of a non-nuclear conflict to the nuclear level and, by forcing an enemy to take into account the existence of nuclear weapons, they can make non-nuclear defenses more capable. For example, if an aggressor has to disperse his conventional forces to take into account the possible use of nuclear weapons, his non-nuclear attack will not be as efficient and defenses will be more effective.

Note that I have not suggested, so far, that nuclear weapons have a significant role to play in actual warfare. This is a much more questionable proposition. A nuclear war, once begun, certainly would be difficult to control and, if any significant number of nuclear weapons were used, the destruction to all parties would be unprecedented. In this context, it is not easy to define any concept of victory. However, the paradox that we must face up to is that if nuclear weapons are to be effective in their deterrent role, they must have some war fighting capability and that capability must be credible. It is the belief on the part of a potential agressor that he could not gain by agression or by the use of nuclear weapons, that his political and military objectives would be thwarted and that he risks catastrophic defeat on the battlefield, that in fact underlies the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.

APPENDIX A

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

	U.S. Counting Rules	Soviet Counting Rules
U.S.		
Pershing Ia		108
Fighter Bombers		
F-111	164	555
F-4	265	
A-6/7	68	
FB-111	63	
Total	560	
U.K.		
Polaris		64
Vulcan		56
FRANCE		
Land-based Missiles		18
Submarine Missiles		80
Mirage Bombers		33
FRG		
Pershing Ia		72
Total		986
SOVIET UNION		
SS-20	250	496
SS-4/5	350	
SS12/22	100	
SS-N5	30	18
Backfire	45	461
Badgers/Blinders	350	
Fighter Bombers (SU-17, 24, 27)	2700	
Total	3825	975

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* Taken from New York Times, 30 November 1981, p. A-12.

In sum, the facts that nuclear weapons exist and are unlikely to be done away with in the forseeable future, force us to consider how they can be used and how we can defend against their use by others in order to protect U.S. security interests both in peacetime and war. While it would be unwise to rely too heavily on nuclear weapons to protect our security, it would be equally unjustified to ignore them in our planning. U.S. defense planners have a responsibility to think through how nuclear weapons could be utilized in war; for by preparing an effective defense, that includes nuclear weapons, we maximize deterrence. At the same time, we also prepare for the contingency that cannot be ignored -- that nuclear weapons might be used in war.

NATO STRATEGY

For decades, differing views about the roles of nuclear weapons have been at the heart of the debate with respect to NATO strategy. This debate has frequently been over-simplified by saying that the Europeans favor deterrence exclusively while the U.S. argues a defensive strategy for Europe. In fact, there are a variety of views on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, there are clearly different emphases. The Europeans do not make the sharp distinction between strategic and theater nuclear war that has traditionally been made by U.S. strategists. To the Europeans, a war that is limited to the territory of Europe _is_ strategic; and if the Soviet Union is the aggressor and remains free from nuclear attack for any length of time, then it is perceived as a one-sided strategic conflict, not a tactical nuclear war. European concerns, since the time of DeGaulle, have focused on whether the U.S. would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to defend Western Europe. As the strategic balance has shifted, over the past several decades, this concern has spread widely throughout Europe.

These different perspectives are understandable given the geopolitical positions of Europe and North America. Europe wants to assure that it would not be left to fight alone against the Soviet Union and that the Soviets will have to contend with U.S. nuclear power from the outset of any conflict. The U.S. is concerned that the use of nuclear weapons not be forced upon us in desperation, but is the result of considered deliberation. Thus, since the early 1960's, and with some success, the U.S. has pressed for strengthening NATO's non-nuclear forces.

The two perspectives have been reflected in NATO strategy for years. This strategy has been a compromise. MC-14/3, the current basic NATO doctrine, stresses flexible response. Essentially, there are two components of flexible responsible: direct defense and deliberate escalation. If Europe is attacked, NATO will either respond in kind to the attack without escalating the level of warfare or will deliberately escalate the conflict if that is agreed to be in NATO's interest. The "direct defense" part of the strategy satisfies U.S. concerns, and the "deliberate escalation" part of the strategy conforms with European desires.

The strategy is purposely vague as to the circumstances under which escalation might occur, and for two reasons. One is to keep the Warsaw Pact uncertain, complicating their military-political calculations prior to the outbreak of hostilities and, thus, assist deterrence. The other is that the NATO allies have been unable to agree in the abstract on this issue. Specifically, current strategy does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons by the NATO side. This reflects a recognition that because

NATO has been unwilling to match the Warsaw Pact in non-nuclear capabilities it relies on the threat of first use to bolster the non-nuclear defense. There are now some on both sides of the Atlantic, but particularly in the U.S., who argue that in light of the radically changed strategic balance, the first use of nuclear weapons should be relinquished as a part of U.S. policy. In effect, this view holds that NATO can no longer expect to dominate the process of escalation if a nuclear war should progress to major exchanges, and thus the threat of first use is no longer credible.

On the other hand, it is argued that as long as nuclear weapons are there, the threat of their use cannot be removed entirely. For the U.S. to agree formally to a non-first use declaration that would apply to Europe, as the Soviets have frequently suggested, would unnecessarily remove a significant element in deterrence. At the same time, there is no question that NATO would have a more comfortable and confident posture if the non-nuclear component of its defenses were further modernized and strengthened. This has been a long-range goal for more than thirty years.

Fiscal considerations have been a major factor in limiting the growth and modernization of NATO's non-nuclear forces. But doctrinal considerations have also come into play. Europeans have felt no more comfortable with the prospect of replaying World War II than that of initiating a nuclear World War III. They hope to deter both contingencies. Therefore, they have wanted the Soviet Union to believe that nuclear weapons might come into play in any type of war in Europe, including a non-nuclear conflict. So the issue of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe is not an either/or proposition; it is one of relative emphasis and of balancing risks. Over-reliance on nuclear weapons carries dual risks. It increases the risk of escalation should a conflict occur in Europe. Conversely, to the extent that heavy reliance or nuclear warfare is no longer credible it increases the risk that the Soviets would not be deterred -- either from undertaking military agression or, more likely, political pressures against the states of Western Europe. On the other hand, if we unduly denigrate the role of nuclear weapons, we also risk weakening deterrence. The problem is finding an appropriate balance.

This question of balance leads to consideration of the current debate over deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces.

LONG-RANGE TNF (INF)

The focus of the current nuclear debate in Europe is on long-range theater nuclear forces, more recently termed intermediate nuclear forces. However, this should not be seen as a new debate but rather an extension of the discussion of the issues described above, with much broader public participation than in the past. In 1976, German Chancellor Schmidt expressed concern over the growing deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missiles aimed at Europe. In one sense, this was not a new threat, because Europe had been under the threat of nuclear attack for many years, both from older medium-range Soviet missile systems and from the longer-range ICBMs, some of which are aimed at Europe. Nevertheless, the Soviets had brandished this new mobile/multiple warhead weapon system and the initial psychological impact on Europe caused some to seek a NATO response. Somewhat to Chancellor Schmidt's surprise, however, when his initiative was converted into plans to deploy two new nuclear weapons systems in Europe, it created a public furor he had not anticipated.

The U.S., under the Carter Administration, was initially lukewarm towards the idea of deploying a new nuclear capability in Europe. The Carter Administration was not persuaded that any measures were required in Europe to offset the SS-20 and was concerned that the deployment of a long-range weapon system would tend to "de-couple" U.S. strategic systems from the defense of Europe. The U.S. military establishment, at the time, was more concerned with the modernization of short-range nuclear systems. Many defense experts maintained that any ground-based systems might be highly vulnerable to attack, and there was some sentiment for basing any new deployment at sea. Nevertheless, it was considered important to respond in some way to European concerns. But for some period of time, the Carter Administration let the Europeans assume the lead in devising a response to the Soviet threat.

For example, the U.S. initially put forth several options for modernization of the nuclear force in Europe and essentially left the Europeans to choose which option they preferred. There was some preference in the U.S., for example, for an option which would involve modernization of both short and medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. European leaders, though, were persuaded that countering the SS-20 required a new capability that posed a threat to the Soviet Union, and that it must be deployed in Europe.

However, given the growing public pressures in Europe against the proposed deployments, it was deemed essential to link any deployment decisions to an arms control initiative. Agreement was reached at the Rome NATO meeting in December 1979 to proceed along two tracks. First, NATO would deploy a mix of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. Second, an effort would be made to negotiate limitations on intermediate range systems with the Soviets, which if successful, could limit or even eliminate such deployments.

During the time these issues were being debated in the NATO forum, they became major public issues in Europe. Paradoxically, as European views were shifting against the deployment of new nuclear weapons, the Carter Administration, and subsequently the Reagan Administration, became stronger advocates of deployment. In particular, because several European governments, notably the FRG, had become committed to the deployment despite the reservations of their citizens, it was felt in Washington, as well as in many European capitals, that proceeding with the deployment had become a test of NATO's cohesion and its ability to offset Soviet pressures. At the same time, in order to defuse some of the public pressure in Europe, good-faith arms control negotiations became a prerequesite for a deployment decision.

There are two very important relationships between the INF and START negotiations. One is political and the other technical. On the political side, many Europeans assume that the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe and the INF negotiations would follow a SALT II treaty. Indeed, there are some in Europe who see a SALT II treaty as a precondition of deployment. With the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify SALT II, many Europeans would argue that the conditions envisioned at the conclusion of the 1979 Rome ministerial meeting have yet to be met. The more technical issue concerns the relationship between limits on intermediate nuclear forces and those on strategic forces. Indeed, given the different U.S. and Soviet views as to what constitutes intermediate nuclear forces, there are even differences as to what systems should be the subject of discussion in which negotiations. In any event, it would seem imprudent for either party to enter into a firm agreement limiting intermediate nuclear forces without simultaneously knowing what will be limited under a treaty on strategic forces.

CONCLUSIONS

The INF negotiations must be seen in the political-military context described above. I see little prospect that these negotiations can contribute significantly to European security in the narrow military sense; for even if we could negotiate a "zero option", which seems most unlikely, there would remain a very considerable nuclear threat to Europe from systems other than the SS-20. I see a real risk of the negotiations weakening European security. So long as the Soviets insist on including U.S. forward based systems as well as British and French nuclear forces -- while excluding comparable systems on their side -- there is little basis for a constructive compromise. Indeed, one must interpret Soviet negotiating tactics to date as designed principally to divide NATO rather than achieve arms control. This should not surprise us, as the weakening of NATO has long been a major

Soviet goal. Our primary goal must be to prevent this, and it will not be easy. Progress in arms control seems to be necessary to deal with European public pressure against NATO INF deployment, yet progress may be very slow if we want a sound agreement. Experience indicates that if we try to negotiate with the Soviets, under domestic political pressure for agreement, we are likely to emerge with an unsatisfactory agreement.

At this time, the deployment and arms control issues are linked in such a way as to frustrate the desirable objectives of either. As the 1983 date for deployment nears, the pressures to conclude an agreement -- any agreement -- will increase. Otherwise, the absence of agreement will create strong sentiment in Europe to defer deployment. Deployment has become hostage to Soviet manipulation of the arms control process, for by putting forth plausible, but unacceptable, proposals the Soviets create great pressure to continue negotiations and defer deployment. Their propaganda apparatus has been hard at work on European opinion.

The arms control negotiations have become highly politicized and hostage to European politics. For example, in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the deployment issue has become one on which governments could stand or fall. This does not make for objective analysis of security issues. Finally, a deployment plan which is of very questionable military value, and certainly far from the central issue of European security, has become the test of both East/West and European-American relations. This is an unhappy situation.

What is needed now is a fresh look at both the deployment plan and the arms control proposals, recognizing that there are now both serious problems and considerable political momentum that will be difficult to change. It is important that NATO not be seen as equivocating on an important joint decision in the face of Soviet blandishments and pressures. It is also important that the U.S. not be pressed into an arms control agreement that is unsound in order to carry European support for deployment. Yet, in 1983 we could well find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma -- either defer deployment or accept an arms control agreement we do not like. Such a choice could be forced on us if our allies in Europe refuse to go along with deployment in the absence of an agreement, or insist on delaying a deployment decision. We could force the issue of course, but the resultant strains on the alliance would be serious, and would play into Soviet hands. We need to face the fact that we have permitted ourselves to be maneuvered (or perhaps permitted events to manuever us) into a very sticky position.

There is no easy solution to this dilemma, but I believe the U.S. government should be working along two major lines to avoid, if possible, the denouement projected above for 1983. First, there is a need to develop a NATO defense concept that Europeans can believe in. Today too many have lost conviction in their capacity to defend themselves. Thus, such a concept must renew Europeans' confidence in their ability to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defend Europe without destroying it. It must include a role for nuclear weapons, acceptable to Europeans and Americans but such a concept must rely heavily on non-nuclear capabilities. Therefore, in addition to modernization of NATO's non-nuclear forces, the new concept must update tactical doctrine.

Finally, it must be achievable within reasonable defense budgets. I am convinced that, while it will not be easy, we can develop such a concept if we put our minds to it. If we cannot, we had better start re-examining all of the premises on which NATO is based.

Second, we need to begin planning how to face the dilemma of 1983. This will require developing more precise understandings with our allies as to what is, and is not, an acceptable outcome of the negotiations. It should also include consideration of whether there are alternative deployment plans, consistent with NATO security, which might prove more acceptable to Europeans in the current political context. Specifically, we need to consider once again (and at this stage I suggest no more than that) whether deploying some portion of the intermediate range missile force at sea could ameliorate the political and military problems. Obviously any such discussions would have to be conducted very delicately in order to avoid undercutting the negotiations and the political positions of some allied governments. For this reason, I would not expect the Administration to greet such suggestions with any enthusiasm. However, I would be disappointed if they did not at least consider them. Some change in the present course is necessary if we are to avoid further major strains in the Alliance and thwart new opportunities for Soviet political manipulation in the year ahead.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you, Mr. Sloss.

Without objection, the prepared statements of the witnesses will be placed in the record. Thank you for your statements.

We will now proceed to the 5-minute questioning period.

If my perception is correct, although in different ways, all three of you have expressed deep concern about the prospects for successful INF negotiations in Geneva by implying a relationship to the yet-to-be-announced START talks. I believe, Ambassador, you said they are interdependent.

DELAY IN RESUMPTION OF TALKS

Is the Reagan administration's hesitation in resuming strategic arms control talks substantially inhibiting the prospects for progress in the INF talks? And, if so, I would be interested in your reaction to the legislation I introduced yesterday, calling upon the administration to immediately begin strategic arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union.

There is some concern, some of the earlier proposals that do have broad and wide cosponsorship, may indeed undermine our position in negotiation with the Soviets. I'm not certain, however, I would welcome your response as to whether the delay in resuming of the SALT talks substantially inhibits the prospects for an INF agreement.

Mr. **Sloss**. Mr. Chairman, my own opinion is that that is a factor, but not as central a factor in inhibiting progress on the INF negotiations as you and others may have suggested. I think ultimately, as I said in my statement, that the INF talks, ultimately, have to be linked to the strategic arms talks, but I do not think that is the major factor inhibiting progress now.

I think we are in a phase where both parties are jockeying for position. The history of these negotiations of this sort is that they take quite a long time and there is a period of jockeying, which I think is going on at the present time.

Now, as to the pace of SALT or START, it seems to me that there are two factors that need to be taken into account. It would be ungracious of me to be critical of your proposal, and I am not. I think it has merit.

I think that the administration's position has been influenced by two factors. One is the Polish situtation. There is clearly, as I think most arms control experts would agree, some linkage between what happens in arms control and other developments. I think there are differences, and you will find differences among the three of us, I am sure, on how closely they should be linked. But there is bound to be some linkage.

MESSAGE TO SOVIETS

I think the other factor, that has perhaps been overlooked, that I perceive—and I perceive this from the outside, without inside information—is that the administration is deliberately sending a message to the Soviets that we are not any more eager to get into negotiations than they are.

It is my own personal view that during SALT I and SALT II the United States weakened its negotiating position by seeming more eager to reach agreement than the Russians. I think one of the aims of the present administration is to carry a message that we are not more eager than they are. One can argue whether that is a sound tactic, whether it has gone on long enough after more than a year. But I think that is one of the reasons that START has not moved more rapidly than it has.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Davis, would you like to comment?

LINKAGE

Ms. DAVIS. I think I would agree that a lack of SALT framework is not the major factor in inhibiting a process on the negotiations on TNF. My concerns are two concerns with the linkage: First of all, that we may as we proceed down the track of negotiating on TNF end up doing some things that do not make very much sense if we do not know how the limits on the rest of our strategic forces are going to be either negotiated or actually limited.

Second, it is possible that we cannot get a TNF agreement because of all the other systems that merge or come together with concerns about theater nuclear forces unless we have this framework and we can talk about where some of these other systems may fit more logically; sea-launched cruise missiles, potentially even British and French systems.

So we need that substantively in a sense to get some movement perhaps on the theater side. I think the most important reason for beginning the SALT negotiations now from the point of view of the 1979 decision is for political support in Europe. That is the whole foundation for that foundation was premised on SALT and that SALT would be going forward and the fact that we are not going forward with that is one important reason why people are not giving us the support on the theater side that was expected that we had in 1979.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. GARTHOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that the delay in START is a principal factor in holding up INF talks progress at this time. As I suggested in my statement, the position we have taken in the INF talks itself is mainly responsible for holding it up. But in the longer run, it is certainly going to be essential that there be real movement and in fact agreement on strategic arms limitations if there is to be, in the final analysis, agreement on INF limitations.

I do not believe that either side would be prepared, in the final analysis, to accept limitations on forces in Europe in the absence of a broader strategic arms limitation regime.

I agree with Dr. Davis on the importance of launching START as soon as possible, among other reasons because of the effect in Europe.

I also agree with Mr. Sloss as to some of the reasons why the administration has held back. But I think it is important that we do proceed with the START talks as soon as possible.

I would also observe that while it may be that we are concerned about appearing too eager, the Soviets do not appear to be inhibited by appearing to be eager, they are not bashful about saying that they think it is important to get START talks going and that they are ready to do it. So we are not going to be any more eager than they are if we simply agree with them and start.

U.S. FIRMNESS IN INF TALKS

Chairman **Zablocki**. I would like to make an observation, Ambassador. You assert that one of the reasons we are really not getting off the ground with SALT is because of our firmness in INF talks. As a negotiator, would you come in prepared to give before starting the negotiations? Or would you come in knowing what you would like to get and then negotiate?

You do not come in from a position of weakness ready to give at any time, but you come to the negotiations with firmness. So I am not certain if I can agree with your statement.

Mr. **Garthoff**. Certainly, firmness is an important element in negotiating strategy. I am certainly not going to defend flabbiness as an alternative. The question, I believe, essentially is whether in fact the administration is prepared to develop a position on which it will negotiate in the months ahead. I am speaking to that more than I am to the question of our stance at the present time in the talks, where we should put emphasis on the weak points in the Soviet position, which there are. We should emphasize those elements of our position that are most essential. We should not get out ahead in terms of simply making change and concession and so forth on our part alone.

These are important questions having to do with the negotiating strategy, and especially with its tactics. I would not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that there is not an important element of consistency and of firmness needed in that respect.

But beyond that—and, of course, we are commenting here at this time publicly and on the outside, it is important that consideration be given within the administration and within the alliance, since these positions are all coordinated—and indeed necessarily and properly so—in the NATO alliance, to sorting out what our real objectives are in the long run and to developing a strategy which would involve moving from our present position if and as this is called for in the course of negotiations.

I may be in error in my understanding of the administration's position in this respect. I hope so. But I am not sanguine as to whether or not thought is being given to where we need to go as the negotiations progress if we want to maintain a credible negotiating stance and to move toward possible agreement.

Chairman **Zablocki**. I have further questions on the type of agreement we should seek, one that can be ratified. But I will pursue this later. My time has run out.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. **Broomfield**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to thank our witnesses today for their statements. Although I do not entirely agree with all the witnesses, I tend to agree more with Dr. Davis. I think what she is recommending is more in line with my own thinking.

ZERO OPTION

I frankly do not think that the Soviets are really sincere in any kind of negotiations. I frankly feel that what they are doing, is attempting to maintain their superiority, in what they already have in weapons over there.

And I think it is important, as Dr. Davis has pointed out, to keep these negotiating positions very narrow without complicating them. I believe we should not bring in other issues, as the Ambassador pointed out. Frankly, I think what the President offered—the zero option—is a good starting point and, I think, it should be taken seriously.

LESSONS FROM 1979 DECISION

I was wondering if the three of you might comment on the experience of NATO's 1979 decision in regard to INF deployment and arms control. What lessons, both positive as well as negative, are we to learn in dealing with nuclear negotiations within the Western alliance. Dr. Davis?

Ms. DAVIS. Well, I think many of us who worked on that decision have asked that same question. It perhaps is a little too soon to draw final lessons, because it will depend importantly on whether or not we are able to actually implement the decision.

It was unique in the sense that we tried to put together a modernization program with an arms control program. It has the problems that have been outlined before you, which is that we became hostage to the two parts. The politics in Western Europe today are more difficult than we had seen at the time in 1979.

I remain convinced that politically and militarily it makes sense to try to complement a modernization program with an arms control program. I disagree with Mr. Sloss that the modernization part of that decision is militarily insignificant. I think it is important, from a military point of view both in terms of the capabilities and the survivability of the systems that are going to be deployed.

I think it is particularly unfortunate when we as Americans sit back and look at our full range of our nuclear forces and say that 572 weapons is not very significant, when in fact in Europe these weapons will be significant. It will be a response to a particular concern that Europeans brought to us. And it does not help us in trying to continue to sustain support for that decision when people say it is not militarily very important. Maybe it is OK to say it here but not too publicly in Europe.

The lesson now for the alliance is whether or not we can take a decision and sustain it, as complicated as it is. I still, if I had to bet, feel confident that we can bring it off.

I think the European governments are committed, and it is hard to see a set of scenarios in each government that would lead them to come back to us to say, no, we reject the decision that we took in 1979.

That does not mean that we do not have to be sensitive to their concerns. And I suggest at the end of my statement the need to find a persuasive rationale for the new systems for our nuclear force posture in Europe as a whole. We ought to think about perhaps restructuring that force posture as a way of maintaining the public support, the European governments support that we now have, before we think about falling back or moving away from that decision. We may have to but before we do that, let us try as hard as we possibly can to see it through and to make it a success.

I think it is particularly important, given that the Soviets are so worried that we might actually succeed. And that is as good a reason as any to try to do it.

Mr. **Broomfield.** Mr. Sloss.

Mr. **Sloss.** I think the central lesson is a very simple one, and has been true for years, that the issue of nuclear weapons is about 90-percent political and 10-percent military. When you think about nuclear weapons in Europe, we entered into these negotiations somewhat reluctantly in order to respond to political pressures. We entered into the deployment first without any great enthusiasm for its military benefit.

I will stick to that latter remark. It does have some military benefits, but we entered into it largely in response to political pressures from our allies who were: one, concerned about being somewhat left out of the SALT II negotiations, and, two, concerned about this new deployment of long-range weapons by the Soviets. We entered into the arms control track, again, because of pressures from our allies. And I think that is a reality that will govern how we deal with the negotiations from here on in.

In making the comments that I did about the military value, what I want to stress is that we must stick with this deployment position as long as our friends and allies in Europe want.

On the other hand, if they change their views—and I do not see this happening yet— we should not be so stuck with this particular deployment and this particular arms control proposal that we feel we have to pursue it against the opposition of our allies.

And if their views change, and they have changed significantly since Schmidt first made his speech in 1976, we cannot change with every wind, but we need to be responsive and remember that we started this whole process primarily to maintain the cohesion of the alliance. That ought to be the lodestar by which we pursue these negotiations in the future.

Mr. **Broomfield.** Mr. Ambassador, do you want to comment on this?

Mr. **Garthoff.** Yes. I would generally agree with both Dr. Davis and Mr. Sloss in what they have said just now. I agree that the political significance is important to the alliance. That has been the biggest factor both in leading to the decision and as a justification for supporting it.

I also agree that the United States should not pull the rug out from under the 1979 decision, but also that we should not make it a touchstone of loyalty in the alliance and weaken the alliance by trying to hold to it if the allies should decide that they want to modify that decision in some way.

Also, I think it is clear that the Soviet Union is attempting to use the whole issue to weaken the alliance. And we should be working to prevent that from being a successful tactic on their part. One element is to continue on the basis of alliance consensus at the present time on the two tracks.

It is also important, and this is what I stressed in my statement, to develop a serious and credible negotiating position both to sustain the alliance political support and to do our part to work toward a possible INF agreement.

Incidentally, I think it is by no means, of course, assured that we would reach an arms control agreement, even if we were to have a more flexible and broader approach. But I think it is clear that we will not reach any agreement unless we are prepared on our side to be more flexible. It will then be up to the Russians, and we shall see whether they are prepared on their side. If they are not, then there will not be an agreement.

Mr. **Broomfield**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Mr. Hamilton.

ALTERNATIVES TO ZERO OPTION

Mr. **Hamilton**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I guess all three of you have reached the conclusion that the zero-option proposal will not get anywhere. When do you think we should come forward with another proposal as a matter of tactics?

Mr. **Sloss**. I think, as I suggest in my statement, that we are going to have to resolve that issue sometime between now and when the the first deployment of the GLCM is due, in December of 1983.

I think it has to be resolved well before that, because we need some time to negotiate a new position. We need time to develop it. We need time to give it at least a chance in the negotiations, to demonstrate that either it is going to go somewhere or that it is not going to go somewhere.

I would guess—and I really hate to second-guess the people involved in it, because I have been in the negotiations myself, and I am not now close enough—that sometime before the end of this year we would need to be ready with a new position.

Ms. **Davis**. When the alliance decides to move on this zero option, it will in fact be a statement by the European governments that they are prepared to agree to deployments of United States missiles in their countries. So, it is not simply a matter of a political decision about an arms control strategy. It really effectively says that we are going to move from zero to some number, whatever number. That means we are going to be setting a level which will require some deployments on our side.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Do you believe deployment is possible without an agreement?

Ms. **Davis**. I think it will depend—the answer is yes—but it will depend importantly as to how we move from here to that conclusion that there is no agreement and who bears the onus of responsibility for there being no agreement.

But, to answer your question, it is really a question for governments to decide when they want to take that step.

Mr. **Hamilton**. That is just returning my question back to me. I am asking you when the Government ought to make another proposal.

Ms. **Davis**. I think it would be a different consideration for the United States and for the European governments. I think the

United States ought to be prepared today to make that decision, because from our point of view we need to show our seriousness about actually getting an agreement. We need to prepare for the deployments which I think are going to have to occur. I would like for the United States to take the lead.

Mr. **Hamilton**. You think it is a mistake on the part of the United States to fool around with the zero-base option any longer. Should we flat out say right now it is not going to work, and begin to come up with another proposal?

Ms. **Davis**. I am not privy to the actual negotiations in Geneva. But, from what I know of those negotiations, I would say yes, it is time to go back in to the alliance and say we need to find a serious arms control proposal and take the political decision for deployment.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Ambassador Garthoff.

Mr. **Garthoff**. I agree. I think we should be working now with our allies on it. And I think that they are in a very difficult position, too, because they feel committed to us as well as publicly to the decision. It is a situation where public opinion and political opinion, including the parties supporting, for example, Chancellor Schmidt in Germany, which are raising the most questions now about that decision.

I think we should be not only talking with our allies, we should be leading in talks with them in looking at other positions. But, again, I would do this, not from the standpoint of telling our allies that we are not prepared to support the position we all agreed on so far, but, in raising with them the fact that we are at an impasse and are going to remain at one, and in working to develop positions that are acceptable to our allies.

It is a difficult situation in many respects. And, as Mr. Sloss has pointed out, circumstances have put us in a situation where we are now already halfway down the track between the NATO decision and the initial deployment, which may indeed pose difficult questions at that time, as he has suggested.

Time in negotiations goes very slowly. So, I think we should be working now with our allies in terms of again considering what our real objectives are and what positions in the talks are most likely to serve those objectives.

SOVIET ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIES

Mr. **Hamilton**. Let me move to another topic. I think as you look back over the last year, one of the things that impresses you about the Soviet actions is the variety of arms control strategies that they have put forth in the past year. They have talked about a moratorium on intermediate range missiles. They have talked about a nuclear-free zone. They have talked about a two-thirds cut in certain arsenals. The other day Mr. Brezhnev came up with a unilateral freeze on the SS–20's and so forth.

How do you read all of that in terms of the politics of the situation? Who is winning the PR battle in Europe and the world? How are we doing in it? How are the Soviets doing in it? What influences have all of these proposals had, anyway? And what does the United States need to do to be more effective here? This is where the thing is going to be won or lost, really. How do you read all of this?

Mr. GARTHOFF. I think the Soviet Union was a little slow at the beginning in coming up with their campaign to head off the NATO TNF decision. When they made the proposals that Brezhnev did in October 1979, when he proposed talks and began talking about agreeing on their side for the first time to consider limitations on their theater forces, he did it at a time when the NATO decision was already virtually made.

And it became more of an issue within the alliance of whether we were prepared to stand firm on the basis of the course we were on, so we went forward with the decision in December. Subsequently, the Soviets modified their position a number of times to drop various conditions they had set for the talks and to express their readiness to go ahead, and they began talking about a moratorium on both sides and eventually came around, when they had no doubt already made their basic deployments, to the unilateral moratorium on some of their SS-20 deployments announced just the other day.

I think they were beginning to move back into a position of advantage in this propaganda war, if you wish, during most of 1981, mainly because there seems to be a great reluctance in the United States to go into the talks at all.

I think the President's speech of November 18 reversed that for the time being. That put the United States ahead, mainly because it appealed to those in Western Europe who did not want to go ahead with NATO deployments. So, zero option offered a chance to avoid going ahead with our own deployment. Now it is beginning to become clear to people that it is not a negotiable proposition.

So we, I believe, have all suggested that if we were to stand on that proposition in the months ahead, support in NATO would fall away. That is one of the reasons we feel that there needs to be a continuing look and some flexibility in our position.

Mr. SLOSS. May I make one quick comment? I do not think we are doing as well as we might, or as badly as some people suggest. But I want to point out one important difference between us and the Russians, particularly in these issues that involve Europe. We cannot just snap off proposals weekly like they can. They need to be coordinated with our allies. And we do ourselves a lot more damage if we try to keep up with their numbers. I hope we will be better in quality and have fewer proposals to make.

Ms. DAVIS. The best thing about the Soviet proposals is that they do not change very much, so it is easy to come out every week. Basically, we do not get any, and they continue to do everything they want to do.

But I think if we continue to respond that way, which tends to be the way the United States always comes back—we really are losing the public debate. The Soviets sound as if they are much more interested in arms control, much more interested in freezes and moratoriums. They say they are even prepared to consider a full renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe. Their rhetoric is complete.

We are losing because we do come back more technically and more seriously. That does not mean we should not. We cannot afford to act just as the Soviets because that is not in our interest either. But I do think that we ought to try a little harder.

For example, in response to the most recent proposal, clearly we are very pleased that the Soviet Union has finally stopped deploying SS-20's in the western part of the Soviet Union. That is something we have been trying to get the Soviets to do for some time. We are still very upset that they are continuing to increase their SS-20's in the rest of the Soviet Union. We would like for them to stop that as a means for showing seriousness about arms control.

From that point we would like to move toward reductions. That is what we want, to try to place it in more of a political context.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I want to thank all of the witnesses. I think all of your statements have been very good, very thought provoking. I have scores of questions, but I know our time is limited. Thank you.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Mr. Findley.

Mr. **Findley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTIONS

The witnesses, I assume, are familiar with House Joint Resolution 434 and similar resolutions which call for a mutual and verifiable freeze in nuclear weapons, sponsored by a number of Members of the House, including several on this committee and, I believe also supported by a distinguished personality or two in the arms field. Gerard Smith is one of them, if I am correct. Perhaps someone here can correct me.

Do any of you see any drawbacks to our national interest in the advancement of this resolution?

Mr. **Garthoff**. I think it would be in our national interest to proceed on that basis. There are many complexities and difficulties that would have to be seriously and carefully gone into in the course of working out any such arrangements.

But I think that if it is generally understood as an indication of the fact that we have the interest and the will to try and move along this line, that such a resolution could be useful.

Mr. **Findley**. I am sure that many people contend and will argue that there is quite a difference in nuclear strength in various aspects. And perhaps some of those on this resolution would acknowledge that, too, but nevertheless feel it is worthwhile to focus public opinion, and particularly the opinion of Members of Congress on this resolution.

Would Dr. Davis or Mr. Sloss have any comment on the wisdom or lack thereof of proceeding with this resolution?

Mr. **Sloss**. I do have some problems with it, Mr. Findley. I think on the one hand, from the point of view of our public posture, the point that Mr. Hamilton made earlier, it has some benefits. On the other hand, I think it does tend to reduce our leverage.

I put some weight on the point I made earlier that we need to demonstrate to the Soviets that while we are certainly interested in pursuing arms control, we are not more eager than they are. I think a freeze would leave us with some asymmetries. There are asymmetries that favor us and favor them, but on balance I think it would leave us with some very disturbing asymmetries. For example, the greater counterforce capabilities that the Soviets have today. A freeze might also inhibit us from developing new systems, new capabilities which would be more stable.

So while on the face of it, a freeze has some attractive features, and I think we cannot ignore the propaganda value, if you will, I do not think we want to be permanently frozen into the posture that we are in now. If it can be the beginning of a process which would take us to a more stable posture, of course, we should all support it.

But I am one who believes that not all developments in nuclear systems are necessarily destabilizing. For example, I would be particularly concerned if it would freeze both us and the Soviet Union into a position where we could not go to more stable postures. Over the next decade or less, the developments in technology are going to make fixed land-based systems on both sides very vulnerable, as we all know. If it freezes both us and them in a position where we have increasingly vulnerable systems on both sides, I do not think that is in the interest of stability or arms control.

Mr. **Findley**. Do you have any comments, Dr. Davis?

Ms. **Davis**. Just briefly. That as a goal, as a general goal to stop the arms race and to get some sense back into the interests of both sides for arms control, I think it is a good objective, the right objective if it is a means of getting this administration to begin talking about these issues. As a means to get serious discussions underway, I think it is useful. Therefore, I do not think it should be seen as a step back in that process.

On the other hand, I still believe that the best way to start would really be from SALT II. After a long negotiation, agreements that made quite a lot of sense in terms of the posture of the United States, the force posture of the Soviet Union because they thought it was probably in their interest as well.

To really take that as a basis and move from there seems to me to be a better way than by saying arbitrarily let us freeze today.

But I still am a supporter of SALT II, and that is not shared by everybody in the country, even around this table probably.

Mr. **Findley**. I think the chairman, Mr. Bingham and I have been here since Jack Kennedy went to West Berlin and issued his ringing pronouncement that he himself was a Berliner. Even in that era, the credibility of our nuclear commitment was waning. It surely has waned substantially since then. And it is difficult for us to put ourselves in the shoes of the nonnuclear, a citizen of a nonnuclear Western nation and see how the world looks from that vantage point.

NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN NATO

I think in this area, as well as many others, our main emphasis should be on the cohesion of the West, of the Atlantic Community, and I am much more comfortable when we are negotiating deeply and intensively within the Community of the Atlantic Association of nations than when we are trying to work out a deal with the Soviet Union.

Like Mr. Hamilton, I can think of 18 specific questions to raise. But I am inclined to leave it with my little philosophizing and maybe one or more of you would want to comment on the priority of negotiating within the membership of the Atlantic Community as the basis for any undertakings with the Soviet Union.

Mr. **Sloss**. I agree with that observation. And I would just underline again the proposal that I make in my paper, which is not really fleshed out. But I think the central security requirement that we have in relationships with Europe today is to restore a sense of confidence which has been waning in Europe, that they have the capacity to deter this horrible prospect of nuclear war and to defend themselves.

I think when a whole continent—and this is what we ought to be working on as a first priority, to restore all of a sense of confidence which I see waning in Europe. As I say in my paper, nuclear weapons have a role to play in this, but they cannot play a central role. I believe that whether we like it or not, they are going to be there for some period of time. We need to work out a reasonable role.

I think that precedes, really, arms control because we have to work out a role for a defensive concept and then shape our arms control policy consistent with that. I think the concepts that we have had for the security of Europe were getting pretty threadbare. The nuclear balance has changed. Our reliance that we placed on nuclear weapons for 25 years we probably cannot place in the future. We need a concept which will shift, not entirely, but shift toward greater emphasis on the nonnuclear forces. And as difficult as that may be, it is not a new idea, we have been trying it for 30 years. But I think it is compelling now.

If we can do that, then I think that we will find our allies more willing to interact with us and to support reasonable arms control positions.

Mr. **Findley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. **Bingham**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, would like to thank the witnesses for extremely thoughtful and helpful testimony. I would like to say that I agree with my colleague from Illinois about the absolute necessity of working with our allies in Europe on these matters.

FREEZE RESOLUTION CONCEPT

It may seem that the freeze resolution is somewhat antithetical to that. I do not think it really is. The point is that the freeze resolution reflects a national grassroots movement for some action in this field. And the beauty of the concept is that it is a simple concept.

Now, we all know on this committee that this whole subject is enormously complex. And you cannot cope with it if you are just going to talk slogans. But in the first place, this was a simple concept that people could understand.

And I would agree with Dr. Davis that the virtue of it is that it may push the administration into more realistic debate. It is very interesting to me that the administration should respond negatively and so quickly as if this were a real threat to them. First of all, this is a sense-of-Congress resolution. It does not have the force of law. Second, in its final form it does not call even for an immediate freeze; it simply calls on the administration to negotiate and to discuss the modalities of arriving at a freeze, which is quite different.

I do have some questions that I would like to ask on your testimony, Dr. Davis. First of all, I would like just to underscore your statement about limits on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, an agreement on TNF is neither militarily nor politically sensible.

I take it the other two witnesses agree with that?

Mr. **Garthoff**. Yes.

LAND-BASED MISSILES

Mr. **Bingham**. You do say that the United States should continue to seek an agreement focused on land-based missiles. These weapons are clearly the most threatening and troublesome for each side. But are they not almost equally threatening and troublesome in the case of the SS-20's if they are moved east of the Urals and so taken out of the scope of the theater?

Ms. **Davis**. I also say that I think we need to place global limits on the SS-20 because of its range and mobility.

Mr. **Bingham**. OK.

Ms. **Davis**. Dr. Garthoff argues that those in the Far East are not sufficiently mobile to warrant inclusion in this negotiation. I think they are sufficiently mobile to be worrisome to the Western Europeans, so that they ought to be taken into account.

The easist and simplest way is a global limit. Maybe there are other ways that we ought to look at.

AIRCRAFT DATA

Mr. **Bingham**. I find your appendix A extremely useful and helpful to have. And I frankly did not realize that the United States and the Soviets are using the same accounting rules applied to U.S. aircraft, or more or less the same, but totally different accounting rules when applied to Soviet aircraft.

What excuse do they give or what rationale do they give for excluding a whole lot of Soviet aircraft that presumably have similar capabilities to the U.S. aircraft?

Ms. **Davis**. Let me ask Dr. Garthoff if he can help us on that.

Mr. **Garthoff**. Unfortunately, there are some inconsistencies, for one thing, in this chart, which is drawn from a New York Times attempt to reconstruct what the numbers meant.

The Soviet position does not include, for example, the Pershing IA missiles, which are shown here and instead has a larger figure for U.S. aircraft.

Part of the problem is that the Soviets have taken what is an arbitrary, but not on the face of it unreasonable, standard of 1,000-kilometer range. They say that the F-4 has more than the 1,000-kilometer range and should be included. And in fact, it depends upon the flight profile what the maximum range is. It also depends upon whether it is flown one way or round-trip.

The same is true of Soviet aircraft. Now, the ones which have been included in the administration comparison include the Fencer, which is a relatively long-range fighter bomber. It also includes others such as the Fitter, the SU-17, which is a much shorter range. And I believe we have used different criteria in determining the ranges of the Soviet fighter bombers as compared to what we have applied to our own F-4. Also, we have apparently included all Soviet aircraft of these categories, not all of which are configured for dual conventional and nuclear weapons delivery use.

But getting away from the specific numbers involved, the question, in part, is of a conceptual kind that is difficult to deal with because the Soviets have been saying it is not just a question of what is involved in the European balance but what is involved in the global strategic balance.

This is where the whole issue of American forward-based systems, FBS, came up repeatedly in SALT. And it is true that if one looks from Moscow's standpoint and takes a worst-case type of analysis, an F-4 can fly to Moscow and drop a 1-megaton bomb. We have that ordnance. The plane has that range. Now, that is not the way we would use it, but it is not entirely dissimilar from calculations that the United States has advanced from time to time about the way the Soviets could use their Backfire medium bomber in reaching the United States.

Each side tends to look at things in terms of what are the worst capabilities the other side has, and so on. My suggestion earlier, in passing, was that we would have done better to attempt to refute the Soviets on their inclusion of the F-4's rather than to make debating points, so to speak, by adding up all of their fighter bombers.

Also, incidentally, if one did include relatively shorter range fighter bombers, it again poses even more sharply the question of allied forces, because there are an additional wide range of light bombers and fighter bombers in allied forces, in the British and French cases having their own nuclear weapons, and in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany and several other countries having American nuclear munitions available for wartime contingent use.

And some of these aircraft are on quick-reaction alert. So it is a difficult problem. And I recognize and, to some extent, sympathize with the argument that this whole question, including aircraft does raise great complexities. But at the same time, it is a part of the strategic picture. We are not going to persuade the Soviets it is not by simply noting the complexities.

Mr. **BINGHAM**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take any more time.

Chairman **ZABLOCKI**. Mrs. Snowe.

Mrs. **SNOWE**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

And I thank all of you for your very informative statements. I know what makes the subject so difficult is that everybody starts with different assumptions. But could you tell me, do you believe that the zero option proposal assisted our negotiating position in the talks or hindered our position?

Mr. **GARTHOFF**. Mrs. Snowe, I think that it hindered our position, primarily because it does raise the questions which have been raised in these very hearings about whether and how long we should stand firm in support of it. I think it was advanced, and successfully so, as a step to take the public relations or propaganda high ground. And it did that.

This again points to one of the differences between the two sides. The Soviets are pretty shrewd and hard bargainers and negotiators. They sometimes take extreme positions. But then they do not have any difficulty in coming off those extreme positions and getting into more serious negotiation.

We do have a greater difficulty, and especially in cases where we have to work through and develop an alliance consensus, as is clearly the case here. So without attempting to make any net judgment as to whether it was a wise thing to begin with the zero option, I do think that it helped our position in terms of public opinion in Europe, but that it tended to complicate it as far as our negotiating position.

I would also point out that the zero option was not part of the initial alliance consensus on a negotiating position. It is something which was adopted only in the fall of 1981. And, the alliance had been building up a general position for the talks and indeed had initially advanced some of this position, in the fall of 1980, when the talks began for just one short season.

Mr. **Sloss**. I do not think it is clear that the zero option has hurt us. The proof of the pudding will come somewhere further down the line. And, because I do view the political cohesion of the alliance as the dominant issue, I think, as Mr. Garthoff has already acknowledged, it has helped us in the short run.

I think we all agree that we have a problem now of getting from that opening position to some other position. And so do the Soviets, because the Soviet position is, in my view, as nonnegotiable as ours. I do not accept the view at all that we are the sole obstacle to the negotiations. No matter what position we had opened with, we would have had to face the problem of modifying that position at some point in time.

So I do not see it as an impediment yet. I think it is a question of how we handle it from here.

Mrs. **Snowe**. Dr. Davis.

Ms. **Davis**. I think I agree with Mr. Sloss. It is too soon to tell for sure. One of the problems is it took us 2 years to get the negotiations underway after the decision, and then to start with a position that certainly helped us politically in Europe, but raised another stumbling block to getting an agreement in the negotiations. That adds more time.

So we are coming up closer and closer to the actual time, the deployment time, without an arms control agreement, and still trying to figure out what our real negotiating position is. It is hard to say. It may have affected the timing somewhat.

Since we had not started SALT at the same time, it obviously gave the Soviets even more incentive, if they needed any more incentive, to expand the scope of the negotiations on TNF.

Initially, the Soviets had said in the summer of 1980 they would be prepared to look at British and French systems in a follow-on to SALT II, SALT III. Following the zero deployment proposal in the INF negotiations, they said, well, clearly now we would have to look at British and French systems as well. They may have done that anyway, but that was certainly an opportunity once we put it down.

Another problem that the zero option poses, not just in getting off the proposal, but now in having to sell the deployments publicly. The 1979 decision said we needed these new missiles for a variety of different military reasons, not simply to respond to the SS-20. And now, a zero deployment arms control proposal says the only reason we wanted these new missiles is that the Soviets have SS-20's, if they get rid of them we do not need any.

So, now going back, we are going to find it slightly more difficult, I think, to sell the deployment. So I think it has all these problems. On the other hand, I think it is very important to say that it had a tremendously good political effect in Europe with the peace movements. It served that purpose very well.

Mrs. **Snowe**. To follow up on that, Dr. Davis, I think what is curious about this whole situation is that the Soviet Union has managed to have an upper hand with public opinion, and yet this was a decision as far as the modernization and deployment plan was a decision that was made by the NATO alliance back in 1979.

RECENT SOVIET AGGRESSION

What I cannot understand is why are the Europeans not concerned about the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union, particularly in light of what happened in Afghanistan and more recently in Poland? What do they feel is their greatest threat: Soviet Union activities or the threat of nuclear war?

Ms. **Davis**. I think they think those two are connected. And it is again hard to really understand as well as we would like to exactly what is motivating and what is on the minds of those people, Europeans as a whole, publics as a whole.

Clearly, everybody is worried about nuclear war. I do not think that is particularly strange. That leads people who are normally relatively conservative to join with people demonstrating in the various capitals in Western Europe.

I think fundamentally, though, that the hard-core part of the peace movement in Europe is still a very small part, that those who actually favor unilateral disarmament is even a smaller part, that most people continue to see the importance of nuclear weapons, as horrible as they might be, and seek basically through the protest to give attention to the arms control side and attention to getting something done about nuclear weapons.

Why are we not winning? The United States lost some opportunities by not getting SALT started again, by putting off the negotiations for 2 years, by some of the rhetoric by the new administration in talking about limited nuclear wars. All these things have given us more problems than we should have had in the face of what the Soviets have done in Poland and Afghanistan and in continuing to build up their SS-20 missiles every day and every month.

So we have to get over that, and I think that the President's speech took a big step in that direction. Now we have to sustain it, and that is really what the critical problem is.

Mrs. **Snowe**. Would you care to comment, Mr. Sloss?

Mr. **Sloss**. Well, I think that it is a complex problem, and one thing to keep in mind is not to underrate the strength of the antinuclear movement in Europe.

It is most vocal, and one does not really know what the average German or the average Frenchman is thinking. What you are hearing is not insignificant. I do not mean to underrate it. But you are getting, of course, the most vocal people who are out there on the streets demonstrating.

I think the problem the United States must always deal with is that our policies are directed at several audiences, and one of the things this administration has done in the interest of strengthening deterrence—improving our military posture both actual and perceived—has resonanted poorly in Europe and among some of our public.

I think there has been a conscious effort to project a position of strength to the Soviet audience which has not always done well with the audience in Europe. It has exacerbated the very understandable fear in Europe of nuclear war. And the Russians, in turn, have exploited that with their propaganda.

That is not a wholly soluble problem. I think all of us could see ways in which we could have handled that better in the last year or 2 years. But it is not a problem that is susceptible to easy solutions.

Mrs. **Snowe**. Ambassador.

Mr. **Garthoff**. I generally agree, although I think that the fear of nuclear war has been growing and is even more important politically than perhaps these comments have suggested. And it is tied with concern over the apparent sluggishness of interest and action on nuclear weapons control on our part.

It may not be fair, but still Brezhnev is up there talking about arms control and talking about the need to move forward in peace and so forth. And while many people do recognize that ought to be discounted, still it has some impact, and especially when some key political leaders in the West appear to be more interested in talking about deployments and ways of fighting limited nuclear wars and so forth.

Also, this general concern has tended to be focused on our TNF deployments. That is somewhat unfair, but it is a fact. And it is spilling over into anti-NATO and anti-U.S. sentiment in some circles, which again is unfair and highly unfortunate. But this concern is one which has been there all along; it has been building.

For example, even in making the decision in December 1979, in the weeks immediately preceding that decision, the Prime Ministers of Norway and the Netherlands and the Foreign Minister of Denmark all flew to Washington for talks with the President and the Secretary of State at that time to get assurances of the seriousness of American interest in proceeding on the arms control track, before they are prepared to go along with the NATO decision.

In addition, the Netherlands and the Belgian Governments placed contingent reservations on whether they would agree to accept deployments in their countries, reservations which are being continued. The Parliament in the Netherlands, just before the NATO decision, in a nonbinding majority vote, came out against the deployment. So it is not something that has only started in the more recent period. But it has gotten much worse in the last year or so. It is something that we need to take into account.

Mrs. SNOWE. Again, I thank all of you for your fine statements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Lady and gentlemen, you have been most generous with your time. I do have a few questions, however there are other members who were unable to be here or who had to leave early if you have no objections, I would like to give you additional questions for inclusion in the record.

But if I may ask just one very brief question, because this follows the gentlelady's questions.

SOVIET MOTIVATIONS

It is safe to assume that if we are going to have fruitful negotiations and some agreement, both sides must have a full understanding of the various positions, and the tactics of the other.

But I believe, Mr. Sloss, on page 11 of your text you very unequivocally stated that the Soviet negotiating tactics, must interpret as being designed principally to divide NATO rather than to achieve arms control.

There are those who would agree with you, and there are some who say the position of the Soviet Union is to gain a military advantage vis-a-vis Europe. Some say that the motivation of the Soviet Union is to reduce the risks of nuclear war or to achieve relative parity at the theater level.

If we understand what their motivation is, we can deal with them better and negotiate with them more effectively. Don't you agree?

Mr. SLOSS. Could I respond briefly before the others? I think what I said in my statement was that this seemed to be their objective at the present time, and I think it is.

I would be somewhat more optimistic than that. I would hope that, as the negotiations progress, because I believe the Soviet Union also is interested in reducing the risk of a nuclear war, that they would find motivation to enter into serious negotiations.

And I think right now they are taking the opportunity of a preliminary stage of negotiations to get maximum propaganda advantage and leverage over the alliance. I think the optimistic view is to assume that if we persevere and we put reasonable proposals on the table, they will negotiate. I am not wholly pessimistic about that. I think they will continue as they have, to pursue several objectives. But in the present stage of the negotiations, that is the principal objective.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS. I think the history of Soviet actions over the last 5 or 6 years has shown them to be terribly interested in preventing the deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles, U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles, and now U.S. Pershing missiles.

They have tried in a variety of ways to do that, primarily to keep us from being able to implement the 1979 decision. If they are able to succeed through that method—that is, through propaganda and through their political action in Europe—they clearly do not need to go to the negotiating table in order to make that objective happen.

When they discover—and I hope that they soon will—that that is not going to be the means by which they achieve their objective, then I think they will become serious, because I think they really are worried about our systems, as we are worried about the SS-20 and other Soviet systems. And that is the basis for a good negotiation.

So I think that because of their concerns, which we have just seen through SALT II and now through this public debate, that we really can go in and see the possibility of a serious negotiation, perhaps even an agreement that would reduce on both sides the weapons that are most troublesome.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Ambassador.

Mr. GARTHOFF. I agree that the Soviet Union has a mix of motivations and that among these certainly has been an effort to divide the Allies and seek to prevent deployment of the systems without having to make any sacrifices on their side. That would be their preferred position.

But I also do agree that there is a serious Soviet interest in limiting these forces and that they realize in a real negotiation they are going to have to make limitations on their side as well, and I think they are prepared to do so. So I believe there is a potential for fruitful negotiation.

Because of the particular circumstances of the deployment calendar and so on, both sides have to make their decisions in this period with some uncertainty. The Soviets cannot be certain that we will not succeed in going ahead with the deployments, and by then it would be much harder to roll them back than it would be to agree at this time on limitations. But we on our part also cannot be sure that the alliance is going to want to stand firm on going ahead with the deployments if arms control has not gotten anywhere or has not really been tried. So I think there are problems in calculation in that sense on both sides.

What we need to do is to make a real negotiating effort on our side. If it turns out, as I think it well might, that the Soviet Union is also prepared to make this move from their side, we might get an agreement. If it turns out they are not, we will not have lost anything by making a real effort on our side, because at least that will then be more clear to public opinion and will lend further support to going ahead with deployments we consider it necessary to make.

But I think there is a possibility of real arms limitations in our interest, in mutual interest, and that we ought to do our part to try and realize those potentialities.

COMMON GROUND FOR AGREEMENT

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You said if we had a proposal for real negotiations which could be interpreted by the other side as sincere, we would be able to achieve an agreement.

What, in your opinion, Ambassador, would be the type of a position you would advocate at negotiations that would induce the Soviets to present negotiation positions which would be acceptable to the United States?

Mr. **Garthoff**. Well, Mr. Chairman, I attempted in my remarks earlier, to spell out at greater length in my prepared paper to present some criticisms of the present position that we have advanced that I think we need to take into account. I have not tried to lay out a tactical negotiating position or program.

I think that the first need is, in fact, to recognize to ourselves and with our allies that this process we were just talking about, of testing out and finding out whether there is a common ground for agreement is not going to be realized if we simply stand on the zero option plan that we have already advanced.

So the first need, I feel, is that we consider what our real objectives are and how to work to get there within the alliance.

I have also suggested a rather different approach that might be considered here and with our allies. Dr. Davis has suggested a less drastically modified approach.

I think the first need, though, is to appreciate the necessity for even relooking at the position and considering what alternatives there are. Although I may simply not be fully informed, it is not my impression, speaking, of course, as an individual outside the Government, that we have done that at this time. That is why I put the emphasis on what I think is the need to do so.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I would not say we are at a disadvantage, it is complicated since we have to consult with our allies, when the Soviets can take unilateral actions without consulting with the Warsaw pact countries.

Again, on behalf of the Chair and the members of the subcommittees, I want to thank you, Dr. Davis, Mr. Sloss, and Ambassador Garthoff for giving so much of your time.

Again, I apologize. Because of the votes we were delayed. We certainly caused an inconvenience to you when we went right through lunch. Thank you very much.

The subcommittees stand adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE STRATEGY IN NATO

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1982

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East) presiding.

Mr. Hamilton. The meeting of the subcommittees will come to order.

This is the third in a series of hearings being conducted jointly by the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East.

The purpose of this hearing is to discuss NATO strategy, to examine the implementation of the 1979 dual track decision and to assess U.S. policies in support of NATO's long-range theater nuclear force modernization program and in the conduct of negotiations with the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.

We are happy to have today as our witness the Honorable Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense. Mr. Brown, we appreciate your willingness to appear and share your views on these important matters.

You have a prepared statement which will be included in the record in full. I understand you want to summarize your statement and you may do that and we will then turn to questions. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to appear before your subcommittees to discuss NATO strategy, particularly its nuclear strategy.

I do not think it is appropriate to burden you today by reading this entire 20-page statement. Even if I did, I am sure you would not let me get away with it. What I will do is spend, I hope, only 10 or 15 minutes summarizing what I have to say, with the rest of my time on questions and answers and discussion.

I think the matter of NATO nuclear strategy needs to be seen in the overall context of European security and of the U.S. interest in that security.

To provide that context let me begin by making a number of observations. None of them is particularly new or insightful, but I think we need to remember them.

U.S. SECURITY INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPE

First, Western Europe is not the only, but it is a central, probably the most central area to U.S. security outside of our own borders and their immediate surroundings.

Second, Western Europe certainly with even modest participation by the United States and probably even on its own, has the economic, technical and manpower capacity to build a military machine capable of resisting Warsaw Pact conventional attack. It could also build a separate and adequate nuclear deterrent given time to do so and assuming no Soviet prevention of such an effort.

But, Western Europe has not done these things, and in my judgment it cannot do these things because of political incapacity. There are many reasons. Perhaps two of the most obvious are a lack of political unity, and problems in relations between the large and small nations of Western Europe, and particularly between the Federal Republic of Germany and the others.

THREATS TO WESTERN EUROPE

Third, the threat to Western Europe security comes not only from the Soviet Union, and even that threat is not solely military. Internal European problems, economic, social, political, are substantial.

There are nonmilitary components intertwined with the state of Western European security. Examples are access to natural resources, expecially oil which makes Southwest Asia so important to European security, and the availability of foreign markets for European goods.

SOVIET POLICY VIS-A-VIS WESTERN EUROPE

Four, U.S. and Soviet purposes in their relations with Western Europe are an important element of the context of Western Europe security. U.S. goals with respect to Western Europe are that it remain democratic, productive, militarily secure and stable and open to trade.

Soviet policy with respect to Western Europe in my judgment is to reduce and ultimately eliminate U.S. influence and the U.S. presence in Western Europe, not only military but also political, and economic and ideological, while avoiding a situation in which Germany, either divided or unified Germany, became Western Europe's dominant power.

Diminution of U.S. military presence in an economic relations and political alliance with Western Europe would be part of such an evolution.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES

Let me turn now to Soviet capabilities that threaten Western European security and support those Soviet goals.

First, the balance of conventional forces clearly favors the Soviet and other Warsaw Pacts as compared to NATO forces in most categories of personnel and equipment as well as in disposition, that is location, and readiness of forces.

But to the Soviets the key measure of the balance is probably whether they would be able to overrun Western Europe within a very short time, say a few weeks, without escalation to nuclear war. In assessing the overall balance of conventional forces in Europe, it seems unlikely that the Allies could sustain for several months a successful defense of a forward line. It is also highly doubtful that a massive conventional war in Europe could last many weeks without a high probability of escalation into nuclear war, first tactical, then strategic.

On the other hand, if a Warsaw Pact attack failed to achieve victory in even so short a time as a few weeks, the stablity of the Warsaw Pact would come into considerable doubt both militarily and politically. Indeed repercussions in the Soviet Union itself from a temporarily stalled attack are unpredictable.

This combination of risks should be a very powerful deterrent of Soviet attack providing that the NATO nations do the following. First, show determination in and unity in a crisis. Second, have a visible capability to fight conventionally for a period of time, say a month or two to prevent the Soviets from quickly overruning Western Europe. And third, make clear the risk to the Soviets that escalation to nuclear war on any attack on Western Europe, particularly in any protracted conflicts.

SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT TO EUROPE

There is also a substantial Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Quite aside from strategic forces which can also be used at those shorter ranges, the deployment of several hundred SS-20's enable the Soviets to destroy a variety of military targets in Western Europe, as well as effect its complete urban industrial destruction.

They can do that in only 10 or 20 minutes from a decision, from sites, untargetable because they are movable, in European Russia and Western Siberia. NATO forces have significant short-range tactical nuclear forces, perhaps somewhat more numerous than the corresponding Soviet forces. Those are however largely nuclear artillery and manned aircraft. They are short range, vulnerable to Soviet preemptive strike and, they are themselves unable to reach Soviet borders or penetrate successfully if they could.

No land-based U.S. forces in Europe pose any substantial retaliatory threat to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Suppose there were a NATO conventional capability fully adequate to defeat any conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, but that the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe remains unbalanced by any NATO retaliatory capablity that could inflict massive damage on the Soviet homeland. To the extent that the Soviet Union could then threaten the countries of Western Europe with a nuclear war confined to that area, because either the physical capability or will to retaliate against the targets within the Soviet Union did not exist, that would be a major political edge under certain circumstances.

In principle, U.S. retaliation against Soviet targets for such an attack should serve as a significant deterrent but that deterrent has clearly been eroded in the perceptions of Europeans over the past 15 years.

THREATS TO OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS

France and Britain may feel reasonably well protected themselves against such a threat by their national deterrents. Whether German or other NATO nations' doubts about U.S. retaliation on their behalf would be matched by greater confidence that the United Kingdom or French forces would be used in that role is subject to considerable question.

The Soviet Union also poses some political threats to Europe aside from military ones. They include possible future economic dependence of Western Europe on the Soviet Union and East Europe both for markets and for energy, and the possibility of Soviet political domination or attack on Southwest Asia.

In this context, the contrasting concepts of flexible response and of no first-use need to be seen in the light of the paradoxes of European and indeed of U.S. thinking about nuclear conflict.

Europeans have come to consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella much less certain in an age of United States-Soviet parity.

The statements—in my judgment generally unfounded—by many American public figures over recent years to the effect that the Soviets have substantial and growing superiority inevitably worsened this European perception problem.

DECEMBER 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION

The consequent fear that U.S. nuclear retaliatory and deterrent capability has become decoupled from perceptions, from balances, and from events in Europe, caused Europeans to wish a clearer U.S. commitment.

And in the light of that situation the alliance in December 1979 decided both to modernize intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe and at the same time to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets to limit and reduce such systems.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR EUROPE

I see three alternative strategies for Europe. One, sufficient conventional natural forces adequate to deter a Soviet conventional attack or intimidation by threat of such an attack.

Second, a strategy of flexible response which is more or less what we have now, implying that NATO would have the option of using tactical nuclear weapons to slow down or to halt through military or through political effect, a Soviet conventional attack that NATO conventional forces had not been able to contain.

The third, political accommodation to Soviet military supremacy in Europe.

NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

If and when NATO conventional forces become adequate in themselves to deter a Soviet conventional attack and providing that NATO nuclear capability—taken overall—becomes such that the Soviets cannot threaten Western Europe with a nuclear war confined to Western Europe but leaving the Soviet Union untouched, then a no first use doctrine becomes a feasible position.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS

I have talked about military and economic threats, but the present threat to the survival and political independence of Western Europe is at least as much one of political disintegration and of division between the United States and Western Europe. It is on that political situation that Soviet military capability, political expansionism, and potential leverage adversely effecting the European economy and political will could operate effectively.

These divisions have been exacerbated by European concern that the U.S. Government, or important officials in it take the horrors of nuclear war too lightly and could involve Europe in such a war against its will.

Such concerns are amplified by perceptions that the U.S. Government sees the world solely in terms of United States-Soviet competition and that competition in too purely military terms.

UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN ALLIES

Americans, on the other hand, often see Europe as relying on United States military protection while seeking competitive economic advantage over the United States. In extreme terms this perception is that Europe expects the United States to be more concerned about and more willing to sacrifice for Western European security than Western Europe is itself.

But, like it or not, we Americans and the Western Europeans need each other.

Changes in alliance form and in relationships among its members and its strategies and policies are in order in combination with or parallel with changes on the Warsaw Pact side. But both Western Europe and the United States would be in enormously greater peril if the alliance were to dissolve.

What are my prescriptions?

FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

First, we need to carry through the force improvements already agreed within the alliance. Specifically, NATO needs enough conventional military capablity to prevent a quick conventional Soviet victory.

Second, modernization of theater nuclear forces and intermediate force nuclear arms limitations to achieve levels as low as possible on both sides. The levels of course can be negotiated depending upon reduction of overall Soviet intermediate nuclear forces, not just SS-20's, SS-4's, and SS-5's.

Third, I would note that the United States, in President Reagan's November speech, indicated a willingness to drop plans for intermediate range land-based missiles in Europe if the Soviets dismantle their SS-20's as well as the older 4's and 5's.

The Soviets proposed freezing the present intermediate nuclear force situation: No NATO INF modernization and no additional SS-20's in European Russia.

I think that negotiations can now proceed on the basis of these two obviously quite different and incompatible positions. How far they will get in the absence of strategic arms agreements or at least negotiations is very doubtful.

I would also add that it is important to pursue the mutual and balanced force negotiations. They are useful to alliance security in themselves and they will help improve European political perceptions of U.S. Government attitudes by displaying commitment to political negotiations and cooperation in the East-West situation, not only to competition.

Most important, the administration should resume as soon as possible strategic arms limitation and reduction talks with the Soviets. It should also initiate talks on measures to reduce any tactical or political advantages that might be seen by a potential attacker as accruing from a preemptive attack.

Finally, in my list of actions to be taken, closer coordination of economic and political strategies within the alliance as well as military ones. That is easier to recommend than to implement, but it is no less vital for that difficulty.

Mr. Chairman, during the 25 years from the late 1940's to the early 1970's the United States, because it felt itself sufficiently powerful economically and militarily and because Europe was so much a junior partner, was able to make decisions in the common interest.

Western Europeans grumbled and went along. And Western European leaders were able to gain acceptance of such discussions, both in elite circles and among their publics, by announcing that the needs of the NATO alliance required particular unpopular actions.

Sometimes these actions imposed real costs on the Europeans, more often their principal economic and political costs were borne by the United States, but the system worked. It cannot work that way any longer given greater European economic weight relative to that of the United States, greater Soviet military capability relative to that of the United States than was the case during that 25-year period, and given the erosion in U.S. morale and self-confidence dating from the midsixties.

The partnerhsip must be more equal now but it is no less important for both partners.

In the end leadership, though of a less dominant kind, must still come from the United States which remains by far the largest, by far the most economically powerful and by far the leading military member of the alliance. Such leadership has been at best sporadic during the past 20 years.

We do not have much time left if we are to avoid a further decline, one that may become irretrievable in the security of Western

Europe, and in a consequent and vastly dangerous decline in U.S. security.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE

I am very pleased to appear before your subcommittees today to discuss NATO's nuclear strategy.

1. This matter needs to be seen in the overall context of European security, and of the U.S. interest in that security. To provide that context, I would like to begin by making a number of observations.

   A. Western Europe is not the only, but is a central, and probably the most central, area to U.S. security outside of our own borders and their immediate surroundings. This is so because Western Europe is the largest concentration of industrial production and skilled people in the entire world, quite aside from the historical and cultural connections that bind the U.S. and Western Europe so closely together. Western Europe has a population substantially, and gross national product slightly, larger than that of the U.S. and Canada combined. The U.S. would be put in grave danger if Western Europe were to fall under the domination of a power or powers adversary to the United States. It was perceptions of this sort that led to U.S. involvement in World War II (and of even World War I, to the massive economic contributions of the U.S. to the rebuilding of Europe after World War II, and to the NATO Alliance itself. These views remain the basis of U.S. policy in Europe to this day.

B. Western Europe (certainly with even modest participation by the U.S., and probably even on its own) has the economic, technical, and manpower capacity to build a military machine capable of resisting Warsaw Pact conventional attack. It also could build a separate and adequate nuclear deterrent, given the time to do so and assuming no Soviet military preemption of such an effort. But Western Europe has not done and in my judgment cannot do these things, because of political incapacity. Reasons have included: a lack of political unity; problems of relations between the large and small nations of Western Europe, and particularly between the Federal Republic of Germany and the others; the substantial economic costs that would be involved; and the presence of a U.S. nuclear umbrella and of U.S. conventional forces deployed in Europe for a succession of reasons, beginning shortly after World War II (and continuing to the present), which seemed to make such a Western European autonomous defense capability unnecessary at a time when it was also physically impossible.

The assurance provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella is perceived in Europe as having erroded substantially during the last fifteen years, but the other reasons for failure of Europe to provide sufficiently, let alone entirely, for its own defense continue. Thus the removal of the U.S. contribution in nuclear and conventional military capability and in political commitment - to deterrence of Soviet attack or intimidation of Europe and to the East/West military balance in case of a confrontation or a military action in Europe - would surely lead to major changes in European and in Soviet behavior. Those changes would be of a kind that placed U.S. security in grave danger.

C. The threat to Western European security comes not only from the Soviet Union, and even that threat is not solely military. Internal European problems - economic, social, political - are substantial. The state of European productivity and of internal morale and cohesion are important constituents of the state of Western European security. And there are non-military components intertwined with them. Examples are access to natural resources, especially oil (which makes Southwest Asia so important to European security), and the availability of foreign markets for European goods as well.

D. U.S. and Soviet purposes in relations with Western Europe are important elements of the context of

Western European security. U.S. goals with respect to Western Europe are that it remain democratic, productive, militarily secure, stable, and open to trade. Not surprisingly, U.S. policy sees the continuation of a U.S.-Western European partnership both as an end in itself and as an important means to those other goals. Moreover, ever since World War II the U.S. has encouraged cohesion and political unity among Western European countries, even while recognizing that success in that endeavor bends to limit U.S. influence in Western Europe.

Soviet policy with respect to Western Europe is to reduce and ultimately eliminate U.S. influence and the U.S. presence in Western Europe while avoiding a situation in which Germany (either divided or unified) becomes Europe's dominant power. Diminution of U.S. military presence in, and of U.S. economic relations and political alliance with, Western Europe would be part of such an evolution. Simultaneously or subsequently, the Soviets would seek a Europe biddable to Soviet wishes through a combination of economic dependence, political weakness, and Soviet military intimidation, but without war. The Soviets would hope thus to exploit the technology, the industrial production, the wealth, and the trained personnel of Western Europe without introducing into the Soviet Union the freedoms and economic forms that have gone with those characteristics. Western Europe might then, in Soviet eyes, shield the U.S.S.R. against outside influences that could change the Soviet Union in ways that the Soviet ruling class sees as inimical to its own interests. In many ways this vision of an evolution of Western Europe must resemble in amplified form some of the prospects - however awry they have since gone - that the Soviet Union saw in Eastern Europe after World War II.

2. Several Soviet capabilities threaten Western European security and support the above Soviet goals.

   A. The balance of conventional forces clearly favors the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces as compared to NATO forces in most categories of personnel and equipment, as well as in disposition of forces. But to the Soviets, the key measure of the balance is probably whether they would be able to overrun Western Europe within a very short time (a few weeks) without escalation to nuclear war. In assessing the overall balance of conventional forces in Europe, it seems unlikely that the Allies could sustain for several months a successful defense of a forward line, near the German border, or even substantially to the rear, against an all-out Warsaw Pact attack. It is also highly doubtful that a massive conventional war in

Europe could last many weeks without a high probabilty of escalation into nuclear war, first tactical and then strategic. Moreover, if a Warsaw Pact attack failed to achieve victory in even so short a time as a few weeks, the stability of theWarsaw Pact would come into considerable doubt, both militarily and politically. Indeed, repercussions in the Soviet Union itself from even a temporarily stalled attack are unpredictable. This combination of risks should be a very powerful deterrent of Soviet attack, providing that the NATO nations do the following: show determination and unity in a crisis; have a visible capability to fight conventionally for a reasonable period - say a month or two - to prevent the Soviets from quickly overrunning Western Europe; and make clear the risk to the Soviets of escalation to nuclear war in any attack on Western Europe, but particularly in any protracted conflict. NATO's degree of ability to meet these criteria now is far from comforting. But given the existence of the nuclear powder train, the present conventional force balance, Soviet political problems in Eastern Europe, and NATO's political disarray which the Soviets must also see as offering them certain political chances in peacetime, the threshold for Soviet military action remains high for the time being. It would require circumstances where they concluded that inaction would be catastrophic for them to approach that threshold.

B. There is also a substantial Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. With the deployment of several hundred SS-20s, the Soviets can destroy a variety of military targets in Western Europe, as well as effect its complete urban industrial destruction, within fifteen or twenty minutes, from untargetable (because movable) sites in European Russia and Western Siberia. Though NATO forces have significant short-range tactical nuclear forces (perhaps somewhat more numerous than the corresponding Soviet forces), these are largely nuclear artillery and manned aircraft. They are of short-range, vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike, and themselves unable to reach Soviet borders or to penetrate successfully if they could. No land-based U.S. forces in Europe pose any substantial retaliatory threat to the territory of the Soviet Union. U.K. and French forces have a modest deterrent capability, and U.S. poseidon missiles committed to NATO also have that purpose. However, it is significant that Chancellor Schmidt found those forces insufficient as a balance to the SS-20 capability (much smaller then than now) in his speech to the IISS in the Fall of 1979.

. Suppose that there were a NATO conventional capability fully adequate to defeat any conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. Suppose also that the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe remains unbalanced by any NATO retaliatory capability capable of inflicting massive damage on the Soviet homeland. Would not that imbalance be quite effective in intimidating the Federal Republic of Germany and the smaller nations of Western Europe, and even the U.K. and France? To the extent that the Soviet Union could threaten those countries with a nuclear war confined to Western Europe because either the physical capability or the will to retaliate against the targets within the Soviet Union did not exist, that would be a major political edge under certain circumstances. In principle, U.S. retaliation against Soviet targets for such an attack should serve as a significant deterrent. But it has clearly been eroded in the perceptions of Europeans over the past fifteen years. They have become less confident that the U.S. would so react, or that the Soviet concerns about such a U.S. reaction would act as a deterrent. France and Britain may feel reasonably well protected themselves against such a threat by their national deterrents. Whether German and other NATO nations' doubts about U.S. retaliation on their behalf would be matched by a greater confidence that the U.K. or French forces being used in that role is subject to considerable question. Thus, the Soviet political strategy of a Europe denuclearized except for Soviet forces makes considerable sense from the Soviet point of view. When it becomes clear that this is what the Soviets mean by denuclearization, it appeals less to Europeans. Such has been the experience with the Nordic nuclear free zone when it became clear that what was meant was a Baltic Region free of all but Soviet nuclear weapons, as revealed by the Soviet submarine stranded in Swedish waters.

C. The Soviet Union also poses some political threats to Europe aside from the military ones. These include possible future economic dependence of Western Europe on the Soviet Union both for markets and for energy. The latter dependence is increasing on European initiative through direct supply of Soviet oil and gas. But there is also an even more dangerous possibility of Soviet future domination of Southwest Asia, from which Europe gets much more of its energy. And perhaps the greatest political threat both to the U.S. and Western Europe is the increasing political situation between them.

3. The contrasting concepts of "flexible repsonse" and of "no first use" need to be seen in the light of the paradoxes of European (and indeed of U.S.) thinking about nuclear conflict. The Europeans have come to consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella much less certain in an age of U.S.-Soviet parity. The statements - in my judgment unfounded - by many American public figures over recent

years to the effect that this situation is not one of parity but one of substantial and growing Soviet superiority inevitably has made this problem of European perceptions worse. The consequent fear that U.S. nuclear retaliatory and deterrent capability has become decoupled from perceptions, balances, and events in Europe has caused Europeans to wish a clearer U.S. commitment. That was behind the commitment of U.S. Poseidon missiles to NATO. But these are offshore and invisible. Those very characteristics make them desirable from the point of view of moderating European public anti-nuclear pressures against European political leaders. They also make such forces seem less certain and less committed on the part of the U.S. in the eyes of European leaders. Those leaders also wanted a clearer offset of the new fact of Soviet SS-20 capabilities, which far exceed those of the systems which they replace in the Soviet arsenal. In the light of that situation, eighteen months of discussion within the Alliance led to the December 1979 decision. This was to modernize intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe and at the same time pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets to limit and reduce such systems.

Three alternative strategies exist for Europe. One is sufficient conventional forces, adequate to deter a Soviet conventional attack or intimidation by the threat of such attack. A second is the strategy of flexible response. This implies that NATO would have the option of using tactical nuclear weapons to slow down or halt (through military or political effects) a Soviet conventional attack that NATO conventional forces had not been able to contain. The third is political accommodation to Soviet military supremacy in Europe. Flexible response has great risks, but so (from the Soviet point of view) should a Soviet invasion that would trigger it. Political accommodation to Soviet supremacy would have effects of a different, but immediate and enormously damaging, kind.

If and when NATO conventional forces become adequate in themselves to deter a Soviet conventional attack, and providing that a NATO nuclear capability becomes such that the Soviets cannot threaten Western Europe with a nuclear war confined to Western Europe but leaving the Soviet Union untouched, then a "no first use" doctrine becomes a feasible position. We can never know whether the Soviets would believe such a position. After all, one may doubt whether Europeans would believe that a Soviet "no first use" doctrine would be observed in a stalemated conventional war with *no* nuclear weapons stationed in Europe except Soviet ones. But with a mutual "no first use" agreement, the Soviets could be somewhat restrained from *peacetime* threats of nuclear initiation. In my view, a situation of NATO adequacy in conventional forces would still require NATO to have some Soviet-threatening intermediate forces in Europe that would be triggered by Soviet nuclear use. But with such adequacy, a "no first use" doctrine could serve to reinforce NATO determination to maintain its conventional forces. Some have suggested that adoption of the doctrine would itself serve to produce a European willingness to meet the costs of sufficient conventional capability. I see little sign of that; in the absence of conventional adequacy, such a doctrine could as well lead to political accommodation to Soviet power.

One more point may be in order about nuclear forces. Suppose that NATO follows through on parallel approaches; an adequate program for intermediate range nuclear force modernization; and arms limitation, aimed at a reasonable (it need not be exact) balance in INF between Soviet and NATO forces. It could then be both feasible and politically helpful with European publics for NATO to begin reducing its short-range theatre nuclear forces to whatever level is needed to deter Soviet use of such forces either militarily or through political intimidation. Again, the balance of such short-range forces need not be exactly equal to create an adequate balance, but NATO forces must be of like kind and capabilities.

4. The present threat to the survival and political independence of Western Europe is principally one of political disintegration, and of division between the U.S. and

Western Europe. It is on this political situation that Soviet military capability, political expansionism, and potential leverage adversely affecting the European economy and political will, could operate effectively. These divisions have been exacerbated by European concern that the U.S. Government, or important officials in it, take the horrors of nuclear war too lightly, and could involve Europe in such a war against its will. Such concerns are amplified by perceptions that the U.S. Government sees the world solely in terms of U.S.-Soviet competition, and that competition in too purely military terms. Americans, on the other hand, often see Europe as relying on U.S. military protection while seeking competitive economic advantage over the U.S. In extreme terms this perception is that Europe expects the U.S. to be more concerned about and more willing to sacrifice for Western European security than Western Europe is itself.

But, like it or not, we Americans and the Western Europeans need each other. Changes in Alliance form and in relationships among its members, and in its strategies and policies, are in order in combination with or in parallel with changes on the Warsaw Pact side. But both Western Europe and the U.S. would be in enormously greater peril if the Alliance were to dissolve.

5. What would constitute an appropriate program to meet these problems and risks?

A. We need to carry through the force improvements already agreed within the Alliance. Specifically, NATO needs enough conventional military capability to prevent a quick conventional Soviet victory, by stabilizing for at least some weeks a line much nearer the inner-German border than the Rhine. NATO cannot confidently expect to do this now. Although the Soviets are probably not sure of being able to drive to the Rhine, the North Sea, and the Channel in that time, their confidence of doing so probably exceed ours of being able to prevent it. That leaves NATO with an uncomfortable degree of reliance on the threat of nuclear escalation. To reduce this military risk as well as the potential for Soviet intimidation, NATO must: increase its levels of prepositioned equipment; improve the interoperability of the national systems of communications, command and control; improve the readiness of its forces; and expand its reinforcement capabilities. NATO would not have to make major changes in its present peacetime force levels.

The great bulk of NATO resources should go toward improving immediate combat capability. The next priority is to increase the sustainability of NATO forces. Diverting resources in any major way in order to improve the capability to fight a conventional war for two or three years is almost surely a mistake. The needed improvements are embodied in the NATO Long-Term Defense Program adopted in 1978 by Heads of Government. But the complexity of the issues and the intrinsic uncertainties in measuring military needs have produced a spectrum of assessments of the balance. The prospects for success in meeting the LTDP remain unclear. Many military leaders, opting for worst case scenarios, call for growth in military budgets beyond that available in political and economic terms. Finance Ministers in Europe sometimes pick the best-case scenario, to argue for low-growth in, or even reduced, defense spending. Heads of government sometimes combine the worst-case scenarios with economic constraints and public reluctance to conclude that the military competiiton should be abandoned. Only occasionally do they support major but achievable defense growth to reduce military risk as a part of an overall alliance security policy including political, diplomatic, and economic and defense components.

These complexities of conventional military defense and the political imperatives in Europe make such a symbolic goal as a three percent annual real defense growth a useful fallback. It produces a basis for real improvement (though whether that is achieved depends on subsequent detailed decisions). It spreads the responsibility for the divisions through the alliance, and creates external pressures to balance the domestic pressures for other uses of the resources (particularly for domestic social welfare programs).

B. Modernization of intermediate nuclear forces, along with INF arms control negotiations to achieve levels as low as possible on both sides (even zero). As a fallback to the present program of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles, one possibility is compromise on their numbers in conjunction with reduction of overall Soviet INF (not just SS-20) levels. A more problematic alternative is the substitution of cruise missiles launched from U.S. attack submarines (SSNs). That has the virtue of providing less of a target for protest by European anti-nuclear forces, and a reduced sense on the part of European publics that they are immediate targets. Correspondingly, however, the forces are unlikely to be in position for a rapid retaliation (because the major tasks of the SSNs lie elsewhere) and provide very little visible commitment.

The U.S. has indicated willingness to drop the plans for intermediate range land-based missiles in Western Europe (U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles) if the U.S.S.R. dismantles its SS-20s, as well as the older SS-4s and SS-5s. This would trade undeployed systems for deployed ones, but head to a sort of equality. That equality would not be complete; because U.S.S.R. forces are deployed in Eastern Europe, shorter-range U.S.S.R. systems can reach Western Europe while the same range NATO systems cannot reach the U.S.S.R. (though they can reach Eastern Europe). Some French and U.S. systems can reach the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets propose freezing the present INF situation - no NATO INF modernization and no additional SS-20s in European Russia. Added SS-20s, east of the Urals could reach most of, and could be moved into European Russia to reach all of, Western Europe.

Freezing a clear imbalance, even in a part of the nuclear spectrum is not attractive militarily. But the political situations to be created or ratified by any arms limitation agreement is even more important. Thus SALT treaties set forth (depending on the observer) a condition of strategic parity between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviet position on INF implies that Western Europe (or at least Western Europe aside from the U.S. and France - which the Soviets presumably have other political plans for handling) are to be in a category very different from the U.S.S.R. That category is one in which they can be hit by intermediate nuclear forces from Eastern Europe as well as by forces based in the U.S.S.R. But no forces based in those Western European countries would pose a nuclear threat to the U.S.S.R. itself, only to Eastern Europe. This equating of Western Europe (particularly the FRG) with Eastern Europe, and its separation from the U.S. as the locus of nuclear forces that deter a

Soviet nuclear attack by being able to reach the U.S.S.R. in retaliation, is an understandable goal of Soviet political and negotiating strategy. But it seems to me to be in U.S. and in Western European interest to stand fast against such an erosion of the political coupling of Western Europe from the U.S. NATO, after all, was designed to ensure just that coupling.

C. It is important to pursue the Mutual and Balanced Force (MBFR) negotiations. They are useful to Alliance security in themselves. Moreover, they will help improve European political perceptions of U.S. Government attitudes, by displaying commitment to political negotiation and cooperation in the East-West situation, not only to competition. "Associated measures" (AMs) have been discussed by the two sides in recent years as ways of reducing the advantages of a surprise conventional attack as well as helping verification of arms control measures. This is a particularly promising approach.

Most important, the Administration should resume as soon as possible strategic arms limitation and reduction talks with Soviets, and also initiate talks on measures to reduce any tactical or political advantages that might be seen by a potential attacker as accruing from a preemptive attack.

An appropriate approach would be to begin with the provisions of the SALT II treaty. The U.S. has foregone the dismantling of Soviet strategic launchers contained in the treaty by not ratifying it. But apparently neither side is taking actions that would undercut the other limitations of the treaty. Negotiations should proceed by adding provisions for further limitations and for substantial reductions, both sorts of provisions to be aimed at stability, predictability of forces, a visible balance that reinforces deterrence, and a start at lower levels of strategic armament.

Negotiations on measures to reduce the chances of accidental or preemptive strategic attack are a logical but substantial extension of some agreements (e.g. the "Hot Line") already reached. They could include matters of operational practices and communications arrangements between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., aside from the weapons systems deployments and developments covered in SALT. There are pitfalls in such negotiations; I can think of some myself. But properly approached, they could help our security.

I would also note that the INF negotiations must necessarily be carried out in the context of the strategic arms balance and the SALT process. This does not necessarily mean that the two should be combined (the degree of NATO coordination required, for example, differs in the two cases). But they do need careful coordination.

D. Closer coordination of economic and political strategies within the Alliance as well as military ones is easier to recommend than to implement. But it is no less vital for that difficulty. The Allies have many interests that they perceive as diverging, and some that probably really do diverge. Examples are trade and economic relations with the U.S.S.R., perceptions of Soviet military and political threats, attitudes toward the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and other third world areas; and economic competition and domestic economic policies. But our common interests and needs are so much greater! The political leaders in each country need to meet better than they have the test of a good ally - the willingness to take some domestic political damage to themselves where necessary to meet the long-term needs of the Alliance.

Conclusion

During the twenty-five years from the late 1940's to the early 1970's the United States, because it felt itself sufficiently powerful economically and militarily, and because Europe was so much a junior partner, was able to make decisions in the common interest. Western Europeans grumbled and went along, and Western European leaders were able to gain acceptance of such decisions, both in elite circles and among their publics, by announcing that the needs of the NATO Alliance required particular unpopular actions. Sometimes these actions imposed real costs on the Europeans, more often their principal economic and political costs were borne by the United States. But the system worked.

It cannot work that way any longer, given greater European economic weight relative to that of the United States, greater Soviet military capability relative to that of the United States than was the case during that 25 year period, and given the erosion in U.S. morale and self-confidence dating from the middle 1960's. The partnership must be more equal now, but it is no less important for both partners. And in the end leadership, though of a less dominant kind, must still come from the United States - which remains by far the largest, by far the most economically powerful, and by far the leading military member of the Alliance. Such leadership has been at best sporadic during the past twenty years. We do not have much time left if we are to avoid a further decline, one that may become irretrievable, in the security of Western Europe and in a consequent and vastly dangerous decline in U.S. security.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Now, let's begin with a few questions on the present intermediate nuclear force negotiations.

We had three witnesses here last week who said that the zero option proposal that the United States has put on the table in Geneva was no longer viable as a basis for negotiations, and that we have got to move beyond that proposal at some point.

One of those witnesses was Dr. Davis whom I think worked with you in the previous administration.

VIABILITY OF ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

Do you agree that the zero option is no longer a viable basis for negotiation in Geneva?

Mr. **Brown**. I would say that it is a fair opening position for the United States and it has been our opening position. It, of course, seeks a situation in which both sides end up at the same place in terms of intermediate-range missiles. The Soviets take a different view.

They say let's start from where we are and let's not make any changes in that. That clearly is an unacceptable position to us. Our position is likely to be unacceptable to them.

Our position, also, has some future dangers because if the Soviets were to accept it—which is not going to happen—we would then have abandoned the intermediate-range nuclear force modernization while one of the reasons for it has not changed. That reason is the one I alluded to in my summary remarks, namely, that if the Soviets can threaten to make Western Europe the site of a nuclear war without themselves being at risk, that would be an unbalanced situation.

So I would say that clearly neither the Soviet nor the U.S. position is likely to be a position that is agreed by the two sides, and we had better work on some alternatives. I mentioned one in my prepared remarks. A smaller number than the full U.S. program in return for Soviet reductions to an equal level.

Mr. **Hamilton**. From a technical sense in the negotiations, would it be better to move to that position in the near future or to do it closer to mid-1983 when the deployment is about to take place?

Mr. **Brown**. It is not just a matter of the tactics of the neogtiation, Mr. Chairman, it also is a matter of tactics in dealing with the political problems in Europe which are in a very real sense just as important as the way the negotiation comes out.

My own judgment is that the United States can probably stick with its position for sometime longer but how long depends on the relationship between intermediate nuclear force talks and strategic arms talks.

Mr. **Hamilton**. I do not know if you have read the statements that were made by the administration witnesses before this subcommittee, but they were awfully tough on the point of not changing their proposal, even to the point of suggestion that a change in that proposal might even amount to a surrender.

Mr. **Brown**. You know, that is also the Soviet position until the last minute compromise is reached and I am not saying it is an inappropriate one.

If I were speaking as a Government witness I might very well take the same position. There is, I think a difference in view of that how to negotiate. A number of the people who speak for the present administration have said down through the years that if only the United States will stick to its initial positions the Soviets will come around.

I think we may now have a chance to see whether that is a correct evaluation.

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II MISSILE

Mr. **Hamilton**. Do you believe, given the present climate in Europe, that deployment of the Pershing II missile is going to be possible in the absence of an INF agreement?

Mr. **Brown**. There is no way to say. I think it would. If one adopts the view, as some Europeans do, that only if an agreement is reached can any of these be deployed, then one is giving the Soviets a veto on the deployment and it is rather clear what their answer will be, all they have to do is keep the negotiations going and not have any agreement.

Thus, I think it may be a correct statement of fact that none will—I am not at all sure that it is—but it is surely not a correct statement of policy that none should be deployed without an agreement.

PROSPECTS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT

Mr. **Hamilton**. What is your general attitude? Are you optimistic that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are going to be able to conclude an INF agreement in time for or by the 1983 deployment date?

Mr. **Brown**. No, I am not very optimistic.

Mr. **Hamilton**. If it is not reached, what then?

Mr. **Brown**. Well ——

Mr. **Hamilton**. I should add, why are you not optimistic?

Mr. **Brown**. Maybe it is because I am a pessimist in general, but I do not see much sign of movement. I do not think that means very much because movement does come toward the end if it comes at all. If no agreement is reached then it is U.S. policy—and indeed it is NATO policy under the December 1979 NATO statement—that these will be deployed.

In fact, the NATO 1979 statement in no way conditions the deployment on the outcome of those talks. It does, however, in my judgment, require the talks to proceed and to be pursued in good faith with the goal of reaching a level as low as possible on the two sides, and even including zero, if that should prove to be possible.

If there is no agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in those negotiations, I would anticipate a grave political crisis in United States-European relations. There surely will be many in Europe who say that the United States is to blame and that the modernization should not proceed.

How that comes out will depend on a variety of factors. Perhaps the most important will be the way those negotiations have been seen as proceeding. Thus, whoever can make the case better to the Western Europeans as to how their security will be better served is likely to win the fight, and indeed win the battle for European public opinion and governmental adherents. Indeed that is why those negotiations and the political movements that are going on around them are correctly described as a battle for the minds and hearts of the Europeans, Western Europeans.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Findley.

Mr. **Findley**. Dr. Brown, I appreciate very much that you are here and that the chairman has called these hearings because the strategy of NATO is a vital importance and a proper subject for this subcommittee to examine.

One of the disappointments I had during the Carter years was that the architectural creativity—to use Dr. Brzezinski's term—to develop better institutions to tie the Atlantic community together never materialized.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO

With the advantage of 4 years in office during that administration, would you comment on the prospect for better institutional organization of the Atlantic community?

I raise the question because of the emphasis that seems to be placed under the Reagan administration, as well as under the Carter administration on negotiations between the United States and the Soviets, as contrasted to a focus on the negotiations within the Atlantic community itself.

Mr. **Brown**. The latter negotiations go on all the time, Mr. Findley. I think that people can differ about how effective they are, but Western heads of government see each other every year—actually more often than that, twice, three times a year.

The contact takes place.

The institutions are not all that effective, although NATO as an institution for dealing with the military questions, I think, operates reasonably effectively and, of course, those permanent representatives at NATO see each other every week, two or three times a week sometimes. Foreign ministers, defense ministers see each other two, three, four times a year.

What is missing is the same kind of connection in the less obvious parts of national security: economics, trade, ideology.

The summit meetings—although they are billed as economic meetings—provide or could provide an overall opportunity. They have not been so used.

They have not been much used for political, let alone for military consultations and agreements on policy.

So the structure is not very good but the real problems, I think, go beyond the structural. The real problem is that the United States and Europe actually do have some differing interests, particularly outside of Western Europe, but even in Europe itself.

And unfortunately, they see even more cases than really exist of those differences and that has driven us apart.

Mr. **Findley**. To get down to specifics——

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

SEALANE SECURITY

Mr. **Findley**. There has been, in my view at least, a longstanding need for a much closer coordination of sea powers in dealing with sealane security than has existed.

Looking back on your 4 years in office, would you wish that the administration had tried to set up, say, a NATO-like system to deal with the sealane security problem which still is a very vexing problem which no nation, even the United States, can manage by itself?

Mr. **Brown**. Insofar as the European nations, plus the North American ones, United States and Canada, are involved with Atlantic sealanes, NATO handles that quite well.

Mr. **Findley**. Yes, that is what I think.

Mr. **Brown**. Beyond that, I think it is an observable fact that the navies of allied countries communicate with each other on operational matters probably better than the governments themselves do.

So I would include Australia and New Zealand in that same category. Japan-United States cooperation for a long time was handled very gingerly by the Japanese in terms of operational planning by navies.

But beginning in about 1978 or so, and accelerating thereafter, that cooperation has gotten quite a bit closer.

Wnat is missing is really the question of how the United States and its European allies might cooperate, for example, in the Indian Ocean. That presents a problem because most or all of the Europeans take the attitude that this is not something covered by the NATO agreement. That has to be handled separately.

The U.S. Government has dealt on rather effective grounds with the British on this, and with the French as well.

But I would agree with you that there is no unified alliance planning, if by the alliance you mean the United States, the other NATO countries, Australia, New Zeadland, and Japan.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

Mr. **Findley**. The rapid deployment force concept was initiated under your administration.

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

Mr. **Findley**. And it is, so far as I can determine, a U.S. force?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

Mr. **Findley**. I believe Prime Minister Thatcher made some reference to an allied rapid deployment force, but that is the only such reference I have ever seen.

Can you visualize at least a few of the NATO nations taking on as a joint responsibility the establishment of an RDF?

Mr. **Brown**. France actually has substantial forces in the region already. They have about 6,000 ground forces and substantial naval forces.

They don't approach U.S. capabilities but they do approach Soviet naval force capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom has quite a bit less.

We have had joint exercises with the Australians and even with the Japanese in various parts of this ocean. The Japanese, of course, really in the Pacific.

But I see no sign that NATO as a whole will undertake such a responsibility. The French are willing to consult on a bilateral basis. In fact, it is made easier by the fact they are not in the NATO military structure.

The British have on occasion considered making a few battalions available for joint action in such cases. I would not expect other NATO nations to do much in the way of providing troops or naval forces.

I believe that they could be persuaded to provide transport capability which is an important constituent of any such force, but that had not been worked out, at least when I left the Defense Department.

That is as far as I would expect them to be able to go because of their own internal political constraints.

That would probably be enough if the NATO countries could also come closer to agreeing on a political position with respect to events in that region, but that has not happened.

INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF

Mr. **Findley**. There is a question because the high-risk areas of the world, as I see them at least, are not just in central Europe, but in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region.

Italy and Germany certainly have greater stakes than we do in having access to those regions and Japan, too. Yet, except for a very few tiny symbolic gestures, they look to us to take on the full burden, including the risk to our personnel.

And they seem disinterested in sharing that burden and risk in any measurable terms. I think that is most unfortunate.

We should have been working for years to overcome that.

Mr. **Brown**. I assume that that effort still goes on. I can assure you that it was pressed hard during my stewardship at the Defense Department.

On the other hand, reality does impose limits.

There is not, for example, going to be any Japanese naval force in the Indian Ocean participating in a conflict there. Indeed, if the Japanese were to make preparations to do that, the reactions of various other countries might not be all that positive.

The Germans similarly are not about to do that.

But I do think they can go further than they have in providing logistic support and in providing political support. It is the lack of all three that probably perturbs Americans, including Members of Congress.

Mr. **Findley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. **Bingham**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to see you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. **Brown**. Good to see you again, Mr. Bingham.

Mr. **Bingham**. First a couple of questions on your statement. I think maybe some sentences got a little garbled in transcription.

Mr. **Brown**. Wouldn't surprise me.

CLARIFICATIONS

Mr. **Bingham**. Bottom of page 19, the sentence that starts, "The political leaders in each country." As written, I cannot understand what you had in mind there.

Mr. **Brown**. The political leaders in each country—I think it will go better if I read it and put in verbal punctuation, the political leaders in each country need to meet, better than they have, the test of a good ally—the willingness to take some domestic political damage to themselves where necessary to meet the long-term needs of an alliance.

Spoken that way, I think it does make sense, Mr. Bingham.

Mr. **Bingham**. Yes, it does, OK.

Mr. **Brown**. It is not so easy for them to do, though. Put it that way.

Mr. **Bingham**. From page 14 over to 15 now, it seems to me that there is somewhat of an inconsistency there, particularly the sentence "diverting resources in any major way in order to improve the capability to fight a conventional war for 2 or 3 years is almost surely a mistake."

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

Mr. **Bingham**. In light of the first sentence which is, "The great bulk of NATO resources should go toward improving immediate combat capability," I don't understand the relationship.

Mr. **Brown**. Immediate means day one. The point I am trying to make by that is this, Mr. Bingham, NATO's capability to resist a conventional attack is not such as to give me any confidence that it could last for more than a few weeks. Some would say not nearly that long.

In my judgment, what is needed to increase the assurance of deterrence—which I think operates fully fairly well already in Europe, despite the limitations I mentioned—is to increase the capability that the NATO allies have to fight a conventional war and hold off the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces during the first few days and first few weeks of an attack.

That is where I would put any additional resources.

I wouldn't put them into trying to improve our capability to fight a war in Europe or a global war from year two to year three of that war, for example.

Mr. **Bingham**. I see.

INF TALKS/STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS

Now, I noted from your statement, that the INF talks must be carried on in the context of strategic arms control talks. That was certainly the consensus of our expert witnesses here the other day.

But you suggest that the two can be carried on separately, that the NATO involvement is different in one case than in the other.

Would you spell that out?

Mr. **Brown**. I don't say they have to be carried on separately, but it may be more suitable to do so. I have an open mind on that issue.

The strategic talks which involve forces of the Soviet Union and the United States and none of them based in Europe, clearly are matters for the United States and Soviet Union to decide.

The United States appropriately consults with its NATO partners, but it is a different kind of consultation than what is needed in deciding what agreement shall be made about forces that would be based on the territory of our NATO partners.

They clearly need to be involved in that kind of consultation to a much greater degree and bringing them together has some problems.

Mr. **Bingham**. OK, I buy that, but they are not there now. That is one of the things that is so odd about it. There is no NATO representation.

Mr. **Brown**. No, because they do involve U.S. weapons.

I think that our NATO partners at the beginning quite clearly did not want to be involved in the negotiations directly as they are, say, in the MBFR negotiations which concern their forces.

These are U.S. forces and it is, therefore, appropriate for the United States to be the sole representative.

The Warsaw Pact nations are not represented, even though some of these forces that we think should be included in the INF negotiations are on their territory.

The Soviets would, of course, not have the problem of negotiators getting separate instructions from separate governments if other Warsaw Pact negotiators were there that we would have if there were other European negotiators there.

BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES

Mr. **Bingham**. Does it make any sense for us to maintain, as we do, that the British and French nuclear forces are not to be counted in intermediate-range equation?

Mr. **Brown**. Clearly the Soviets count them in the forces that are targeted against them. In the strategic arms limitations—although they are not explicitly counted—at least one of the reasons given by the Nixon administration for numerically unequal limits on the United States and the Soviet Union, were that one of the reasons was that the British and French forces needed to be considered even though they were not totally covered explicitly.

The Soviets take a more extreme view, they think probably Chinese forces should also be included, which I think is inappropriate, and I don't really think it is up to us to consider all the contingencies that the Soviets might want to consider.

In the Soviet succession problem, for example, some Soviet forces might be arrayed against other Soviet forces. This is an extreme and improbable example, but I don't think we want either of those counted on our side.

In the end, my own judgment, Mr. Bingham, is that an agreement might have to somehow take those into account. But I don't see that it would be possible politically to include them in the U.S. totals.

I also would say it is very important that if they are taken into account that they are not taken into account twice, once in strategic and once in INF forces.

They do have to be thought about in terms of a overall balance.

ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION

Mr. **Bingham**. What about the future of arms control verification once you have deployed ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles?

Mr. **Brown**. Verification is more difficult whenever there are air-breathing vehicles in large numbers, whether these be manned or unmanned.

You have the identical problem now with tactical aircraft which have comparable, although not equal, ranges to the ground-launch cruise missile.

Indeed, the counts on the two sides differ perhaps in part because the Soviets are not counting their nuclear capability aircraft as nuclear-delivery vehicles. I think the problem exists, but it is not a new one.

Mr. **Bingham**. Isn't there great difference in the degree to which they can be concealed? For example, a sea-launched cruise missile, as I understand, could be carried in any fishing vessel.

Once we get them, the Soviets are sure to get them.

Mr. **Brown**. So, also, can sea-launched ballistic missiles. There is a problem, but it is not unique to the weapons system that you describe.

Mr. **Bingham**. In other words, there might be some possibility of verification of agreement which included sea-launched cruise missiles?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes, and without in open session trying to get into all the ways that you verify such things, you don't just look at the missile, you look at the support equipment, at the command equipment and so forth.

So, it is possible, it is not easy, but neither is it easy to verify manned aircraft.

Mr. **Bingham**. I surely hope you are right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Roth.

Mr. **Roth**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. **Brown**. Mr. Roth.

PRIORITIES FOR NATO SUMMIT

Mr. **Roth**. If you were in the administration preparing for the NATO summit in June, what on your agenda would be at the top of the list of topics to be considered?

Mr. **Brown**. I find it hard, even by massive feat of imagination, to picture myself in that situation.

But I will take the question as a legitimate one anyway.

I would say that the United States has to, in its discussion with its allies, put this issue of intermediate nuclear force modernization very high up on the list because however we got here—and there is a lot of history that could be described in saying how we got here—that is a very potentially, very divisive issue with the alliance and within many European countries.

It could topple the government in Germany, it could cause alienation from the alliance of a number of other countries. So that has to be a very hot item and have a very high position on the priority list.

On the other hand, I can't say that economic problems which are even more politically important to most of the members of the alliances, deserve a low place on the priority list. I would expect that the European members of the alliance will be as insistent on the issue of interest rates, and of their own economies, as the United States will legitimately be on the issue of Europeans living up to the agreed program for military modernization including intermediate-range nuclear forces.

MENDING FENCES IN NATO

Mr. **Roth**. You referred to "political disintegration" when you talked about the alliance. What do you think we can do to mend fences?

What is the President and the administration going to do, to try and get the alliance back to the point where NATO speaks with one voice?

Mr. **Brown**. All right. When the new administration came in, I think many Europeans looked for greater consistency and a greater strength and a greater assertiveness in U.S. policy.

And in some ways, and to some degree in its early months, they may have felt they were getting it.

But there came with that change in emphasis by the new administration an attitude toward nuclear war, an attitude toward the complexities of world politics, world rivalries, world instabilities that apparently, and not surprisingly, many Europeans, as well as some Americans, saw as simplistic and dangerous.

I think that President Reagan, in his November proposal for zero option, showed one way to ameliorate that situation. It was a proposal which, whatever its defects—and it undoubtedly has some—was legitimate, fair, and addressed at reducing the threat of nuclear armaments and nuclear war.

I think a good deal more of that approach, a good deal more attention to that part of national security, would be very helpful in improving relations between the United States and the European allies.

And it needs, in the future, to come, not as a last-minute attempt to save the alliance from going over the precipice—which is how that was seen by many people—but as part of a well-thought-out program for security that includes more than just military capabilities, more than just anti-Soviet programs. Both of those are important, but they don't make a security policy.

UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

Mr. **Roth**. It seems to me, that we and the Europeans are seeing things differently. For example, for us on this side of the Atlantic, we think détente is dead. The Europeans don't appear to share that opinion.

Mr. **Brown**. You know, we think of the world and they think of Europe. Clearly Soviet expansionism has been going on very vigorously through the 1970's in various parts of the world. Sometimes successfully, sometimes not, but always vigorously.

Europeans looked at Europe during the 1970's and they saw the Soviets having more troubles rather than making trouble for the Western Europeans.

In the 1980's, that may no longer be the case, but in any event, many Europeans think of détente as a continuation of trade, a lack of war, a lack of physical conflict, a willingness to have a somewhat easier Soviet policy with respect to the emigration of ethnic Germans to West Germany, for example, and so forth.

Indeed, those are parts of détente. But the United States, correctly in my view, takes the view that détente can't be limited to just certain areas of the world, that expansionism, particularly into parts of the world where Soviet domination would clearly give the Soviets economic control over Western Europe, spoils détente.

So there is that difference.

MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

Mr. ROTH. I just have one more question, Mr. Secretary. Here on Capitol Hill, we hear a lot once again about the resurrection of the Mansfield amendment. I would like your opinion as to what would happen if America withdraw its troops?

Mr. BROWN. I was against the Mansfield amendment in the late 1960's and 1970's, even though I was for Senator Mansfield and for Ambassador Mansfield, and I haven't changed my view about that approach.

U.S. forces are in various parts of the world to protect U.S. security. Only when we conclude that their presence there doesn't protect U.S. security should we withdraw them.

Now, I said in my prepared statement that it sometimes seems that some Europeans at least think that their security is more important to them than to us and if I ever believed that that were true and if America comes to believe that is true, then the situation would change.

But I don't believe that is now the case. I hope I never have to believe it.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Zablocki.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize for being late and for not being able to welcome you at the beginning of the meeting.

I feel like a Senator, and you must feel as if you are testifying as a witness before a Senate body when they come in and out over and over again.

NUCLEAR FREEZE LEGISLATION

But I do want to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and although the meeting this afternoon is primarily on the subject of NATO's nuclear strategy and the security of the alliance, I believe that my question would be relevant because there appears to be a perception brewing in Europe—I met two or three of the leaders from Western Europe who are just frightened about the resolutions that are being introduced, including my own, by the way, Congressman Bingham, on the nuclear freeze.

What would a resolution calling for a nuclear freeze do at a time when the Soviet Union has an advantage in the SS-20's and other missiles and, in throw weight and in some cases greater missile accuracy, what would this proposal do to the stability of NATO, and would it affect NATO's strategy, and indeed, the security of the alliance?

Mr. **Brown**. Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the concerns that motivate the sponsors of a freeze are fully understandable. I think that these concerns are even stronger in Europe than they are in the United States. Also, the way that the freeze proposal introduced in the Congress has been written, it rather carefully hedges some of the defects that were present in the earlier proposals. It talks about mutuality, equality, verifiability, reductions, and all the other good things. It does not propose a specific agreement. It says this is what the two sides should work for.

Thus, I think it is well intentioned and it is motivated by real concerns. However, I am afraid that if it were passed by the Congress, that effect would be good. I think, as has been said much more flatly by administration spokesmen, and also be observed by a number of people who aren't in the administration, that this might lead the Soviets to believe that they could count on U.S. and NATO programs not going forward. To that extent, this actually could undermine their motivation to negotiate.

I believe that the right way to approach the desirable goals enunciated in the freeze proposal is to go ahead with specific negotiations: strategic negotiations, intermediate range force negotiations; and, outside the nuclear area, MBFR negotiations. I would prefer that approach, myself.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for endorsing the version I introduced.

Mr. **Brown**. I won't endorse every word, but it does clearly seem to me to make the same point as I did but better.

NO FIRST USE

Chairman **Zablocki**. Once we have negotiations underway and some agreements made, then I think is the appropriate time for reducing, not just freezing on levels of weapons.

My other question, Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Soviets frequently propose an agreement for the United States and the USSR to renounce formally, first use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

So, what is your reaction to this sort of proposal?

Mr. **Brown**. I think that it is in many ways a very appealing proposal. However, so long as there is so great a disparity in conventional force—and I do not think there always has to be, but there is now a great disparity in conventional force—then a renunciation, if actually observed during a conventional war, would merely encourage a conventional war.

In other words, if you are trying to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe, or if you are trying to reduce the possibility of political intimidation by Soviet threats of an attack, then the existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility that they might be used if a Soviet attack were overwhelming and succeeding, needs to be kept as a way of deterring conventional attack.

If Western Europe and the United States are willing to put up the money and make the changes in doctrine and behavior, and personnel that will be needed to provide adequate deterrence by conventional forces alone of a conventional attack, then I would take quite a different view about a no first use approach. Then I think a no first use approach could make real sense. And I think that is a good way to go. But I do not think you get there by first saying no first use. Some people propose that, but I am afraid if you say no first use, that will discourage, rather first than encourage, acquiring adequate conventional forces.

Chairman **Zablocki**. So, what you are really saying, Mr. Secretary, is that this form of renunciation would not make more remote the possibility of an East-West nuclear exchange? Just saying so wouldn't?

Mr. **Brown**. Saying so doesn't do it. After all, not only nuclear war, but all war was renounced by the Kellogg-Briand Pact. And there is no evidence that it inhibited a war, and some that it had the opposite effect.

NEW NATO DEFENSE CONCEPT

Chairman **Zablocki**. Last Thursday Mr. Sloss stated to us that "There is a need to develop a NATO defense concept that Europeans can believe in. Such a concept must rely heavily on nonnuclear capabilities." He felt that this "must be achievable within a reasonable defense budget. Otherwise, we had better start reexamining all of the premises on which NATO is based."

Do you agree with Mr. Sloss? Does NATO need a new concept Europeans can believe in? Should it rely heavily on non-nuclear capabilities? And is this achievable, as he states, within reasonable defense budgets?

Mr. **Brown**. In general, I would endorse those views. It depends upon your definition of reasonable. Certainly if Europeans were willing to spend as large a fraction of their gross national product as the United States is, or even was a few years ago, that could provide adequate funds. You will still have to do something about a greater unity of command, greater operability of equipment and of planning. But all those things are in principle, feasible.

I said in my prepared statement that, in principle, it was even feasible for Europe to do that, alone. In practice, it is not, because of the reasons I gave there. But with U.S. participation, I think it is feasible even in practical terms.

Chairman **Zablocki**. If you agree with Mr. Sloss, what way should the reexamination of the premises on which NATO is based would you suggest?

Mr. **Brown**. The usual approach to this is the wiseman approach, getting a few elder statesmen to take a look at it. I think that may be useful, but I do not think it is enough. I think that at the next summit meeting, the next NATO summit meeting, the United States might well consider offering a situation in which nuclear arms reduction, and increasing conventional arms capability go together. The Europeans understandably are concerned about so much reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe and are concerned that that may actually lead to a nuclear war over whose beginning they think they would have little control. Those concerns deserve to be addressed. But the United States should take the position they can only be addressed in conjunction with a reappraisal and an agreement to do what is necessary to achieve an adequate conventional capability.

CONTACT WITH NEW ADMINISTRATION

Chairman **Zablocki**. My last question Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary.

Are you consulted by this administration on a regular or irregular basis, or at all?

Mr. **Brown**. I would say quite irregular, but occasional. They are like any other administration, Mr. Chairman. When they are in enough trouble, they would like to spread the responsibility around. And they were not the first to find that to be the case.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you very much.

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DEFENSE POLICIES

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your impression on the defense policy generally of this administration.

You know that we are confronted with requests for very rapid increases in defense spending. And one of the reasons for that apparently is the years of neglect that preceded this administration. I take it that is directed toward your stewardship of the Defense Department?

Mr. **Brown**. It is not directed solely at the executive branch, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Surely as Secretary of Defense you would bear some responsibility for those years of neglect?

Mr. **Brown**. Oh, I bear responsibility for my requests. I don't bear the entire responsibility for congressional disposition of them.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Well, if you——

Mr. **Brown**. But I will take my share.

Mr. **Hamilton**. The point I presume you are making is that if all of your requests had been granted, that there wouldn't be any years of neglect?

Mr. **Brown**. I don't accept the words "years of neglect." I think that the United States needed to be stronger then, it needs to be stronger now. But it needs, needed then and now to have a coherent program of military capability matched to a set of foreign policy commitments.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Do we have that match today?

Mr. **Brown**. No. But, again, that is not unique. There has always been a gap I would say since, certainly the middle fifties, and perhaps before then, there has been a gap between U.S. military capabilities and U.S. foreign policy commitments.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Let me go into——

Mr. **Brown**. Both have shrunk since then. What I fear is that there may now be an increasing gap, even though the military capability has increased, because the commitments may have become almost unlimited.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Let me go into that a little bit with you.

U.S. DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES

As I understand what this administration is saying, we have got to have this enormous increase in defense spending because we have got to catch up with the Soviets militarily, and we can't have any more of this one-and-a-half or two-and-a-half wars business. We have got to have a strategy in which a American military power is able to reach around the globe. And so, you hear terms like horizontal escalation, and you hear terms like a global conflict, and protracted war, and all of these things.

We have got to be able apparently to fight a protracted war anywhere, any time, wherever it might strike. And no matter where it strikes, be prepared to strike back where it would be this Nation's advantage to strike back.

When you define American defense strategy in those terms, there is absolutely no limit to the amount of money that has to be spent for defense. It is endless. How do you respond to that kind of definition of our defense responsibilities?

Mr. **Brown**. I think it is an excessive definition, Mr. Chairman. I won't say whether you have characterized the current administration's policies correctly or not. But what you have described certainly is an excessive set of commitments.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Have I described them incorrectly?

Mr. **Brown**. I think you will have to get them up here and ask them. I am not challenging your definition. I am just saying it is not for me to accept. My own view is that there are areas of the world which we have to be prepared to help defend because they are vital to our interests. Europe is one. Japan is another. Southwest Asia is a third. And those are quite difficult enough without taking on additional ones.

I would add that, as I said for Europe, so it is true of these other areas, that we can't defend these areas by ourselves. In different ways the inhabitants of those areas have to make their own contribution. First, they have to be willing to be defended. Second, they have to help in their own defense. And I think our own commitments have to be adjusted to the realities in those areas.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Mr. **Hamilton**. You talk about the various alternative strategies that are before us for Europe, sufficient conventional force, the strategy of flexible response. The third one I guess was political accommodation of Soviet supremacy. I would like to get your view about that second alternative, flexible response.

Does that mean a limited nuclear war to be fought in Europe without involving American stragetic nuclear weapons?

Mr. **Brown**. One can't be sure. I think——

Mr. **Hamilton**. I mean, is that even plausible?

Mr. **Brown** [coninuning]. I think it is unlikely, but it is conceivable. The Europeans worry about a massive use of nuclear weapons in Europe without the involvement of U.S. strategic forces. I do not think that is plausible. Whether a few could be used as a way of signaling political seriousness, and also as a way of having an immediate effect on Soviet reinforcement with conventional forces, that is a more difficult question. I would not rule it out; I think it is at least conceivable, and the threat of it may well be one of the things that deters Soviet attack.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think NATO puts too much emphasis today on nuclear weapons and not enough on conventional?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I gather that from your observations.

Mr. BROWN. I do.

LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

Mr. HAMILTON. What about the progress on the long-term defense program, that I guess was initiated while you were Secretary?

Mr. BROWN. It went well, I would say, for a couple of years. Then it ran into economic difficulties, because the European economic situation actually turned bad even before the United States did. I do not know exactly where it stands now, but I do not think it has proceeded very effectively. The 3-percent commitment has been reasonably well met by most of the countries most of the time. But that is about it.

LINKING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO POLISH SITUATION

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you feel about the general question of linking the participation in arms control negotiations, both INF and strategic weapons, with the general climate in relations and, with the situation in Poland?

Mr. BROWN. I think it is a mistake. Inevitably the acceptibility of arms control as a political fact of life in the United States at least, and perhaps even in the Soviet Union, depends upon the general political atmosphere between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

But, to link it, as a matter of United States link policy, to some specific action in a different area, to link, for example, resumption of strategic arms talks to an end of martial law in Poland—is a mistake, because it deprives the United States of a chance to improve its own security.

PROSPECTS FOR MBFR

Mr. HAMILTON. You emphasize the importance of pursuing the mutual and balanced force negotiations. Those things have been going on a long time. We have been hearing about them for a long time.

Mr. BROWN. There has been no agreement.

Mr. HAMILTON. I never see any sign of progress and I am getting kind of tired of hearing the phrase, frankly. I just even wonder if anything, any prospect of success is there.

Mr. BROWN. Before I became Secretary of Defense my view was, that people who thought that negotiations without agreements were worth something were naive. I changed my view, and the MBFR negotiations are one of the reasons I changed my view. Those negotiations, though they have not produced any agreement, have led I think to greater cohesion among the allies on what it is they are up against, and also I think have led indirectly to some unilateral reductions.

Now, you can argue that those were done for political purposes—both the Soviet withdrawal of 20,000 troops and some tanks, and the U.S. withdrawal of some 1,000 nuclear weapons. It did happen. They weren't negotiated there. But the discussions that went on there I think served in part as the impetus for those things.

Moreover, by now concentrating on the so-called associated measures, which are really both means of verification and also a way of reducing the value to an aggressor of a surprise attack, those talks may lead to similar unilateral actions which would also have a beneficial effect. I do not know what has happened there during the last 14 months. Maybe nothing whatever has happened. I am describing what I saw in the previous 6 or 7 years.

DELAY IN START

Mr. **Hamilton**. This administration has put off or delayed, perhaps for a good reason, I do not know, the start of the START talks. What is your general impression about that long delay. Is that justifiable do you think?

Mr. **Brown**. Well, I think it is unfortunate. I do not know how much it is a matter of policy on the part of the administration, and how much it is a matter of difficulty in coming to a set, a position, an agreed position or set of alternatives on START among which the President would choose. But whatever the reasons, I think it has, that delay has contributed to this political unraveling in the alliance, and the attempt by many people, both in Europe and in the United States, to find sweeping solutions, which attempt I think is often a mistake.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Findley.

FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE

Mr. **Findley**. Mr. Secretary, I came to Congress in 1961. For a while I was known as the franco phile of the House of Representatives trying to make the attitude of Charles DeGaulle understood among my colleagues. This was not an easy task. That was a period in which the flexible response concept was established, and also a period in which the French moved forward on their independent nuclear force.

What is your assessment of the French nuclear force? Is it a credible deterrent to Soviet adventurism?

Mr. **Brown**. I think it may be a credible deterrent to a direct Soviet attack on France. Although it could do substantial damage, to the U.S.S.R., if it were used in retaliation, the damage that the French strategic force could do to the Soviet Union is nothing like what would happen in a strategic war, between the United States and U.S.S.R.

Mr. **Findley**. Is is sufficient to require a Soviet nuclear response?

Mr. **Brown**. If the French attacked the Soviet Union?

Mr. **Findley**. Yes, if they used nuclear forces?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes, it would require a Soviet nuclear response. I think there would be nothing whatever left of France after such an exchange, but the threat does act as a deterrent to direct Soviet attack on France. It is much less clear that it acts as a deterrent to other Soviet action in Europe. If, as General DeGaulle felt, the Germans should not rely on U.S. nuclear capability being used in their behalf, they might very well ask the same question about the French.

BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCE

Mr. **Findley**. Would you characterize the British nuclear force in the same terms?

Mr. **Brown**. It is actually somewhat less diverse and therefore perhaps less effective. But I would characterize it roughly in the same terms. It is small. It can deter the Soviets from actions—such as an attack on the United Kingdom—which they may not consider very worthwhile taking in isolation anyway. I have real question as to whether it would deter other Soviet actions in Europe. This of course is quite separate from the issue of the political effect of these forces. They certainly serve the purpose for their own governments of putting them in a different category than nonnuclear powers. And that is important to them.

REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Mr. **Findley**. Several times over recent years I have pondered whether or not it might be wise for the United States after a close consultation with our NATO allies to simply announce and carry out some reduction in our nuclear presence in Western Europe. I saw a piece by Walter Pincus in the Sunday Post that you may have noticed. He didn't advocate that particular strategy. But nevertheless, he pointed out that all but about 1,000 of our tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe are either obsolete or of no military value or will soon be in that category.

What is your reaction to a unilateral step to take out of service nuclear weapons that have no military purpose?

Mr. **Brown**. I would make three points about that, Mr. Findley.

First, such a unilateral reduction did take place in 1979-80. A 1,000 nuclear weapons were removed because, in large measure, they were obsolete. Second, the United States and NATO don't have to match Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on a 1-for-1 basis in order for them to serve either as a deterrent, or as a useful military capability.

And third, you would need to retain enough nuclear capability to serve both those purposes. That is, to deter, and also to force the Soviets to organize and deploy their units so that they would not be devastated by nuclear weapons. The presence of some nuclear weapons in Europe on the NATO side forces Soviet tank dispersion, for example, which makes them rather less effective in a surprise attack. But that doesn't mean that we need as many nuclear weapons as we have there now for that purpose, nor does it mean that they have to be exactly of a kind that there are there now. It could be possible to reduce their number, replace them with longer range systems, more closely controlled.

I am not saying that should be done, but I am saying it is a line that is worth pursuing.

Mr. **Findley**. How about the question as to whether it is wise for us to take steps unilaterally, expecting the Soviets would respond with their own perception of military needs anyway?

Mr. **Brown**. We do that all the time. I would be cautious in proceeding that way, and do it in very small steps. But I wouldn't rule it out.

Mr. **Findley**. Why did we reduce our presence by 1,000?

Mr. **Brown**. Because that was the calculation as to how many could be spared that everybody was willing to agree to. There were some people who would have given larger numbers, I am sure.

Mr. **Findley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Bingham.

SOVIET NUCLEAR BALANCE

Mr. **Bingham**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Turning to the subject that Chairman Zablocki raised, how would you characterize the overall balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as far as nuclear weapons are concerned as of the time you left office?

Mr. **Brown**. I would say that in strategic weapons it was still a condition of parity, but the Soviets had been gaining realtively for some years. How important disparities are in strategic weapons is hard to say. They are probably more important in perceptions than in actual military effect. But perceptions do count. We were ahead in numbers of warheads, in bomber capability. We were ahead in, probably, the quality of submarine-launched missiles. They have a larger force by far in strategic offensive ICBM's. They were able, or would soon be, and now are, able to threaten our land based ICBM's with their ballistic ICBM's, whereas we coudn't do the opposite. They had more total launch systems, they had more total payload, they had more total megatonnage, they had superior (but not very effective) strategic air defense.

I do not know how you want to describe that. I call it a situation of parity but one in which the United States has been declining and clearly had some disadvantages.

On intermediate range nuclear forces the Soviets clearly were ahead. That is, the forces that run from, say, 1,000 kilometers range through about 5,000 kilometers range. They could threaten Western Europe with their ballistic missiles.

No U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe on land could threaten the Soviet Union. British and French forces could, and it is a lengthy question how you would count that. On short range nuclear forces, I would say the United States has been ahead for many years, the Soviets had come up substantially, but had probably not overtaken the United States in short range nuclear forces. That was the nuclear balance.

Mr. **Bingham**. Did you see the front page of the New York Times news of the week in review yesterday?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes.

Mr. **Bingham**. With the chart showing somewhat as you have described it, except it made the point that we still have a larger number of nuclear warheads deployed.

Mr. **Brown**. I think I made that point too. I think I said we had more strategic warheads than the Soviets. On the tactical side, they are probably about the same.

Mr. **Bingham**. I would like to make a point or two in response to the chairman's remarks. There is nothing whatever in freeze concept that is opposed to the idea of nuclear reductions. There is nothing whatever that is hard and fast about the idea, the wording of that resolution as you carefully have pointed out is such that it states a general proposition and indicates, I hope, that the United States and the U.S.S.R. could get together to discuss that general proposition.

To me, when you look at the overall situation it is a general proposition that is not unrealistic. And the difficulty with trying to adjust it is that you are always trying to adjust and take over the balance, and no time is ever going to be perfect from that point of view.

But, surely if we can really seriously get to the point of discussing reductions in nuclear forces, that is all to the good. And anyway that we can get seriously to the table is all to the good. I feel very strongly that it is unrealistic to pursue the INF talks without the start of negotiations and I also feel very discouraged about the attitude that has been displayed by this administration in its discussion of the chances of arriving at arms control negotiations. But I think we are all pursuing the same objective, and I regret any implication that there is a split here or a serious difference of opinion as to what we ought to do. And I do not think we ought to be criticizing one another. There are different resolutions of interest.

Mr. Downey came up with a proposal which you might have looked at and might care to comment on in the last few days. And there are other resolutions pending, all reflecting the enormous and growing concern on the part of the American people of the nuclear threat. The freeze idea came from a grassroots movement and a resolution we have introduced reflects that. It is not a technical resolution. It doesn't purport to be precise or exact and counting. I haven't framed any question except that I would be interested to know if you have a reaction to the Downey ideas.

Mr. **Brown**. That one I have not paid sufficient attention to to judge, Mr. Bingham.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Roth.

Mr. **Roth**. Mr. Secretary, you have had a long afternoon and have answered all our questions very frankly and candidly. I was not going to ask any more questions, but you are such an interesting witness that I want to ask one more.

My question is that a few years ago you were quoted as saying the following about Soviet strategic programs: "We build, they build. We don't build, they build." Do you still stand by that quote today?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes, although my statement really went to a longer period of time. Nothing that has happened over the past couple of years changes my view of that. If they have made a decision that they would respond with restraint on their own part, it would be a little while longer before it showed up. So, I don't rule it out. But I haven't changed my mind yet.

Mr. **Roth**. Thank you.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Zablocki.

Chairman **Zablocki**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 443

I shall just take 30 seconds on something intramural here. I want to assure my colleague from New York that my resolution is not criticism of his resolution or any other resolution, however the Chair believes that it is with a compromise proposal which doesn't satisfy the original sponsors of the freeze, nor the executive branch. That is why it gave me even further confidence to pursue a road that was not satisfactory to extremes, if I may characterize it in such a way. But I do want to point out, it is not the resolution which concerns me reaction of our allies to such a proposal. Do we really want a unified NATO? We must not give the perception that we are beginning to flag in our will to face up to the Soviets. However, that said, I will continue to support the disarmament effort and will do so for many, many years. I will not sidestep for anyone my desire to see a nuclear reduction. But it is the way we do it, the way we propose to do it, and how it is perceived by our allies, and, what is even more dangerous, by our adversaries. I want to correct, there is not any criticism on the part of the gentleman from Wisconsin in introducing his resolution and I am not criticising the gentleman from New York, and 150-some other cosponsors that he has. As a matter of fact they represent a ratio to mine of 151 to 1. But that doesn't mean that the one is wrong nor does it mean the 150 are infallable. We will have I hope a full discussion, a hearing on all the proposals and come up with something better than what we have on the table at the present time.

But, I must caution that we do not give the wrong signals to either our allies or our enemies when we talk about nuclear reduction or nuclear freeze. There is one Ambassador who said "I just froze when I heard about the nuclear freeze." That is a hell of an opinion.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Mr. Secretary, just one other question if I may.

ALTERNATIVE TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY

Is it time now to begin to think about another strategy other than flexible response for NATO? And if we do, is that going to be severely taxing to the alliance? Developing the strategy of flexible response was a painful experience for the alliance. That response was developed during a time of nuclear superiority. We don't have that any more. Does it still fit?

Mr. **Brown**. Flexible response certainly has, to a degree, lost some of its credibility, as I indicated in my opening statement. Until we have something to replace it, it would be a mistake to abandon it. I believe we should start working, as I said, on a strategy that relies more on conventional capability. That will put some strain on the alliance both politically and economically, but it is feasible.

NEED FOR CHANGES IN NATO

Mr. **Hamilton**. Any other questions? Mr. Findley?

Mr. **Findley**. Mr. Secretary, your response causes me to return to my original question which had to do with what Dr. Brezinski perceived as the need for institutional changes in the transatlantic community.

When Dwight Eisenhower left the White House one of his early interests after the White House years was to advance the idea of closer cooperation among the NATO nations.

Do you think the time has come for us to try to get off the ground some concept that will lift the hopes of the nations that do rely upon us very heavily to preserve their individual liberty?

Mr. **Brown**. Like you, Mr. Findley, I came to Washington first in 1961. And during the early 1960's, it was U.S. policy to encourage greater political unity among the European nations, even though recognizing that to the degree that succeeded, it would reduce U.S. influence in Europe.

Mr. **Findley**. But that was without U.S. participation.

Mr. **Brown**. Yes. I think we should continue to pursue the idea of greater European political unity. To the degree that that is made easier by some sort of closer U.S. political association, I would be for it, although there are terrible difficulties. But I am not convinced it would make it easier. I think the Europeans have enough trouble, and they haven't succeeded in fact in increasing their political unity. We should encourage them. Our own participation in it, or offered participation, should be whatever encourages them.

Mr. **Findley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Any other questions? If not, Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your excellent statement and responses. It is good to see you again. We wish you well.

Mr. **Brown**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Hamilton**. The subcommittees stand adjourned.

[Whereupon at 3:40 p.m. the subcommittees adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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